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ABSTRACT 
The dynamics of private life have changed along with the vast advancements 
in 21st Century communications technology.  Private conversations no longer 
simply take place in the citizens’ home or through using a landline telephone, 
but rather online through the Internet, social media and through the ever-
growing list of chat applications available on the smartphone that allows 
encryption.  However, what often follows the legitimate use of technological 
advancements is criminal, or in this case terrorist exploitation.  In the digital 
age it has become increasingly easy for terrorist groups to communicate their 
propaganda and for individual terrorists to communicate freely.  This has 
served to create an investigatory capabilities gap thereby increasing the 
pressures on UK policing and security agencies’, in fulfilling their task of 
protecting national security and protecting the citizens’ right to life.  
 
In response, the UK and the European Union (EU) have attempted to close the 
capabilities gap and thereby ensure collective security, by enacting new laws 
allowing the law enforcement agencies’ to monitor electronic 
communications.  The UK Government has recently enacted the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 (IPA) that introduces and preserves the ability to bulk 
collect, and retain electronic communications data, and to attain the operators’ 
assistance in decryption.  Although the IPA attempts to take a human rights 
approach, the main contentious elements in the Act are those in relation to the 
authorities’ capabilities to intercept electronic communications data on mass, 
and to retain such data.  Specifically, concerns currently surround the 
 viii 
introduction of ‘backdoors’ into encrypted online services, and bulk 
interception and equipment interference warrants, and bulk personal data sets, 
all of which serve to weaken the security and individual data protection and 
privacy rights of, potentially, the entire population.   
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been the most 
influential judicial body in terms of individual data protection, and thereby on 
the UK’s law making process, through its key judgements in Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources 
and others, and the conjoined case of Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael 
Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others (Digital Rights Ireland).1  The CJEU 
has done this by asserting the EU’s constitutional and legal prowess in 
protecting data protection, such as Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and byway of two directives, namely the Data Protection Directive in 
1995 and the e-Privacy Directive in 2002.2   
 
In order to close the capabilities gap ensuring national security, the UK 
Government must ensure the law endures by safeguarding the cohesiveness 
with the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  The courts do focus on different elements, built around the 
Conventional rights, with the CJEU focused on data protection and the ECtHR 
                                                
1 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
2 European Union Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.  Also: Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector.  See also S and Marper v UK [2008] 48 ECHR 1581, [66]-[67], the Court noted the 
concept of private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 
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on Article 8 right to privacy.  To solve the balance between individual privacy 
and collective security, a human rights focus is required with emphasis placed 
on the practical reality that one cannot assert privacy rights, if one’s right to 
life is not fully protected in the first place.  This focus must re-forge the UK’s 
counterterrorism legal structure.  Taken in conjunction with the UK’s already 
broadly worded counterterrorism legal framework, particularly the lack of a 
freedom fighter exclusion within the legal definition of terrorism, the 
consequence is to almost criminalise any expression of a view that the armed 
resistance to a brutal or repressive anti-democratic regime, could in certain 
circumstances be justifiable, even where such resistance is directed away from 
non-combatant casualties’. 
 
Although the current counterterrorism structure is broad, the UK and the EU 
must police the Internet and remove the safe places used by criminals and 
terrorists.  The IPA fashions a way within which to achieve this, but because it 
can be aimed at the whole population, subject to authorisation safeguards, and 
following historical case law dealing with blanket policies that effect the 
innocent, it is likely to receive continual CJEU and ECtHR judicial scrutiny.  
Post the UK’s exit from the EU however, the CJEU may become less 
important leaving the ECtHR to conduct the analysis.  At present, the UK 
must follow CJEU rulings when the matter concerns EU law, whereas ECtHR 
decisions are merely recommendatory.   
 
The thesis found that overall, the balance between collective security and 
individual data privacy rights in the UK are fairly stable because of the role 
 x 
and importance of judicial review; judicial independence, and the over-arching 
scrutiny provided by commissioners and parliamentary committees.  It is 
further argued that a blanket approach to retaining electronic communications 
data is necessary in finding the terrorist in the ever growing haystacks, 
because sometimes privacy rights and data protection must be curtailed to 
ensure the state can protect citizens’ rights to life. 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
…terrorism is a generic concept covering a wide range of phenomena, 
with important political, philosophical, psychological, historical, ethical 
and legal dimensions.3   
Whilst the majority of academic research approaches the subject of terrorism from 
a sociological perspective, this thesis approaches the subject from a legal black 
letter law doctrinal viewpoint, listed within Wilkinson’s analogy.4  The House of 
Lords decision in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
kindled this perspective in Lord Hoffmann’s judgement, illustrating the 
dichotomy between terrorism, the resulting restrictive laws and human rights: 
In my opinion, such a [counterterrorism] power in any form is not 
compatible with our constitution. The real threat to the life of the nation, 
in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and 
political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. 
That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for 
Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.5 [My 
emphasis] 
This statement inevitably prompted this postgraduate research.  However, the 
research focus shifted from the controversial area of law highlighted by 
Hoffmann, to another increasingly controversial area, dealing with bulk electronic 
communications data surveillance, and bulk equipment interference.  Rather than 
exploring counterterrorism measures that effect the few, these new measures are 
aimed at the population as a whole, and this is where the CJEU’s decision in 
                                                
3 Wilkinson, P. cited in R. Jackson and S. J. Sinclair (2012) Contemporary Debates on Terrorism (Routledge) p.11 
4 Ibid 
5 [2004] UKHL 56, [97]bulk  Although beyond the ambit of this thesis Hoffmann was referring to sections 21 and 
23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) that allowed for the indefinite detention of 
foreign nationals, without having been formally charged or having gone through due process. 
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Digital Rights Ireland became prevalent, given it repealed the EU’s 2006 
Directive and with parties concerned having successfully challenged the UK’s 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA).6   
 
The research began by looking into UK’s legal counterterrorism structure and 
examining other academic researchers’ contributions.  It quickly became clear 
that the terrorist threat faced is extraordinarily different from previous 
experiences, particularly following al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the United States 
on the 11th September 2001.7  The use of 21st Century communication technology 
by stateless terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda and more recently by the 
Islamic State, in influencing and recruiting others to their cause, illustrates the 
need for legislative measures.   
 
The thesis examines a number of issues, from the legal perspective related to 
surveillance of electronic communications data including analysis of UK’s 
counterterrorism legislation, and the impact of this on society.  In order for the 
thesis to attempt to analyse the issues, the UK Governments approach to 
legislating for counterterrorism must be explored.  Clearly, legislation must be 
aimed at combatting the 21st Century terrorist threat whilst ensuring human rights 
                                                
6 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
7 Ibid 
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protections.8  What first became clear is that the UK’s current counterterrorism 
structure has been built up, layer by layer over time, which significantly curtail 
human rights and civil liberties.9  This led to the striking fact many of these 
counterterrorism laws lacked full and complete pre-legislative scrutiny, which has 
then led on to simply create a sometimes-abrasive relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive when conducting post-legislative scrutiny.10  
Compounding a controversial area of law with controversial legislation is 
certainly damaging on a number of fronts, not only to human rights but to 
legitimate law making and the reputation of the Government, and the UK 
Government appear to have recognised this fact given the recent passing of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016. 
 
Focusing on the UK’s counterterrorism legal framework the research highlighted 
the fact that the laws in this area are comprehensive and interlinked with other 
regulatory laws not entirely terrorism focused, such as the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 (IPA) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).  It 
was around this time that the UK Government, introduced many broadly worded 
Acts, the reach of which have been merely moderated by unelected executive 
                                                
8 D. McKeever (2010) The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK: one great leap forward by Parliament, 
but are the courts able to slow the steady retreat that has followed? Public Law, 110-139, 111 
9 Ibid 
10 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was enacted 33 days after the first reading in Parliament.  See 
the Report on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 (2001-02 HC 351), & Reports on the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill (2001-02 HL 37, HC 372) and (2001-02 HL 51, HC 420).  Also the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 was enacted within 17 days of the first reading in Parliament.  See the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2004-05) (2005) HL 68 Paragraph 1, ‘The rapid progress of the Bill 
through Parliament has made it impossible for us to scrutinise the Bill comprehensively for human rights 
compatibility in time to inform debate in Parliament’. 
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departments, the Department of Public Prosecutions for example.  This is an 
important point because these broadly worded Acts fashioned a repeated 
movement between the UK Government and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
whereby the Government’s conjoined reactionary attitude to law making 
evidently served to protract many different and repeated discussions surrounding 
individual human rights and civil liberties, and State powers.11  The lack of pre-
legislative scrutiny here simply serves to create further contention between 
Parliament and the judiciary as they effectively conduct post-legislative scrutiny.  
Changes in UK legislation only seem to happen when the judiciary decide against 
the Government.  However, if the Government would implement 
recommendations made by others, such as their own various Parliamentary 
committees and appointed independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation, the 
situation could potentially be eased.   
 
There has been an unprecedented amount of counterterrorism legislation enacted 
by the UK Government since the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000, which 
re-defined an act of terrorism.  The rationale behind this is that these have been 
aimed at policing the changing nature and methods of terrorism, thereby 
attempting to reduce the terrorist threat posed.  Some of these legislative 
measures, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 that was replaced by 
TPIMs, and particularly sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that have not 
                                                
11 For example sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, enacted in a reactionary fashion to the 7th July 2005 
terrorist attack on London serves to show an example.  Another example is ATCSA that was presented to UK 
Parliament on the 12th November 2001 and enacted on the 14th December 2001, in response to the terrorist 
attack on the United States on 11th September 2001.   
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been as effective as the UK Government had hoped, have simply proved 
redundant in the face of the quickened speed of 21st Century technological 
growth.  Using Islamic State as a case study, the research illustrates that current 
legislation remains ineffective; particularly since that overall the group’s use of 
their digital communicational strategy has proved first class.  The problem 
therefore remains: How can the UK’s legal response to how terrorists 
communicate in the 21st Century balance individual privacy rights whilst ensuring 
collective security? 
 
The thesis, being a doctrinal black letter law study, starts by conducting research 
into the restricted activity, important because of the impact these counterterrorism 
laws have, conferring special restrictions upon individual citizen’s and providing 
special executive powers to the State.  The activity in this instance is terrorist 
action of course, which is distinguishable from other forms of violent criminal 
aggression.  This is because the deployment of this tactic, which ultimately results 
in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, with whom the perpetrators 
have no relationship other than the fact they are there at the time, is motivated by 
the desire to gain publicity for their cause.12  Used by groups and individuals, 
terrorist action has been described as triadic rather than dyadic in terms of the 
effectual relationship, reaching far beyond the immediate victims involving other 
                                                
12 R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243, [29], the very nature of terrorism is indiscriminate.  See also C. H. Simmons and J. 
R. Mitch (2001) Labelling Public Aggression: When Is It Terrorism? The Journal of Social Psychology, 125:2, 245-251, 
245.   
 6 
observers and the media.13  Forming an integral part to the success of a terrorist 
attack is the placement of fear in the population, by effecting a spectacular event 
causing death and serious injury.  Essentially aimed at undermining democracy, 
states are almost forced to take legislative action in seeking to prevent and pre-
empt further episodes.   
 
Whilst there is little international agreement on the accurate ascription of the 
terrorist label, the rule of law demands clarity and precision to enable the state to 
deal effectively with the problem.14  The importance of the rule of law continued 
to push through the research, to which the legislature, the executive and law 
enforcement staff must all work within.  Legal definitions must be precise and 
insofar as possible representative of the problems they are designed to address.15   
The difficulty found in trying to formulate a legal definition of terrorism, is the 
fact that the term ‘terrorism’ is subjective, pejorative and political, which is 
usually applied by one’s enemies, rendering it as ambiguous as other terms such as 
democracy, freedom, justice and equality.16  Internationally and domestically the 
terms use is entirely dependent on the legislators or definers’ viewpoint and is 
                                                
13 F. J. Hacker (1980) Terror and Terrorism: Modern growth industry and mass entertainment, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 4, 143-159.  Hacker argues most aggression is dyadic, involving the attacker and victim only, whereas 
acts of terrorism are described as triadic due to the dramatisation of the events, involving observers and the 
media.  See also C. H. Simmons and J. R. Mitch (2001) Labelling Public Aggression: When Is It Terrorism? The 
Journal of Social Psychology, 125:2, 245-251, 246.   
14 Ibid as per C. H. Simmons and J. R. Mitch (2001) at 245 
15 Analysis drawn from Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. (2007) Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The 
Definition of Terrorism, March 2007, CM7052, p.21 
16 B. Hoffman (2006) Inside Terrorism (2nd Edition, Columbia University Press) pp.1-44: The term ‘terrorism’ has 
changed from the revolutionary view in the 1970’s, to the pejorative present day view implying moral and social 
judgment.  This change in direction has been driven by political will.  See also R. Jackson, L. Jarvis, J. Gunning 
and M. B. Smyth (2011) Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan) p.101 
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often ascribed opportunistically, rather than representing, factually, a description 
of a tactic.17  Fashioning a ‘one size fits all’ legal definition of terrorism is 
extraordinarily difficult given that globally, there are a large number of groups 
labelled as terrorist, all with different grievances employing different tactics.18   
 
An issue that repeatedly comes to light is the low threshold and broadly worded 
nature of the definition of terrorism under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  
All the independent reviewers of anti-terrorism legislation have recommended the 
threshold be raised, such as from ‘influence’ to ‘intimidate’, which unnecessarily 
expands the applicability of the terrorist label, yet the UK Government have failed 
to implement the changes.  For Gale this is simply representative of the UK 
remaining in a permanent state of emergency, and as a result measures are 
increasingly encroaching upon UK citizens’ rights, protected under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and, at least for the time being the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 (CFR).19  However, the 
definition serves its purpose well in practical terms, where law enforcement 
                                                
17 Ibid 
18 A. Martyn (2002) The Right of Self-Defence under International Law-the Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September.  
Australian Law and Bills Digest Group, Parliament of Australia Web Site 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_A
rchive/CIB/cib0102/02CIB08 accessed 2 September 2015 
19 C. J. S. Gale (2006) The UK Response to Terrorism: Human Rights and a Wider Perspective, Working Paper Series, 
No 06/01. See also J. Welch, and S. Chakrabarti (2010) The War on Terror without the Human Rights Act – what 
difference has it made? European Human Rights Law Review, (6), 593-600, 594.  Measures include those such as 
sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 that criminalise the collection of terrorist documentation, and 
section 59 covering incitement.  The Terrorism Act 2006 was then enacted to attempt to fill the vacuum between 
phrases such as ‘incitement’ and ‘encouragement’, but all have been unsuccessful in preventing terrorist groups 
from spreading their propaganda through the Internet.  
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agencies’ use it to determine if the activity they are investigating is terrorist.  This 
has been particularly important when determining if the electronic 
communications data is terrorist or not.  Overall the thesis found that 
technological advancements constantly evolve and progress, and it is therefore 
essential the UK legislature change its approach, from reactionary to progressive 
seeking to stay one step ahead, ensuring that law enforcement do not continue to 
suffer from the capabilities gap.  In the attempt to remedy this, the UK has 
recently enacted the IPA that will introduce extremely wide state discretionary 
powers of electronic data surveillance. 
 
The thesis found that the use of the Internet is continually expanding, as is the 
growth and use of commercially available encrypted direct messaging 
applications, largely used legitimately and extensively by smart phone users.  
Given that the average age of the IS recruit is 24; the subsequent growth in the use 
of this technology by terrorists is not entirely unexpected.  Most 24 year olds have 
grown up with the Internet and smart technology, and are therefore proficient in 
its use.  Cyber-crime has vastly escalated along with the use of the darker side to 
the Internet, coincidentally named the ‘Darknet’.  The capabilities presented to a 
potential terrorist by the darknet are perhaps the most concerning and startling, 
allowing those who mean to do serious harm anonymity and access to weaponry, 
including firearms, ammunition and explosives. 
 
 9 
The IPA is an essential element in forming part of the UK Governments approach, 
in order they may determine which members of the public are friend or foe.  The 
proliferation of terrorist communication through the Internet and social media 
means that the Internet must be monitored, if they are to avert the dangerous and 
destructive nature of a terrorist attack.  This is a controversial area of law, where 
the IPA seeks to focus on surveillance powers, bringing many powers under one 
statute and repealing others, and is aimed at far more than the gathering of bulk 
data.  In addition to the bulk electronic data collection and retention powers, the 
IPA introduces the ability to decrypt messages sent through instant messaging 
applications, such as Whatsapp.20  The possible outcome of increased state 
presence online, which may result in a sudden growth of the availability of 
anonymity software and services, seems to have been pre-empted by the 
Government.  Section 253 of the IPA offers such pre-emption, allowing the 
Secretary of State to issue an operator a technical capability notice, requesting all 
assistance in the removal of electronic protection.  It may however prove difficult to 
police given the international nature of the Internet, and of course the locality of 
service and application providers. 
 
In order to reassure and gain public support for this legal initiative, a human rights 
and civil libertarian approach must be taken with an infusion of open and honest 
Governance, aimed at building trust.  Utilising the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the 
                                                
20 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 6 for Bulk Powers, and s 253(5)(c): The Secretary of State may impose an 
obligation on the service provider to remove electronic protection, i.e. Encryption. 
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thesis has developed a new criterion from the Digital Rights case, from which to 
test the IPA, which is that: 
1. Primary legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing 
the scope and application of the measure; 
2. Minimum safeguards must be imposed sufficiently reducing the risk 
of abuse or unlawful access to the data; 
3. Access to the data must be expressly provided for, limiting the 
number of persons authorised to have such access and restricted to the 
purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious criminal 
offences; 
4. Access to the data will only be granted after a prior assessment has 
been made by an independent administrative body or court, with the 
primary focus on human rights and proportionality of the measure; 
5. Retained data will be deleted after 12 months unless an independent 
administrative body or court decides otherwise, having weighed the 
evidence and conducted a proportionality test.21 
 
The passing of this test and the focus on the building of trust is crucial given that 
the IPA has passed through the UK Parliament, resulting in the public’s belief that 
they are being constantly subjected to bulk electronic communications data 
collection and retention, effectively removing the majority of available online 
privacy.  Human rights groups such as Liberty, who use over-exaggerating 
flamboyant language to gain support in challenging UK State powers, perpetuate 
this belief.22  Of course, in practical terms nothing could be further from the truth 
for two reasons.   
 
                                                
21 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
22 See https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk accessed 30 December 2016 
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Firstly, law enforcement agencies’ have finite resources and simply cannot 
physically conduct surveillance on the entire population.23  This has been made 
apparent where they have even struggled to keep careful watch of targeted 
individuals, such as the killers of Fusilier Lee Rigby.24  Although the IPA allows 
for the retention of electronic communications data to be stored for 12 months, 
and legislative pre-emptive measures that criminalise neutral behaviour are 
littered thought the UK’s counterterrorism framework, the thesis will argue that 
neither affect individual privacy rights in the way portrayed by Liberty.  The 
doctrinal methodology will highlight that mass data retention does not equate to 
mass data surveillance, and pre-emptive measures are not ‘pre-crime’ measures.  
They are in fact, criminal offences.  
 
Secondly, the Home Secretary must first sanction the use of bulk powers, which is 
then subject to independent judicial approval, and reviewable by the Independent 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner.25  This ‘double lock’ system provides a new 
proactively pervaded human rights agenda.  With this in mind, the thesis will 
argue that the balance in the UK between collective security and individual data 
privacy is reasonably steady because of the role and importance of judicial 
                                                
23 First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, Investigatory Powers Bill, Publications on the Internet, Column 
23, 24 March 2016 available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/160324/am/160324s01.ht
m accessed 30 August 2016 
24 The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, HC 795, 2014 at p.81 
25 See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473744/Factsheet-
Investigatory_Powers_Commission.pdf accessed 2 December 2016 
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review; judicial independence, and the over-arching scrutiny provided by 
commissioners and parliamentary committees. 
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THESIS OUTLINE 
The information presented in this thesis is correct as at the 30th December 2016.  
The thesis contains five chapters, plus the Introduction, Methodology and 
Conclusion.  As explained in the Introduction the hypothesis to be tested 
throughout the thesis is: How can the UK’s legal response to how terrorists 
communicate in the 21st Century balance individual privacy rights whilst 
ensuring collective security? 
 
Chapter One opens the thesis by outlining the UK’s current legal definition of 
terrorism.  It discusses several elements to the definition position, such as the 
undefined phrases used and resulting breadth of capture.  The impact on the rule 
of law is considered along with a focus on human rights infringements.  The 
Chapter focuses on the legal definition of terrorism because it is the definition 
used by law enforcement agencies’, and applied by the UK courts to activities 
related to surveillance of electronic communication data.  Chapter Two then 
moves on to consider how terrorist groups and individual terrorists communicate 
in the 21st Century.  It highlights the growth in technology and how, using the 
Islamic State as a case study, they have used this to fashion an extraordinary 
threat level whereby law enforcement have difficulty in recognising friend from 
foe.   
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Arguing the law enacted that is aimed towards protecting national security and the 
lives of UK citizens’ is not used effectively, Chapter Three is introduced showing 
the UK latest efforts to close the technological capabilities gap.  Taken in 
conjunction with the counterterrorism framework, this new law will provide the 
State with exceptional powers of online electronic communications data 
surveillance.  Illustrating the implications for human rights and the rule of law, 
Chapter Four is where the original contribution comes to fruition, where the 
chapter discusses the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisprudence in 
the area of individual data protection, developing a new criterion to test the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016.  This criterion is again used to test international 
intelligence exchange between the EU and the United States of America covered 
under Chapter Five, that then goes on to look at the potential relationship between 
the EU and the UK following the UK’s exit from the EU, estimated to take place 
in 2019.  Looking forward and highlighting some potential stumbling blocks to 
successful negotiation, the situation appears to not be as worse as first thought. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer the research question overall, it is essential that the 
methodology used is able to stand up to scrutiny.  The thesis takes a doctrinal, 
black letter law approach, which is perhaps the most traditional methodology for a 
legal study.  Significantly analytical and interdisciplinary, it provides a legalistic 
approach to concentrate on the letter of the law.  The primary aim of this method 
is to collate the legal rules surrounding a research question and critically analyse 
existing normative rules and the laws effectiveness.  Being a black letter law 
study, the thesis is an amalgamation of doctrinal and non-doctrinal research.   
Doctrinal research naturally marginalises political, ethical, moral and societal 
impact discussions, and may be described as narrow: 
‘All [non-doctrinal] legal research can be generally grouped within three 
categories: problem, policy and law reform based research...They can be 
considered together because of the often-occurring link between them.  In 
fact, all four categories of research, doctrinal, problem, policy and law 
reform, could be part of a large-scale research project.  A researcher, for 
example, could begin by determining the existing law in a particular area 
(doctrinal).  This may then be followed by a consideration of the problems 
currently affecting the law and the policy underpinning the existing law, 
highlighting, for example, the flaws in such policy.  This in turn may lead 
the researcher to propose changes to the law (law reform)’.26 
 
The thesis therefore reflects the great tradition of legal scholarship and uses 
mainly primary sources of data, such as legislation found in UK statute books and 
case law, which is reported.  This approach fits within the broader picture of 
                                                
26 I. Dobinson and F. Johns, (2007) Qualitative Legal Research, in M. McConville and W. Chong Hui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press) pp19-20. 
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social science theory and methodologies, and whilst a substantial amount of 
secondary data is relied upon, it remains empirical: 
‘[E]mpirical research, as natural and social scientists recognise, is far 
broader than these [normally] suggest[ed].  The word “empirical” denotes 
evidence about the world based on observation or experience.  That 
evidence can be numerical (quantitative) or non-numerical (qualitative); 
What makes research empirical is that it is based on observations of the 
world...These facts may be historical or contemporary, or based on 
legislation or case law, the results of interviews or surveys, or the 
outcomes of secondary archival research or primary data collection’.27 
 
The thesis will therefore make empirical observations and offer original critical 
analysis on the UK’s current counterterrorism and surveillance law structure, 
focusing on those dealing within the ambit of the research question.  Given the 
UK’s legislative interdependency on European Union law, specifically with 
regards to data protection, the thesis will further critique relevant EU Treaty law, 
regulations, directives and framework decisions, and the relevant articles from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 2000.    
 
Contribution to Research 
The significance of the approach taken in this thesis naturally allows for a certain 
degree of originality in so far as interpretation of primary and secondary sources.   
Chapter One provides a good example of the merits of this approach, where the 
legal definition of terrorism is heavily critiqued and compared to other 
jurisdictions.  In doing so, the Chapter develops a new legal definition, which 
provides a higher level of legislative certainty and in turn, some protection from 
                                                
27 L. Epstein and G. King (2002) The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L Rev. 1, 2-3 
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the current remarkably low thresholds set.  Chapter One proves essential to the 
research question, given that law enforcement and the courts in assessing whether 
or not the action is deemed to be terrorist use the current definition.   
 
Chapter Two considers how terrorist groups and individual terrorists’ 
communicate in the 21st Century, critically analysing the current digital problems 
fashioned.  The doctrinal approach then assists Chapter Three in examining the 
UK’s latest efforts, in attempting to close the capabilities gap faced by law 
enforcements, as discussed in Chapter Two.  Analysing the UK’s current legal 
surveillance framework, the Chapter offers original critique to the newly enacted 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).   
 
Highlighting the implications for human rights and the rule of law, the uniqueness 
and the advancement of the doctrinal methodology used enables Chapter Four to 
develop a human rights based criterion, called the Digital Rights Criterion, from 
which to test the IPA, and potentially future counterterrorism laws, ensuring 
compatibility with the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR.  Utilising the 
doctrinal approach, the Chapter challenges the terms ‘pre-crime’ and ‘mass 
surveillance’, illustrating the effectiveness of the method used.  It is concluded 
that particularly since the enactment of the IPA, the UK has managed to correctly 
balance collective security with individual data privacy.  
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The doctrinal methodology is then utilised in Chapter Five in order to illustrate 
international intelligence exchange. The current PNR agreement between the EU 
and the USA is used as a case study, to explore the potential relationship between 
the EU and UK, for when the UK becomes a third country in 2019.  The Digital 
Rights Criterion is then used to test potential future international intelligence 
exchange post the UK’s exit, ensuring this continues in line with current 
agreements, thereby maintaining law enforcements’ capabilities.  
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CHAPTER ONE. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S LEGAL 
DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is distinguishable from other forms of criminal activity and aggression, 
by the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and the lack of nexus between 
the victims and perpetrators, and by the motivational aspect to gain publicity.28  
The substantive risk posed by terrorism to national security and to the public in 
the 21st Century, are so serious in consequence and so complex to investigate as to 
justify specialist counterterrorism legislative powers, and increased powers of 
electronic communications data surveillance.29 
 
This chapter is important to the thesis title because it outlines the 21st Century 
understanding of the concept of terrorism, illustrating the need for specialist 
permanent counterterrorism legislation.  UK law enforcement and the courts use 
the legal definition of terrorism in order to ascertain if the crime being 
investigated is in fact, terrorist related.  It legally defines what actions amount to 
terrorism and introduces an extra-jurisdictional provision illustrating the 
international nature of the threat.  By considering certain prominent cases, this 
                                                
28 R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243, [29]. See also C. H. Simmons and J. R. Mitch (2001) Labelling Public Aggression: 
When Is It Terrorism? The Journal of Social Psychology, 125:2, 245-251, 245.   
29 D. Anderson (2014) The Terrorism Acts in 2013, London: The Stationary Office p.84 
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chapter reveals that the UK’s legal definition of terrorism presents numerous 
shortcoming, such as the relative lack of resolute definitions for certain phrases 
used, which has led to malleable judicial application. These undefined phrases 
have also resulted in rather low thresholds, thereby expanding the term ‘terrorism’ 
beyond international comparisons.  Discussion will then be introduced on what 
this clear and evident lack of legislative uncertainty means for the rule of law.30  
The alternative options to the phrases used will be analysed, revealing this would 
be a better choice for the UK’s definition, ultimately resulting in greater 
understanding and fairness, having been brought into line with international law. 
 
The aim of this chapter is not to offer a full and comprehensive exploration of the 
historical changes surrounding the term ‘terrorism’, rather to focus on the legal 
definition of terrorism and to present the research findings concerning the phrases 
used within the legislation.  These inconsistencies can be described as a 
legislative failure due to the higher currency fixed to the political value of 
terrorism.  In reality, it is not feasible to entirely remove this political value 
simply because UK Parliamentarians create law, and terrorism is after all a 
political crime.  This chapter therefore advocates for a permanent definition of 
terrorism that is as free as possible from ambiguous phrasing, focusing on the 
wrongful nature in line with international law. 
 
                                                
30 Legal terms must be clear and precise, analysis drawn from Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. (2007) Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The Definition of Terrorism, March 2007, CM7052, p.21 
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Terrorism: The Concept 
Before considering the law in this area, it is fundamental to briefly highlight the 
concept of terrorism and illustrate the need for specialist legislation.  Without a 
doubt terrorism is characteristically a unique from of criminality, whereby the 
high risk posed to national security and to the public, are so serious in 
consequence, often resulting in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, 
and are increasingly complex to investigate, as to justify specialist legislative 
powers.31  Put plainly, the nature of the 21st Century terrorist threat has 
augmented whereby terrorists’ capabilities have increased, particularly in the 
digital age, which has allowed them to remain unknown to the policing and 
security services until the moment of attack.32  Although debatable, the 
description of terrorism was provided by Wilkinson as:  
…coercive intimidation or more fully as the systematic use of murder, 
injury, and destruction or threat of same to create a climate of terror, to 
publicise a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to its 
aims.33 
It is clear that ‘without being noticed terrorism would not exist’, meaning the act 
of killing alone fails to create a terrorist act.34  The acts to which are assigned to 
the terrorist label are deliberate terrifying events, but without its horrified 
                                                
31 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.84 
32 J. Klausen (2009) British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against 
Domestic Terrorism Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, March, 403-420, 404.  See also Supra as 
per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) paragraph 1.7 
33 P. Wilkinson (2006) Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (2nd Edition, Routledge,) pp.20-21.  
Professor Paul Wilkinson is the former chairman of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence 
at St Andrews University 
34 Ibid 
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witnesses, it would be rendered as ‘pointless as a play without an audience’.35  For 
Wilkinson, the general public understanding of terrorism in the 21st Century 
includes bombing campaigns, shootings and hostage takings, hijackings and 
threats of carrying out these actions, aimed at the civilian population.36  
Conceptually and empirically, terrorism can be distinguished from other violent 
crimes by following characteristics such as: 
• Premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; 
• Directed at a wider target than the immediate victims; 
• Inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including 
civilians; 
• Considered by the society in which it occurs as ‘extra-normal’, that is, 
in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, 
protest and dissent; 
• Used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political 
behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups.37 
 
Because terrorism is directed towards a wider target than the immediate victims, 
the effectual relationship is different from the normal ideas on violent criminal 
behaviour.  Normally one would know one’s victim, and simply aim the violent 
criminal aggression towards that person.  Hacker recognises this and described the 
terrorist relationship as ‘triadic’, reaching far beyond the immediate victims 
involving other observers and the media, with normal criminal activity being 
‘dyadic’ in nature, meaning that the aggression is limited involving only the 
                                                
35 M. Juergensmeyer (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (University of 
California Press) p.139 
36 Supra as per P. Wilkinson (2006) p.1 
37 Ibid 
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attacker and the victim.38  The placement of fear in the population forms an 
integral part to the success of a terrorist attack.  Essentially aimed at undermining 
democracy, states are almost forced to take legislative action in seeking to prevent 
and pre-empt further episodes by providing policing and security agencies 
sufficient powers.   
 
This was recognised by the UK’s former Home Secretary Jack Straw in 1999 
where he defended to the UK Parliament why special powers and restrictions 
were desirable, stating:  
‘Terrorism differs from crime motivated solely by greed in that it is 
directed at undermining the foundations of government’.39 
This statement goes to the heart of the rationale behind the introduction of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and within this context, epitomises the key mischief of 
terrorism that is its danger to democracy.40  An effective political response, 
adopting specialist terrorist offences rather than relying on the normal criminal 
law is required, especially when having regard to the international nature of 
terrorism and the UK’s obligations under international law.41   
 
The UK Government’s independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation, David 
Anderson QC, supports this contradictory view that terrorist violence is not 
                                                
38 F. J. Hacker (1980) Terror and Terrorism: Modern growth industry and mass entertainment, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 4, 143-159. See also C. H. Simmons and J. R. Mitch (2001) Labelling Public Aggression: When Is It 
Terrorism? The Journal of Social Psychology, 125:2, 245-251, 246.   
39 Jack Straw MP, the then Home Secretary, The Terrorism Bill, Second Reading HC 14 December 1999, col 152 
40 C. Walker (2009) Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press) p.10 
41 Supra as per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2 and 2.3 
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necessarily worse than ordinary crime, and has therefore recommended a review 
of criminal law specifically in the area of national security, focused primarily on 
the necessary extent in supplementing ordinary rules and procedures.42  He seems 
to advocate this position due to the amount of counterterrorism legislation that is 
aimed at early intervention, enacted whilst being drawn to focus on the worst-case 
scenario.  This is an important point given that should law enforcement, through 
the use of electronic communications data surveillance determine a person has 
been disseminating terrorist publications through the Internet, the current 
counterterrorism structure criminalises this conduct, which would have otherwise 
fallen short of a prosecutable offence under the ordinary criminal law of inchoate 
offences.43  McKeever takes this argument further and confirms that action 
captured by counterterrorism laws is well below the standard required by ordinary 
UK criminal law, whereby ‘only that action which goes beyond mere preparation 
for the commission of the offence, is criminalised as attempt’.44  The threshold for 
attempt is extremely high where the suspect must only have the actual crime left 
to commit.45  Given the potential devastating nature of a successful terrorist 
attack, law enforcement and the courts must be able to intervene before this point.  
Simply waiting for example, until the suspect has his finger hovering over the 
trigger is not a viable option.  This is why it is argued that Anderson is potentially 
                                                
42 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.83 
43 Terrorism Act 2006, ss1, 2  
44 Supra as per D. McKeever (2010) 119 
45 Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s 4(3) 
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incorrect in advocating that counterterrorism laws must be closely associated with 
ordinary criminal law.46  
 
It is further pertinent to note, that the serious implications of being convicted and 
labelled a terrorist remain with that person for the rest of their lives.  This is 
because the term has become increasingly pejorative, particularly in the 21st 
Century, where the terrorist label almost dehumanises the person convicted.  This 
could potentially be due to the inhuman behaviour committed by terrorist groups, 
such as al-Qaeda and IS, depicted in the graphic and disturbing media released by 
the group, showing the beheading of non-combatant western citizens’ and 
combatant captives.  Justice Collins pointed out the pejorative nature of the label 
in R (CC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another, stating: 
…once a terrorist always a terrorist whether or not the person in question 
has renounced his past or circumstances have changed (for example 
where the acts of terrorism occurred in a country whose government, 
perhaps because dictatorial and oppressive, has since been overthrown). 
Indeed, the terrorist may have become a respected and respectable 
member or even leader of the new government of that country. 
Nevertheless, he is still a terrorist within the meaning of the [Terrorism 
Act] 2000.47 
   
                                                
46 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.83 
47 [2011] EWHC 3316, [5] 
 27 
THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 
The foundation stone to the UK’s current specialist legislative counterterrorism 
framework is the Terrorism Act 2000.  Simply, it legally defines what actions 
amount to an act of terrorism and is used by UK law enforcement and the courts 
to determine if the criminal action is terrorist related.48  Under section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000, in order for an action to be deemed as terrorist, three 
collective elements are required, the action or threat of action, the target and the 
causes.49  The use or threat of action must involve,50 serious violence against a 
person51 or serious damage to property,52 or endanger a person’s life53 or create a 
serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public,54 or be 
designed to seriously interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.55  
The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or an 
international organisation,56 or to intimidate the public or section of the public.57  
The second element is expressly made redundant by way of an exclusory 
provision however, when such action or threat of action involves the use of 
                                                
48 It has also been described as a lynch pin in R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243, [962], a corner stone at [963], and 
central to counterterrorism legislation at [967].   
49 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.75 
50 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(a) 
51 Ibid s1 (2)(a) 
52 Ibid s1 (2)(b) 
53 Ibid s1 (2)(c) 
54 Ibid s1 (2)(d) 
55 Ibid s1 (2)(e) 
56 International organisation was added to section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by an amendment brought in by the 
Terrorism Act 2006, s 34(a)  
57 Terrorism Act 2000, s1 (1)(b) 
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firearms or explosives.58  In satisfying the causes element, the use or threat must 
be made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial59 or ideological 
cause.60  
 
Comparatively, overall the international perspective is not very different in terms 
of the words used to define an act of terrorism.61  Although the international 
community have not entirely succeeded in defining terrorism, the United Nations 
(UN) Member States have adopted a series of conventions, which attempt to 
define and criminalise terrorist activities.62   In 1994 the UN General Assembly 
condemned terrorist acts as: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.63 
Similar to the international situation, the UK legal definition of terrorism is 
essential in condemning violations of human rights by other citizens’ and to 
ensure adequate protection of both the state and its citizens’.64  It is also argued 
that ‘without a definition of terrorism it is impossible to formulate or enforce 
                                                
58 Ibid s1 (3) 
59 The racial element was added to section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by an amendment brought in by the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, s 75(1)  
60 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(c) 
61 Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations High Comr for Refugees intervening) DD (Afghanistan) v 
Same (Same intervening) [2012] UKSC 54 [25G] 
62 Supra as per A. Martyn (2002) 
63 United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/60 (1994) ‘Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism’ A/Res/60/49 
64 B. Saul (2008) Defining “Terrorism” to Protect Human Rights, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
08-125, p.1. See also, R. Jackson (2008) An Argument for Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 2, 1-12, 1 
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international agreements against terrorism’.65  This is representative of the fact 
that terrorism is no longer simply a local problem, but an international issue 
requiring an international unified response.  An example of the need to define 
terrorism, in line with other nation states, concerns the extradition of terrorists.  
For Ganor, extradition for political purposes is often expressly forbidden as per 
the many bilateral and multilateral agreements however; this can be achieved for 
the committing of a crime.66  Whilst these are important aims, in practical terms 
the UK legal definition does nothing more than to clarify what actions and causes 
must be met for the UK executive to use in determining if an individual’s actions 
amount to terrorism, and thereby seek prosecution, and the judiciary to then 
interpret and determine if the case before them amounts to terrorism.   
 
The Terrorism Act 2000 was enacted specifically to provide some permanence to 
the counterterrorism structure and in order to combat the emerging international 
Islamist terror threat.  This was identified by the research carried out by Lord 
Lloyd of Berwick working with an inquiry team, where the threat was highlighted 
as directly affecting the UK, given that many Islamist supporters were permitted 
direct entry into the UK through the means of asylum in the late 1980’s and 
90’s.67   Governmental scrutiny of applications was lacking at this time, simply 
                                                
65 B. Ganor (2002) Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? Police Practice and 
Research: An International Journal, 3:4, 287-304, 300 
66 B. Ganor, (2014) Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter? In D. Lowe, A. Turk, and D. 
K. Das, Examining Political Violence: Studies of Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Internal War, (CRC Press) pp18-19 
67 G. Joffe (2008) The European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 46(1), 147-171, 155 
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because the UK’s primary focus was directed towards Irish related terrorism.68   
Internationally, it became a well-known fact that Islamist supporters were free to 
openly fundraise for international terrorist groups and causes, which inevitably 
led French Intelligence to describe London as ‘Londonistan’, the international 
jihadist/Islamist hub.69 
 
In addition to this emerging threat, the UK and the EU had fashioned multilateral 
agreements in a joint effort to combat it, recognising an international threat 
required an international response, and co-operation.70  Commonwealth countries 
and the EU have all provided similar definitions of terrorism within their own 
legislative frameworks, highlighting this fact.  Canada and Australia for example 
have the same causes, reflecting the international nature and response required to 
combat the terrorist threats.  Although the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 is easily 
understood by policing and security agencies and the executive, and therefore 
could be said to serve its purpose well, it has been criticised for being too broad 
with terms undefined.71  The words threat and influence, and the proliferation of 
potential causes represent the main contentious issues. 
 
                                                
68 R. S. Leiken (2005) Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism, April 2005, Center for 
Immigration Studies, available at http://cis.org/EuropeMujahideen-ImmigrationTerrorism accessed 11th January 
2016.  See also Legislation Against Terrorism, A consultation paper (1998) The Stationary Office Cm 4178 at 
paragraph 4 
69 Supra as per R. Pantucci (2010) 253, and see also Supra as per S. Hewitt (2011) p.33 
70 A. Kaczorowska (2013) European Union Law (3rd Edition, Routledge) pp.17-21 
71 Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. (2007) Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The Definition of Terrorism, 
March 2007, CM7052, p.22 
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The Causes 
Dealing with the causes first, the idea of introducing more potential causes was 
fashioned by Lord Lloyd in his 1996 report titled ‘Inquiry into Legislation 
Against Terrorism’, commissioned by the UK Government of the time.72  Lloyd’s 
mandate was to assess the potential types of terrorist threats moving forward into 
the future, and to assess whether permanent counterterrorism legislation would be 
required, following at the time the potential peace settlement in Northern Ireland.   
Lloyd’s research findings led him to conclude that as the Northern Ireland threat 
would decrease, a new emerging international Islamist threat would increase, 
rendering the then legal definition under section 20(1) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, inadequate.  This definition read: 
…“terrorism” means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use 
of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in 
fear.73   
 
For Lloyd this definition was aimed solely towards dealing with the Irish related 
threat, and would therefore prove to be unsatisfactory, should a terrorist type act 
be carried out for a single-issue religious or ideological cause, rather than a 
straightforward political cause.74  Ensuring that the legal definition of terrorism 
captures all terrorist activities, and taking inspiration from the US Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI) definition of terrorism, Lloyd recommended social and 
                                                
72 The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism, Volume One, The 
Stationary Office Cm3420, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.21 
73 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) 
Act 1996 
74 Supra as per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Chapter 5, paragraph 5.21, and Chapter 6, paragraph 6.13 
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ideological causes be introduced, in addition to a political cause.75  The UK 
Government of the time largely agreed, but declined his recommendation for the 
inclusion of a social cause, opting for a religious cause instead, due to the breadth 
of non-terrorist style crimes it could capture, such as blackmail or extortion.76  
Conversely, the UK Government’s response here is confusing for two reasons.  
Firstly it seems to imply a generalised terrorist crime exists despite there being no 
such general criminal offence of terrorism per se, and secondly why then include 
an ideological cause if a social cause was seen as too broad.  After all there 
appears to be very little difference between the two terms.  The impact of the 
proliferation of these causes is to broaden the definition of terrorism and 
ultimately serves to cast the net wider, encapsulating a broad range of behaviours.   
 
Specifying the use or threat of action must be for a political, religious, racial or an 
ideological cause is not a unique approach to the UK.  Countries within the 
Commonwealth have taken a similar approach.  Canada for example covers the 
same causes apart from racial.77  This is also seen in Australia where the Criminal 
Code 1995 was amended by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2002, meaning that the action must be taken for advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause, aimed at influencing or intimidating a government, Australian 
                                                
75 Ibid at Appendix E Part 1 
76 Supra as per Legislation Against Terrorism (1998) 3.16 and 3.17 
77 See the Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C.1985, c. C-46, s83.01(1)(a) and (b)(i)(A) and (B). Code can be viewed 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-12.html#h-26  
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or foreign, or intimidating the public or a section of the public.78  What is 
interesting is that the EU’s approach differs from the UK and other 
Commonwealth nations, insofar as it does not include potential causes in their 
legal definition of terrorism, whereby specific types of actions that must be 
fulfilled to be determined as terrorist: 
…attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death, attacks upon the 
physical integrity of a person, kidnapping or hostage taking, causing 
extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed 
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private 
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss, 
seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport, [the] 
manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as 
research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons, 
release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the 
effect of which is to endanger human life, interfering with or disrupting 
the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the 
effect of which is to endanger human life.79 
It cannot be denied however, that the causes are a ‘useful way of categorising 
non-state terrorist movements or group is by their political motivation: ethno-
nationalist groups, for example Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, or 
ideological motivation, for example the Red Brigades in Germany whose aim was 
of creating a neo-communist state and socio-economic system’.80  Wilkinson goes 
somewhat further than the law provides, submitting a more detailed academic 
typology of terrorism to encompass five types: 
• Nationalist;  
• Ideological;  
• Religiopolitical;  
                                                
78 Criminal Code 1995, s 100.1(b) and (c)(i) and (c)(ii)  
79 Ibid 
80 Supra as per P. Wilkinson (2006) p.4 
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• Single-issue;  
• State-sponsored and state-supported.81 
 
Definition of causes 
What does not help however, is the fact that the UK Government failed to offer an 
explicit definition of what these new causes actually mean, despite the fact that 
legal discourse and the rule of law demands clarity in order to ensure denotations 
are not used or interpreted interchangeably, thereby providing a safe and secure 
legal framework.  It could be argued the causes were not defined for the very 
reason that it allows for the interpretation to change over time, allowing law 
enforcement and the UK courts a degree of flexibility when applying the law.  
Either way questions regarding the differences between religious and political, 
racial and ideological can therefore be legitimately raised.82  As a direct result, the 
judiciary, applying normal rules of statutory interpretation have been afforded the 
task of providing a definition that for Walker has in turn occasioned malleable 
application.  Rightly so it would appear dissemination by the courts turns on the 
practicality and evidence put forward, where the terrorist group is in essence 
placed into a category dependent upon the predominate cause.83    
 
The Political Cause 
An example of predominantly political terrorist groups are the various denotations 
and factions of the Irish Republican Army, who carried out many terrorist attacks 
                                                
81 P. Wilkinson (2000) Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Frank Cass) pp. 19-21 
82 Nicholas Ryder (2007) A false sense of security? An analysis of legislative approaches towards the prevention of 
terrorist finance in the United States and the United Kingdom, Journal of Business Law, November, 821-850, 824 
83 Supra as per C. Walker (2009) p.10 
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on the British mainland during the Irish Troubles (1969-1997).   Their aim was, 
and still is, to have the British Government relinquish their control over the six 
northern counties to the Dial in Dublin, unifying Ireland’s 32 counties.  The threat 
posed by republican dissident groups remains set at ‘severe’ in Northern Ireland, 
and ‘substantial’ for the UK mainland.  The political cause element remained 
dominant, despite recorded religious intolerance and therefore proved adequate 
within the old definition of terrorism under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 
(PTA).84  The political meaning has not been expressly altered by Parliament 
under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and as a result it appears that neither 
have the judicial approach to the term.  It could be argued therefore, the judiciary 
could potentially widen the term rendering the additional causes redundant.  This 
would serve to bring the law into line with Ganor’s research findings, that 
terrorism is always political regardless of the underlying ideological or religious 
reasons.85  Walker labours this point, arguing further that the UK definition of 
terrorism is overbroad and should focus on the chief cause of terrorist action, 
being political.86  It is clear that the goal of terrorism is to effect political change, 
                                                
84 Irish related terror still remains a threat to the UK’s mainland, evidenced by the increase in threat level set by the 
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Security Service (MI5), from moderate to substantial in May 2016 
https://www.gov.uk/terrorism-national-emergency/terrorism-threat-levels accessed 31 May 2016.  See also 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36267052 accessed 31 May 2016.  See also ‘Continuity IRA claims responsibility 
for Dublin boxing weigh-in shooting at Regency Hotel’ 8 February 2016, 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/republic-of-ireland/continuity-/-claims-responsibility-for-dublin-
boxing-weighin-shooting-at-regency-hotel-34433366.html accessed 8 February 2016.  For IRA/32CSM see 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/republic-of-ireland/continuity-ira-claims-responsibility-for-dublin-
boxing-weighin-shooting-at-regency-hotel-34433366.html accessed 8 February 2016 
85 B. Ganor (2014) Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter? In D. Lowe, A. Turk and D. 
K. Das, Examining Political Violence: Studies of Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Internal War, (CRC Press) p.12 
86 Supra as per C. Walker (2009) p.10 
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which may be underscored by an ideological or religious view.87  Comay adds 
weight to this point proposing political terrorism is in fact always driven by social 
or ideological ambitions.88  Ganor has contended the same position where he 
refers to a statement by Duvall and Stohl, in Schmid’s book titled Political 
Terrorism: 
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most 
analysts fail to recognise this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives 
as logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they 
are empirical regularities associated with terrorism. More often they 
simply confuse analyses.89 
The concept of political cause is sufficiently broad, effectively removing the need 
for other causes.90  When reviewing this area of law, Lloyd recognised this fact 
and in light of it discussed the possibility of retaining the definition under the 
PTA.91 The UK Government in their response to Lloyd’s recommendations 
illustrated this point, which begs the question as to why other causes were added 
in the first place:  
The Government notes that Irish, domestic, and international terrorist 
groups are driven by the same desire to achieve political change by 
violent means.92 
                                                
87 Supra as per B. Ganor (2014) p.12 
88 M. Comay (1976) Political Terrorism, Mental Heath and Society, 3, 249-261.  See also: C. H. Simmons and J. R. Mitch 
(2001) Labeling Public Aggression: When Is It Terrorism? The Journal of Social Psychology, 125:2, 245-251, 246.   
89 A. P. Schmid (1984) Political Terrorism, SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, p.100.  See also Supra as 
per B. Ganor (2002) 294 
90 B. Saul (2010) Defining Terrorism in International Law, (Oxford University Press) p.45.  See also B. Xhelili (2012) 
Privacy & Terrorism Review: Where have we come in 10 years? Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, 
7(2), 121-135, 129 
91 Supra as per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Chapter 6, paragraph 6.13: Lord Lloyd stated, ‘the 
existing definition in PTA section 20 “the use of violence for political ends…” could be retained, subject to the 
addition of the word “serious” before “violence”, and an amplification of what is meant by “political ends”’. 
92 Supra as per Legislation Against Terrorism, A consultation paper (1998) at 3.6 
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The current reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation David Anderson suggested that 
the causes elements be ‘trimmed’, in order to render the definition more clear and 
precise.93  Trimming the causes is not the same as removing the causes all 
together, a point illustrated here as it could render the definition of terrorism even 
more overbroad, applicable to almost any given criminal offence, unless of course 
the potential terrorist offences are specifically outlined.94  It could be argued 
therefore, the additions of the religious and ideological cause along with the racial 
cause are unnecessary and problematic, since terrorism is always political.95   
 
However, in contrast to this view, the UK is currently faced with a terror threat 
inspired by, and based upon a religious interpretation.  Groups such as al-Qaeda 
and IS want to change the western world by implementing their religious 
interpretation and strict Sharia law.  This does not sound entirely political and 
therefore the religious cause element is necessary to capture terrorist action taken 
under this cause. 
 
Political or Religious Cause: The difference 
The UK has a long and distinguished history in dealing with politically inspired 
terrorism.  Religiously inspired terrorism is quite a different story, with the UK 
                                                
93 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.81 
94 R v Khawaja [2006] 214 C.C.C. (3rd) 399.  Canadian Criminal Code section 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A): the motive clause 
defines terrorist activity as ‘an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a 
political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause’. See also Supra as per C. Walker (2009) p.10.  See also 
Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.81 
95 Supra as per B. Ganor (2014) p.12.  See also discussion on religious tolerance and the rule of law in: Lord Bingham 
(2007) The Rule of Law, Cambridge Law Journal, 66(1), 67-85, 82 
 38 
courts approach turning on evidential matters in determining the right cause.96  It 
must be remembered that the judiciary can apply no real substantive tests because 
no definition of the causes exists within the Terrorism Act 2000.  This was seen in 
R (CC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another where Justice 
Collins refers to the causes listed under the Terrorism Act 2000.97  The same can 
be said of all terrorism cases, where the judiciary illustrate this reliance.98  In R v 
G and R v J the House of Lords heard evidence that J had in his possession a 
digital file containing a document entitled ‘How Can I Train Myself for Jihad’, 
‘39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad’, and another called the ‘Al Qaeda 
Training Manual’.99  Similarly in R v Zafar, although much more complex, the 
fact remained the defendants ‘were charged under section 57(1) of the 2000 Act, 
with possessing computer disks and hard drives containing extreme political and 
religious material’, which the prosecution alleged ‘were part of a settled plan to 
commit a terrorist act or acts in Pakistan’.100  Academically, Schmid traces the 
courts difficulty in assessing whether the terrorist action was inspired by political 
or religious causes.  He argues that, ‘…since terrorists generally challenge the 
monopoly of violence of the state and its ability to protect its citizens’, terrorist 
acts obtain political significance even when the motivation for them is not 
                                                
96 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [199] 
97 [2011] EWHC 3316, [3] 
98 See Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom [2010] 50 E.H.R.R. 45, [28], and R (on the application of Lord Carlile of Berriew 
QC and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, [17], [118] 
99 [2009] UKHL 13, [26]-[27] 
100 [2008] 2 WLR 1013 
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primarily political but religious.’101  Although the UK’s Crown Prosecution 
Service charged G and J, and Zafar as having political and religious motivations, 
research shows that religious terrorism is inherently different from political.102  
Pantazis and Pemberton take the point further, mooting that terrorism inspired by 
a religious cause represents new terrorism and therefore new challenges, stating:  
The new terrorism can be differentiated in terms of different actors, 
motivations, aims, tactics and actions from the old twentieth-century 
concept of terrorism.  For instance, the new terrorists are inspired by 
religious extremism and ethnic-separatism (rather than political or 
ideological causes) and are not predisposed to political negotiation...103 
[My emphasis] 
 
The difference between religious and political causes is compounded when 
looking at this issue from a wider context.  Research illustrates that in an 
exclusively religious context, a key feature of religious practices is the ritual of 
making sacrifices.104  The impact of this line of thinking means that the terrorist 
attack and victimisation is often perceived by the terrorist as a legitimate sacrifice, 
in a positive sense, consisting of both attacking innocent citizens’ viewed as the 
enemy, and the physical act of killing oneself and becoming a martyr.105  Human 
rights violations are rationalised by, and invoked by, a divine law that supersedes 
                                                
101 A. P. Schmid (2004) Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:2, 197-221, 200 
102 A. Richards (2014) Conceptualizing Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:3, 213-236, 225 
103 C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton (2009) From the "old" to the "new" suspect community: examining the impacts of 
recent UK counter-terrorist legislation, British Journal of Criminology, 49(5), 646-666, 650 
104 D. Young (1999) Origins of the Sacred: The Ecstasies of Love and War (New York: St. Martin’s Press) p.208 
105 M. Juergensmeyer (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (University of 
California Press) p.167: ‘The idea of martyrdom is an interesting one. It has a long history within various religious 
traditions, including early Christianity. Christ himself was a martyr, as was the founder of the Shiı´ Muslim 
tradition, Husain. The word martyr comes from a Greek term for ‘witness’, such as a witness to one’s faith. In 
most cases, martyrdom is regarded not only as a testimony to the degree of one’s commitment, but also as a 
performance of a religious act, specifically an act of self-sacrifice’. 
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man-made laws.106  The French philosopher Blasé Pascal noted in the 16th 
century:  
Men never do evil so openly and contentedly as when they do it from 
religious conviction.107 
 
The UK courts require substantive evidence in order to make their assessments.  
This is where information regarding the particular group(s) that the defendant is 
accused of having links with, or having been inspired by, become rather 
important.  The IS terrorist group highlights the ambiguity inherent with the 
undefined terms, in assessing whether the group is political or religious.108  Whilst 
predominantly religious and following their own extreme interpretation of Islam 
the group has evidenced some political aspirations having proclaimed a caliphate 
in June 2013 crossing the borders of Syria and Iraq.109  IS appears to satisfy the 
additional factors needed to exist in order to fuse religion with political violence 
as laid out by Schmid.110  Factually, the forming of a caliphate sets them apart 
from other terrorist groups who have a predominantly religious cause, such as al-
                                                
106 A. H. Cook and M. O. Lounsbery (2011) Assessing the Risk Posed by Terrorist Groups: Identifying Motivating 
Factors and Threats, Terrorism and Political Violence, 23:5, 711-729, 724.  See also Hazel Blears in the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill, House of Commons 3rd sitting, 16 December 2014, Column 1312-1313 
107 R. S. Robins and J. M. Post (1997) Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (New Haven, Yale University Press) 
p.144 
108 The so called ‘Islamic State’ is a Salafi Islamist group following an Islamist Wahhabi and Takfiri doctrine 
developed historically from Sunni Islam.  See G. Kepel (2002) Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (Harvard University 
Press) pp.219-222.  See also S. G. Jones (2014) A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al-Qaiada and Other Salafi 
Jihadists, RAND National Defense Research Institute available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf accessed 
8 February 2016.  See also M. Haider (2013) European Parliament identifies Wahabi and Salafi roots of global 
terrorism, available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1029713 accessed 8 February 2016 
109 See http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20378 accessed 8 February 2016 
110 Supra as per A. P. Schmid (2004) 212 
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Qaeda, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formally called al-Nusra and aligned with al-
Qaeda), and Al-Shabaab, who follow a similar extreme interpretation of Islam and 
enforcement of their religious beliefs through the implementation of Sharia 
Law.111   
 
Although the religious cause was added in response to the rise in the international 
Islamist threat, its inclusion could now be questionable in light of greater 
understanding of the Islamic religion, and the fact that religion for many is very 
personal and subjective.112  UK MP’s Yasmin Qureshi and Dr Lewis advocated 
this particular point during the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015.113  Placing this highly contextual term into a piece of legislation is perhaps 
quite hazardous, especially when considering the UK Government’s aim in 
prevention, and has been seen to damage community relations within the UK.114  
Since the 1990s it has been somewhat clear many Muslims perceive that they are 
treated as a suspect community and targeted by police due to their religion, and 
                                                
111 H. Mustapha (2014) The al-Nusra Front: From Formation to Dissension, Policy Analysis Series, Arab Centre for 
Research and Policy Studies, pp.3, 10, 14 and 20.  See also: S. J. Schulhofer, T. R. Tyler and A. Z. Huq (2011) 
American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 101, No. 2, 335-374, 369.  The al-Nusra groups have now changed theor name to 
al-Sham, for further information see http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/01/middleeast/al-nusra-rebranding-what-
you-need-to-know/ accessed 5 December 2016 
112 R. Douglas (2010) Must terrorists act for a cause? The motivational requirement in definitions of terrorism in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 36:2, 295-312, 303 (3.4). See 
also M. Elliott (2004) Parliamentary sovereignty and the new constitutional order: legislative freedom, political 
reality and convention, Legal Studies 22, 340-376, 322 
113 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, House of Commons Second Reading, 2 December 2014, Column 253 for 
Dr Lewis, and 2 December 2014: Column 262 for Yasmin Qureshi. 
114 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, House of Commons Second Reading, 2 December 2014, Column 263 as per 
Jeremy Corbyn MP.  See also T. Choudhury and H. Fenwick, (2011) The impact of counter-terrorism measures 
on Muslim communities, Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 72, Durham University, p.8 
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those few who commit terrorist actions, in the name of Islam.115  It was in fact the 
early Prevent strategies under the UK’s CONTEST policy that proved most 
divisive, raising these issues whereby the religious cause element was seen as 
commensurate with Islamophobia.116  The extremism here was considered, and 
was violent extremism linked to Islamist ideology.117  This made them feel 
discriminated against and demonised for the actions of a few terrorists, using the 
name of Islam incorrectly in their view, which in turn challenges integration and 
the creation of a British and European identity.118  It has been suggested that this 
negatively impacts upon the positive nature of strong Muslim identity, offering 
empowerment and allowing them to challenge cultural practices within their own 
religion.119  Although politically inspired rather than religiously, for Hillyard 
during the Irish Troubles many Irish Catholics and British born Catholics of Irish 
descent felt similarly discriminated against by UK counterterrorism legislation 
aimed at prevention.120 
                                                
115 Ibid 
116 D. Batty (2016) Prevent strategy 'sowing mistrust and fear in Muslim communities', The Guardian, 3 February 
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In contrast Pantazis and Pemberton dispute there is any empirical evidence to 
suggest that the police are currently targeting individuals based needlessly on 
their religious identity.121  Regardless however, the facts remain that IS and al-
Qaeda have a religious foundation and ideology, and have recently been the main 
terrorist threat, hence why the UK’s international terrorist threat level is ‘severe’, 
and as a result the figures show that from 2001 to 2010 there were 237 
convictions in the UK for terrorist related activity, with 87 per cent of these 
citizens’ being Muslim.122  
 
Religious or Ideological Cause 
The former UK Prime Minister David Cameron frequently stated that the IS group 
is not based on Islam, or Islamic, but on an extremist, Islamist ideology.123  These 
Islamist groups are based on an extreme view of Sunni Islam, known as Salafi and 
Wahhabism.  This political statement seems to fit with Neumann’s theory 
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surrounding radicalisation that two elements are always present.124  Firstly there 
must be a grievance, usually rooted in political discontent, and secondly, an 
ideology.125  Anderson provided evidence for this and relying on Neumann’s 
theory, confirmed that a quarter of all terrorists currently serving custodial 
sentences in the UK are Muslim converts.126  Perhaps then, they are not practicing 
religious beliefs at all, but rather an ideological belief founded from the religion, 
as suggested by Cameron’s assertion. This potentially highlights a greater 
political understanding of the 21st Century terrorist threat and perhaps a move 
away from utilising the religious cause element.  This emphasises the political 
value of the terrorist label.  Rather than having definitive legal definitions for such 
phrases, politicians can effectively remove all references to either of them, or alter 
the meaning of the phrases to suit their particular needs at any given time, thereby 
applying them malleably.  
 
Pantucci insinuates this by putting forward a rather negative argument that by 
adding a religious cause into the UK legal definition of terrorism, the Government 
can effectively decide who are good Muslims and who are bad, by their own 
engagement within the communities.127  However, it could be argued that rather 
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than the negative viewpoint put forward here by Pantucci, it is simply a matter of 
UK law enforcement and the Government, making their way through a new threat 
that they did not entirely understand.  In the early days of the Islamist threat UK 
policing and security agencies were learning about this new threat first hand, and 
serious questions required answering, such as who they were and what type of 
threat they pose.128  
 
The ideological cause in particular is perhaps better referred to as a ‘catch-all’ 
cause. The problem here is the broadness of the term ideological that could 
potentially capture anything such as animal rights groups’ activity, or anti-
abortion groups, not normally associated with the 21st Century general 
understanding of terrorism.129  During the drafting stages of the Terrorism Act 
2000 Parliamentarians raised concerns with the inclusion of the ideological cause, 
where the then Home Secretary Jack Straw was questioned as to whether or not 
industrial strike action would amount to an act of terrorism, as per the definition, 
which was topical at the time given the UK fire fighters were on national strike.130  
Such action could have been perceived as influencing the Government for an 
ideological cause, to alter its policy on pay and working conditions and 
subsequently found to be endangering people’s lives by withdrawing labour.131   
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131 Ibid 
 46 
 
Although the Home Secretary unequivocally confirmed that although industrial 
action would be omitted from capture, this fact is not reflected in the legislation, 
despite his assurances the ideological cause was aimed at action by eco-terrorism, 
anti-abortion groups and animal liberation groups as per above.  Without 
legislative certainty, it could be argued there is little in place to legitimately stop a 
successive government deeming such action as terrorist.  Interestingly, industrial 
action has been expressly omitted from the legal definition of terrorism in Canada 
and Australia.  In addition to omitting industrial action, the Canadian legal 
definition of terrorism does not include an act or omission committed during an 
armed conflict, as in accordance with customary international law, or the 
activities by military forces or a state in exercise of their duties, as discussed 
further below.132   
 
The Causes and Freedom of Expression 
There is perhaps little to deny the effectiveness of the causes element when 
looking into the terrorist offences introduced for example under sections 1 and 2 
of the Terrorism Act 2006.  Enacted in the aftermath of the 7th July London 
bombings in 2005, the provision were introduced to deal with religious extremist 
hate preachers and the sheer amount of extremist religious text available in print 
and online, that served to influence others to become terrorist.  To this end section 
1 criminalises the encouragement of terrorism and section 2 the distribution of 
                                                
132 Ibid 
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terrorist publications, which may inspire terrorist action.133  In practice, this 
broadly phrased Act can then be used by policing and security agencies when 
differentiating between freedom of expression and expression that crosses the line 
into potential terrorist activity, when carrying out electronic communications data 
surveillance under an IPA authority.   
 
Utilising this authority, if law enforcement, monitoring electronic 
communications data through the IPA authority, discovered for example a citizen 
planning to carry out attacks in the name of the Irish republican cause, then this 
may satisfy the political element.  Likewise, if a person were to advocate serious 
violence with the aim of preserving animal rights by attempting to force the UK to 
keep the Hunting Act 2004 in place, this may raise law enforcements alarm when 
picking up electronic communications data, that could be seen as potentially 
terrorist acts, satisfying the ideological element. 
 
This is further emphasised by the fact that the provisions in the Terrorism Act 
2006 rely on the definition of terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000, as raised 
prior to the enactment, in the Third Report of Session 2005–06 of the Joint 
Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons on Human Rights.134  
The breadth of the Terrorism Act 2006 mixed together with the broad definition 
of terrorism raised serious concerns for the Committee where they found ‘the 
                                                
133 These can be committed recklessly, which certainly has an impact on article 10 Freedom of expression under the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
134 HL Paper 75-I, HC 561-I 
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creation of the offence of encouragement of terrorism defined as broadly as in 
section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is to criminalise any expression of a view that 
armed resistance to a brutal or repressive anti-democratic regime might in certain 
circumstances be justifiable, even where such resistance consists of campaigns of 
sabotage against property, and specifically directed away from human 
casualties’.135  The former Home Secretary, John Reid MP, admitted this was the 
effect of the offence, but went on to defend the scope saying:  
…there is nowhere in the world today where violence can be justified as a 
means of bringing about political change.136 
Regardless however, the Committee remained concerned and called for urgent 
changes to the definition of terrorism, to be brought in line with the EU Council 
Framework Decision and the UN Security Council Resolution 1566, ‘to avoid a 
high risk of such provisions being found to be incompatible with Article 10 
ECHR freedom of expression and related Articles’.137  Other low threshold parts 
to the definition of terrorism were pointed out to this regard, such as the phrase 
‘influence’. 
 
Regardless of the scope, the 2006 Act has not been a huge success story for the 
UK, given there has only been a few convictions.  This could be due to the high 
threshold of evidence required, and could also be in part because these types of 
terrorist activities take place on the Internet.  Now that the IPA has been passed, 
                                                
135 Ibid at paragraph 12 
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137 Ibid, In attempting to satisfy the Committee’s concerns, the then Home Secretary announced Lord Carlile would 
undertake a review of the definition of terrorism. 
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the chances of law enforcement’s alarm being raised by such behaviour are set to 
arguably increase exponentially.  Testing whether or not the line into terrorist 
activity has been crossed, the IPA’s bulk interception, bulk acquisition and bulk 
equipment interference powers, discussed in Chapter Three, will undoubtedly 
play a huge role in the 21st Century, in the digital age.  This in turn could generate 
a surge in use of the Terrorism Act 2006. 
 
The Threshold of Influence 
The phrase influence is extraordinarily broad particularly when taken together 
with the ideological cause.  The phrase does not fit comparatively with other 
jurisdictions, especially when the fact that protests and industrial actions are not 
expressly safeguarded under UK legislation.138  Illustrative of the UK’s ability to 
‘gold-plate’ EU law and international law, utilising catchall phrasing of this 
nature has been criticised by Anderson, as setting the bar ‘remarkably low’.139  In 
Anderson’s analysis, he draws on comparable definitions from the EU, Council of 
Europe, the UN, Commonwealth countries and the United States of America 
where the standard is set higher, substituting the word influence for ‘compel,140 
unduly compel,141 influence by intimidation,142 coerce,143 intimidate,144 and 
                                                
138 See the Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C.1985, c. C-46, s83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) 
139 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.85 
140 Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C.1985, c. C-46 
141 Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism 2002/475/JHA 
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Terrorism Act of 2001, section 2331, Part 1 Chapter 113B (ii) of the United States Code 18.  However, when 
assessing domestic terrorism the threshold is lowered to ‘influence the policy of a government’, under Part 5B(ii). 
143 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s US Code of Federal Regulations, see http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition accessed 14th October 2014 
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force’.145  Lord Lloyd, in drawing inspiration from the USA Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) definition suggested, ‘to intimidate or coerce a government’ 
should become the set standard.146  In attempting to satisfy the concerns raised in 
the Third Report of Session 2005–06 of the Joint Committee of the House of 
Lords and House of Commons on Human Rights, the then Home Secretary John 
Reid MP announced Lord Carlile would undertake a review of the definition of 
terrorism.  Carlile inevitably agreed with Lloyd and pressed the point in his 2007 
report to the then Government: 
The existing law should be amended [to ensure] actions cease to fall 
within the definition of terrorism if intended only to influence… [My 
emphasis]147 
This made little difference in the end as John Reid defended the existing law in 
his reply to Carlile, explaining he did not see the use of the phrase influence as 
setting the bar too low.  It would appear at least, that despite the reservations over 
this low threshold, not only advanced by the independent reviewers but also the 
judiciary and academic community, the Government are unwilling to change it.148   
 
                                                                                                                                
144 Ibid 
145 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.86 
146 Supra as per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Appendix E, Part 1.  See also G. Joffe (2008) The 
European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb, Journal of Common Market Studies 46(1), 147-
171, 155.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s US Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as,‘...the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s US Code of Federal Regulations, see http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition accessed 14th October 2014 
147 Supra as per Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. (2007) p.47 
148 Supra as per D. Anderson (2014) p.88 
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According to Anderson’s findings, the rationale behind the unwillingness to raise 
the threshold to ‘intimidate’ for instance, is that the phrase itself removes the 
possibility of argumentation being raised surrounding whether or not the 
Government can actually be intimidated by terrorist actions or threat of actions.149  
An example of hostage taking was posed, whereby the release negotiated by the 
Government, or an international organisation, would come more readily within 
the ambit of influence, rather than intimidate.150  Anderson was not swayed by 
this argument and in agreement it is suggested, the phrase ‘unduly compel’ should 
serve as ‘influences’ replacement.  Considering that influencing the Government 
is the legitimate aim of all political activity, such as the recent strike action by 
junior doctors in 2016, it is unsafe for the UK Government to continue its use in 
counterterrorism legislation.151   Interestingly, as to whether or not the 
Government can actually be intimidated or influenced, or indeed the life of the 
nation threatened merely by an act of terrorism was raised in A and Others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department where Lord Hoffmann made it clear 
that citizens’ lives are incomparable with the life of the nation: 
…its institutions and values, endure through generations…England is the 
same nation as it was at the time of the first Elizabeth or the Glorious 
Revolution. The [Spanish] Armada threatened to destroy the life of the 
nation, not by loss of life in battle, but by subjecting English institutions 
to the rule of Spain and the Inquisition. The same was true of the threat 
posed to the [UK] by Nazi Germany in the Second World War. This 
country, more than any other in the world, has an unbroken history of 
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living for centuries under institutions and in accordance with values 
which show a recognisable continuity.152 
 
The EU’s approach certainly seems to raise the threshold.  Article 1 of the EU 
Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism provides that terrorism 
includes: 
1. seriously intimidating a population; or 
2. unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act; or 
3. seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organisation.153 
The actions that amount to terrorism are extremely similar to the UK and 
Commonwealth countries.154  The phrases used however, appear to raise the 
threshold in terms of what aims amount to terrorism.  As opposed to the UK’s 
‘intimidate the public’ and ‘influence a government’, the EU’s model stipulates 
that the action must ‘seriously intimidate a population’ and ‘unduly compel a 
government’.155  
 
Taking the additional specified actions as per above, this is a much more thorough 
definition.  Conversely, no counterterrorism legislation existed in the EU prior to 
al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the 11th September 2001 on the US.  In conjunction 
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with this attack, the fact that many EU Member States had no specific 
counterterrorism legislation led the EU to respond by introducing the framework 
decision as per above.156  The purpose was to ensure Member States responded to 
the transnational threat and to enable co-operation between them supported by EU 
policy programmes.157  The then EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council 
confirmed that the protection of the lives and property of its citizens’, within the 
area of citizenship, freedom, security and justice, is the core task providing 
legitimacy to extensive public powers and policies, where EU citizens’ expect EU 
action protecting their health and safety.158 
 
Canada use similar language in their approach to defining terrorism where section 
83.01(1) and (b) of the Canadian Criminal Code defines terrorism as: 
…as an act or an omission, inside or outside Canada that is committed for 
a political, religious or ideological objective or cause, and with the 
intention of intimidating the public or a segment of the public, or 
compelling a person, government or organisation to do or to refrain from 
doing any act, whether inside or outside of Canada.159 [My emphasis]  
This definition is perhaps a little easier on the eye providing a more everyday 
style of language, however, although the ‘compelling’ element raises the 
threshold, the addition of ‘person’ arguably does not.  The UK specifies that 
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‘serious’ violence is required, against mere ‘violence’ here, albeit that 
intentionally: 
…causes death or serious bodily harm to a person, endangers a person’s 
life, causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any 
segment of the public, causes substantial property damage, whether to 
public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the 
conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or, causes serious 
interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or 
system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, 
protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in 
conduct referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C).160 
The Canadian definition explicitly includes: 
conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission, or being 
an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act or 
omission.161 [My emphasis] 
The Australian definition is also similar in approach, where the Criminal Code 
1995 was amended by the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2002, meaning that the action must be taken for advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause, aimed at influencing or intimidating a government Australian 
or foreign, or intimidating the public or a section of the public.162  The Australian 
legislation, similar to the Canadian model also omits action taken by way of 
protest, dissent or industrial action.163  
 
Serving to lower the UK’s threshold further and effectively remove the necessity 
for an action to influence the Government or international organisation is section 
                                                
160 See the Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C.1985, c. C-46, s83.01(1)(a) and (b)(i)(A) and (B), (ii)(A) to (E) 
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1(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 that contains an exclusory provision for the use of 
firearms and explosives.164  The UK’s definition of terrorism thus changes to:  
…the use or threat of action, involving firearms or explosives, made for 
the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.   
At first, one might question the importance of this provision; given the 
obviousness that such destructive methods and action must be terrorism.  It is 
argued however, this serves to over-complicate the definition of terrorism, as it is 
irrelevant and unnecessary given that such action would most certainly serve to 
intimidate the public, or section of the public in any regard.165  Similar to the 
proliferation of causes, it simply adds further convolution to an already complex 
definition, unnecessarily stretching the applicability of the terrorist label.166  As an 
example should a citizen decide to threaten (i.e. the use or threat of action) a bank 
manager with a firearm (i.e. involving firearms or explosives), for the purposes of 
having the bank cancel all existing debt of all local citizens’ (i.e. made for the 
purpose of advancing and ideological cause), the terrorist label here could 
potentially be ascribed.  Thus one could argue the provision removes the triadic 
nature of terrorism, thereby supporting Hacker’s earlier assertion that the terrorist 
label could move to the dyadic.167   
 
                                                
164 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b) 
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Anderson would disagree that this provision unnecessary stretches the 
applicability of the label however, as he confirms that although the significance of 
this provision may be small, to effectively remove the target provision, would 
directly counter the intention of the Terrorism Act 2000.168  Regardless, he did go 
on to recommend the removal of this provision in his 2014 report, noting he was 
not swayed by the argument put forward by the then Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke: 
… [section 1(3)]…is to cover for instance, an assassination in which the 
terrorist’s motive might be less to put the public in fear, or to influence 
the Government, than to ‘take out’ the individual…169 
Anderson further explains that there is no reason as to why such action should be 
seen as terrorism, and not simply murder.  Critically, he appears to have 
overlooked the fact that this provision fits within, the rather historical rationale 
used by the international community in attempting to define an act of terrorism.   
 
EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL EFFECT OF UK LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL 
THREAT NEEDS AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
The similarity between the legal definitions of terrorism between nation states 
within the Commonwealth and the EU illustrate the international nature of the 21st 
Century terrorism threat and the fact that international security is as important as 
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national security.170  Put plainly, 21st Century terrorists know no borders, 
rendering such provisions essential within the guise of international 
cooperation.171   This legal similarity is pertinent when the policing and security 
services are monitoring electronic communications data between members of the 
same group communicating in different parts of the world, for example UK IS 
fighters in Iraq communicating with UK IS members encouraging or planning 
attacks in the UK. 
 
To this end and similar to other nation states, an extra-jurisdictional approach is 
introduced by way of section 1(4) of the Terrorism Act 2000, stating that an act of 
terrorism applies to one committed or planned in any state in the world, not just 
the UK.  The definition of government came under judicial scrutiny in R v F and 
R v Gul, where the UK Court of Appeal held that the phrase was not restricted to 
representative or democratic governments, applying to all countries, additionally 
and controversially, to those governed by tyrants and dictators.172  It may be the 
case that the apprehension of the UK being known internationally as a safe haven 
for terrorists and supporters, made its way from Parliamentarians to the 
judiciary.173  Focusing on Gul, his appeal against conviction for terrorist offences 
was based on a number of factors.  Overall Gul’s legal argument turned on his 
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assertion that section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was too broad given its 
inheritance:  
1. The Terrorism Act 2000 intended to give effect to the UK's 
international treaty obligations and the concept of terrorism in 
international law does not extend to military attacks by a non-state 
armed group against state, or inter-governmental organisation, armed 
forces in the context of a non-international armed conflict, and that 
this limitation should be implied into the definition in section 1;  
2. Rather closely connected, the second argument was based on the fact 
that it would be wrong to read the Terrorism Acts of 2000 or 2006 as 
criminalising in the UK an act abroad, unless that act would be 
regarded as criminal by international law norms;  
3. The third argument raised by the appellant was that some 
qualifications must be read into the very wide words of section 1 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000.174 
 
Unlike comparative nation states, the UK does not omit action taken during an 
international armed conflict.  The first argument therefore is largely correct.  The 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997 and 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 
1999 excludes attacks by insurgents on military forces during non-international 
armed conflicts.175  Additionally the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions (protection is afforded within Article 14 of the UN Charter) 
relate to international armed conflict, which has the effect of somewhat, 
indemnifying insurgents fighting against occupation in exercising self-
determination during international armed conflicts.176   
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It interesting to note that despite previous international attempts at creating a 
definition of terrorism, the UN General Assembly in 2012 could still not agree on 
the differences between terrorism and a ‘legitimate struggle of peoples fighting in 
the exercise of their right to self-determination’.177  For McKeever it is naturally 
difficult to reconcile, ‘both the general abhorrence for violence which is 
indiscriminate and/or actively targets civilians, with the acknowledgment that 
some forms of political oppression may be so unjust as to legitimate violent action 
by the oppressed’.178  In order to deal with the freedom fighter conundrum and to 
secure an effective move forward, the International Community has attempted to 
focus on the wrongful nature of terrorism, rather than on the intent.179  As a result 
subsequent conventions have all adopted an operational definition of a specific 
type of terrorist act, without referring to underlying motivational aspects, or 
causes, be it for political or ideological purposes.180  The primary focus is 
concentrated on non-state actors adopting a criminal law enforcement model to 
address the problem, with emphasis on increasing global co-operation.181    
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Returning to the UK, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of judicial intervention 
that would effectively serve to introduce legislative change allowing for some sort 
of freedom fighter exclusion.182  The Court decided that the nature of the broad 
definition was known to Parliament prior to enactment and have had the 
opportunity to revisit it, as a result of the various independent reviewers of anti-
terrorism legislation conclusions and recommendations.183  Another important 
point is that the UK’s legislative measures and the judicial response may have 
been different if the EU Council’s Framework Decision in 2002 contained similar 
freedom fighter type exclusions. Regardless, as accepted by the Supreme Court, 
the UK Parliament is supreme and able to legislate on any matters it chooses. 
 
In his analysis written prior to the UK Supreme Court’s findings, Coco supports 
Gul’s argumentation and raises some important issues, proposing the UK Court of 
Appeal should have interpreted the UK domestic legislation in light of current 
international frameworks.184  However, his analysis appears to fall on the pretence 
that the UK Parliament cannot gold-plate international law and that UK courts, 
although not requested to do so in this case, can question the validity of Acts of 
Parliament.  Theory surrounding UK Parliamentary Sovereignty suggests the UK 
Parliament is capable of gold-plating and constructing law on any matter it 
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chooses.185  It is important to note the capability of the UK Parliament, in creating 
unfettered extra-territorial provisions.186  This has been seen in other types of 
statues, such as section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and section 1 of the 
War Damages Act 1965.187  The only time an Act of Parliament may be 
challenged by the courts is if the legal matter in question relates to an EU 
provision, or the UK statute contravenes the European Convention on Human 
Rights as per the Human Rights Act 1998.188   
 
Unlike other comparative jurisdiction there is no defence in the UK, freedom 
fighter style or otherwise available for an accused to use within the terms under 
the Terrorism Act 2000, which does not exempt what could be termed ‘terrorism 
in a just cause’.189  The Canadian judiciary in R v Khawaja tested the Canadians 
armed conflict exclusion, where K claimed that the situation in Afghanistan since 
2002 represented a war within the legal definition and therefore his actions were 
carried out during an armed conflict and in accordance with international law.190  
However, because K’s actions involved acts of violence in the UK and Pakistan, 
and were based on a violent Islamist ideology, the Court found his actions went 
beyond the Afghanistan conflict.  The Court also held the conflict in Afghanistan 
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represented an armed insurrection carried out based on violent jihad against the 
newly appointed Afghan government, and non-Islamic regimes and civilians.191    
 
This illustrates that even when a state has a freedom fighter style defence, the 
tests applied by the judicial authority appear to be stringent and protective of 
maintaining the status quo.  This fits with Netanyahu postulation that freedom 
fighters are in fact not capable of perpetrating terrorist acts: 
For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately 
attacked innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or 
passers-by in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen 
to reside in the area of conflict or are merely associated ethnically or 
religiously with the people of that area…The conclusion we must draw 
from all this is evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is 
the carrier of oppression and enslavement.192 
 
The facts discussed in Gul however, highlight that even if a freedom fighter 
exclusion did exist within the UK’s legislative framework, it would have made 
little difference to the outcome.  It also suggests the unimportance of the UK 
Court seeking advice as to whether or not the conflicts were to be regarded as an 
international armed conflict, given Gul posted a video containing not only attacks 
on Coalition forces, but also civilians that were in the US twin towers on 11th 
September 2001 at the time of al-Qaeda’s attack.  It also included other attacks on 
civilians and excerpts from martyrdom videos with symbols associated with 
proscribed organisations listed under Schedule 2 of the 2000 Act.193   
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Despite these facts the Court thought the need to elucidate further, confirming 
international law had developed insofar as criminalising terrorism in times of 
peace.194  International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law 
specifically refer to civilians and organised groups within their definition, and 
cover acts of terrorism during an international armed conflict.195  Defining 
terrorism as an act carried out primarily against civilians, international rules such 
as those provided by article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, effectively 
ban terrorism, with other conventions considering it to be a war crime.196   
What is clear from the UK court’s decision in not allowing a freedom fighter 
defence, is finding it unpalatable the idea of branding some types of terrorism as 
officially acceptable:   
…acts by insurgents against the armed forces of a state anywhere in the 
world which seek to influence a government…made for political purposes 
are terrorism. There is no exemption for those engaged in an armed 
insurrection and an armed struggle against a government.197 
Whilst this statement may add some weight to Coco’s argument, it certainly 
seems to suggest the courts have universal jurisdiction over terrorism.198  In 
responding to such criticism, the UK Court of Appeal relied on the Lotus case 
presided over by the Permanent Court of International Justice, affirming that its 
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jurisdiction was not questionable given the lack of explicit prohibitions against 
labelling as terrorists, non-state armed groups attacks on state armed forces, in 
non-international armed conflicts.199  
 
Furthermore, although the evidence given by the former UK Foreign Secretary 
confirming the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq during 2008 and 2009 were 
regarded as non-international armed conflicts, thereby rendering Gul’s argument 
weightless, the impact of the judicial decision reinforces the UK’s Governments 
commitment to the international effort to combat terrorism and serves to prevent 
individuals from planning action to take place on foreign soil from the UK.200  
This mirrors the approach taken by the UK Government at the time of drafting the 
Terrorism Act 2000.  Seeking to protect foreign governments from terrorism 
planned and organised in the UK was supplementary reinforced by the Crime 
(International Co-operation) Act 2003 that confirms a resident in the UK would 
be guilty of an offence if actions abroad would constitute an offence within the 
UK under the Terrorism Act 2000.201  It would be interesting to see where the UK 
Government would stand should a citizen return from fighting in Syria or Iraq 
with Kurdish forces against IS, given this has not been recognised as an 
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international armed conflict.202  At the time of writing many UK citizens’ are 
fighting alongside Kurdish forces, who are currently battling for Mosul against 
IS’s stronghold.203  For some States, such as Turkey, the British citizens’ fighting 
with the YPG (or People’s Protection Units) are classed as terrorists, but in the 
UK they are not.204  This is entirely dependent upon which group or organisation 
citizens’ join.  For example in relation to Turkey who has been in conflict with the 
Kurdish group the PKK, where the PKK are looking for independence of Kurdish 
territory from Turkey, under section 3 and Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
the PKK are a proscribed group in the UK.  As such they are seen as a terrorist 
organisation, yet the YPG and YPJ in Syria, which are the army factions of the 
Syrian Kurds currently fighting IS and the al-Assad regime are not proscribed, 
and as such any UK citizen that joins the YPG/YPJ would not be deemed to be a 
terrorist and neither are the actions of this group seen as terrorist action in the 
UK.205 
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Turkey on the other hand, sees the YPG/YPJ as simply PKK factions and classes 
them also as terrorist.  However, the YPG/YPJ is not a proscribed group in the 
UK, therefore fighting with them is not deemed to be terrorist action, despite 
Turkey’s position on this subject. 
 
Concerns with regards the lack of a provision allowing a freedom fighter style 
defence were actually raised during the debating stages of the Terrorism Act 
2000, whereby Parliamentarians focused on the proposed vagueness surrounding 
the terms used, and whether such a provision would have unfairly criminalised 
modern equivalents of the Suffragettes or the South African opponents of the 
apartheid.206  Sir Igor Judge in R v F appeared to have proffered caution in not 
permitting some defence typology: 
The call of resistance to tyranny and invasion evokes an echoing response 
down the ages. We note, as a matter of historical knowledge, that many of 
those whose violent activities in support of national independence or 
freedom from oppression, who were once described as terrorists, are now 
honoured as ‘freedom fighters’.207 
Although acknowledging this, the Court held, ‘…terrorism is terrorism, whatever 
the motives of the perpetrators’.208  Igor Judge’s statement was unsurprisingly 
rejected by the Government, which led Lord Carlile, the then independent 
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reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation in 2007, to advocate a form of statutory 
obligation that required the executive look into the nature and target of the action, 
and towards international legal obligations, prior to the instigation of criminal 
charges.209  Walker proffers a rather scathing view for not creating or allowing a 
type of freedom fighter defence or exception where he states: 
…an antidote to the trend that the UK Government values friendship with 
oil-owning despots much more highly that the political freedom exercised 
by refugee underdogs.210 
 
Despite the international conventions, the UK Court of Appeal drew attention to 
the fact that no internationally agreed definition of terrorism exists.  Although re-
visited in 2002 and 2004 by the Member States of the UN, the impasse in the 
negotiations surrounded whether such a definition would be applicable to the 
armed forces of a state (state terrorism) and to liberation movements (freedom 
fighters).211  Focusing on the latter point, domestically this provides a problem as 
expressed by the UK judiciary above, because should violent action or the threat 
of action by persons engaged in armed conflict overseas be distinguished, it 
would no longer constitute terrorism.212  The UK judiciary have shown that 
although deliberate targeting of civilians is prohibited by International 
Humanitarian Law and could constitute a war crime, such prosecutions are highly 
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unusual.213  The UK Court of Appeals decision follows such concern, where it 
was held that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were both regarded as non-
international armed conflicts, thereby removing the possibility of a claim for 
combatant immunity for legitimate insurgency.  
 
UK DISCRETIONARY POWER TO PROSECUTE 
Perhaps providing some reprieve from the over broad definition of terrorism, the 
executive functions are able to offer some moderation, prior to formal charges 
being brought.  Under section 117 of the Terrorism Act 2000, prior to the 
instigation of proceedings the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) is required.214  However, allowing discretionary power to the DPP was 
criticised by the UK Supreme Court in R v Gul, as ‘intrinsically unattractive’ 
amounting to the legislature abdicating prosecutorial powers to an unelected, 
albeit respected and independent lawyer.215  The Court focused on the risk of 
undermining the rule of law given that although the DPP is accountable to 
Parliament, open and democratically accountable decisions are not made in same 
manner and form as those in Parliament.216  It must be mentioned however, that 
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other areas of UK criminal law have wide definitions that are moderated by the 
DPP.  In fact this appears to work reasonably well.217   
 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 serves to provide such an example whereby 
consent to sexual activity for persons under 16 was removed by way of section 
4.218  Therefore, two persons both under the age of 16 would effectively be guilty 
of committing an offence given they are unable to legally consent.219  Following a 
similar trend in reassuring Parliamentarians that the term ‘ideological’ would not 
extend to industrial action under the 2000 Act, the then Home Secretary made it 
clear that charges would not be brought against children under 16 who engaged in 
consensual sexual activity.220  The ambiguity of this statement is quite staggering 
but beyond the ambit of this discussion.  This has since led the Crown Prosecution 
Service guidance to emphasis, ‘it was not Parliaments intention to punish children 
unnecessarily.’221  This type of safeguarding power could also be utilised to 
narrow the denotation of ‘Government’ within the definition of terrorism, to 
allow, at least at some level, a freedom fighter exclusion. 
 
Given the extremely broad nature of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is argued that 
without this safeguard the law could potentially be used inappropriately.  It is 
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further contended that although the DPP safeguard is useful, it does not replace 
legislative certainty. 
POLITICAL VALUE OF TERRORISM 
The impact of this lack of legislative certainty is realised, where political 
influence and the political value of the terrorism, currently prevails over its legal 
one making its use difficult in legal discourse.222  Internationally and arguably 
domestically, left to its political meaning terrorism can change substantially to 
suit the interests of a particular state and government at a particular time.223  For 
this reason it is argued the law should prevail and provide a clear and precise legal 
position, denying terrorism its political currency built upon historical 
attachments.224  For Gale, the lack of precision mitigates against due process of 
law’, whereby the law should be as precise and foreseeable as possible as held in 
Steel and others v United Kingdom, and, Hashman and Harrup v United 
Kingdom.225  This is perhaps more prevalent within the international arena where 
the issue of an objective legal definition is compounded by the fact there are two 
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terms of terrorism, by the State and freedom fighters.226  State terrorism and 
issues surrounding counter-insurgency are both beyond the ambit of this thesis, 
however, in the interests of fullness, Marian Price, a convicted IRA terrorist, 
draws on this particular issue: 
I don’t see any distinction between al-Qaeda and what George [W] Bush’s 
pilots did in Afghanistan.  I would equate those two as terror, because 
that’s what they are designed to do…to terrorise a population into 
surrender.  That’s the real terrorism.227 
The difference in opinion evidences further the associated subjectivity of the label 
and shows that the politically loaded term can be used beyond its legal 
meaning.228  It also shows that the term can be abused extensively thereby 
confusing the concept.229  
CONCLUSION 
There are two main problems concerning the UK’s legal definition of terrorism 
under the Terrorism Act 2000.  The first is a definitional problem whereby the 
phrases used remain undefined by Parliament.  The proliferation of undefined 
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causes has resulted in some difficulty in deciding which to apply to a particular 
case, thereby effecting at least to some degree judicial application. 
 
The second problem is intrinsically linked to the first, being the political currency 
of the terms use.  In order to solve this, the UK could re-define terrorism and seek 
to remove as many political references apart from the cause element, and 
introduce exclusion clauses for actions taken by way of protest and industrial 
action and dissent, or during an international armed conflict in accordance with 
customary international law.  Although it has been demonstrated that the UK legal 
definition of terrorism works reasonably well in practice, the lack of definitional 
syntax increases the political value and rule of law criticisms.  For this to change, 
the UK must re-define an act of terrorism in line with international law and 
comparative nation states.  It could potentially read: 
Terrorism is the use or threat of serious violence, designed to unduly 
compel a government or an international organisation, or to seriously 
intimidate the public, or section thereof, and is made for the purposes of 
advancing a political, religious, ideological, or racial cause.   
Protest, dissent or industrial action is omitted from this definition.  Action 
taken during an armed conflict as part of a legitimate struggle of peoples 
fighting in the exercise of their right to self-determination is not terrorism, 
unless such action is directed towards non-combatants and/or civilians. 
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CHAPTER TWO. THE 21ST CENTURY TERRORIST THREAT: 
HOW TERRORIST GROUPS AND TERRORISTS COMMUNICATE, 
AND THE UNKNOWN THREAT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the way in which terrorist groups, and individual terrorists 
communicate in the 21st Century.  Concentrating on the terrorist group Islamic 
State as a case study, this chapter will highlight the interdisciplinary relationships 
formed between the group and its individual supporters and cells, by utilising 
digital means.  The chapter will explore the vertical effect of the group’s 
propaganda and communication through the Internet, and how this impacts upon 
the current risk posed to UK security from terrorists.  The rationale for focusing 
on the IS terrorist group is their efficient and prolific use of 21st Century digital 
technology.  The vertical effect of IS’s successful and expert use of electronic 
communications data will be assessed, illustrating the need for new legislative 
measures.  The horizontal effect of terrorist communication will then be analysed, 
which will demonstrate the difficulties posed to UK lawmakers, and UK policing 
and security agencies, specifically with regards to encryption technology in the 
21st Century, and the growth of the darknet.   
 
Following on from discussing the problems faced, the chapter will then place 
emphasis on the UK’s legal efforts made to combat the collection of terrorist 
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materials, the dissemination of such and efforts to prohibit direct and indirect 
encouragement to commit a terrorist act.  The effects of terrorist communication 
in radicalising citizens’ to commit acts of terrorism will then be discussed, 
showing a worrying trend in jihadi tourism and increased individual operational 
abilities. 
 
TERRORIST GROUP: ISLAMIC STATE 
For the media and the world the IS terrorist group appeared to come from 
nowhere and spread across Syria and Iraq at incredible speed.230  According to 
news reports, IS was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004.  Originally the 
group was called Islamic State in Iraq and the group became an umbrella 
organisation under al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2006.231  In 2010 the leadership was 
transferred to Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, also known as al-
Baghdadi, who started to rebuild its military capabilities and within three years 
the group was carrying out terrorist attacks in the local region.232 In an attempt to 
draw more support to IS, al-Samarrai took the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and 
in April announced the merger of IS with other groups to create the Islamic State 
                                                
230 D. Byman (2015) Al Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Global Jihadist Movement, (Oxford University Press) 
pp.166-167.  See also M. W. Nance (2015) The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraqi 
Insurgency 2003-2014, (CRC Press) pp.297-300 
231 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144 accessed 27 October 2016 
232 Supra as per Byman at pp.306-308 
 75 
in Iraq and the Levant/al-Sham (ISIL/ISIS).233  Taking advantage of political 
unrest in the region ISIL/ISIS grew exponentially taking control of various 
villages, towns and cities, finally resulting in the group’s proclamation of a 
Caliphate, becoming known thereafter simply as Islamic State. Abu Mosa was 
appointed as the head press officer, and in June 2014 made it clear that the 
Caliphate had been established, stating:  
…the Islamic State has been established. And we will not stop.  Don’t be 
cowards and attack us with drones. Instead send your soldiers, the ones 
we humiliated in Iraq. We will humiliate them everywhere, God willing, 
and we will raise the flag of Allah in the White House.234 
Building from this statement and in order for the group to expand and fill the 
shortfall of fighters, a press office was developed launching an advertising and 
marketing campaign.  As a result of the statement and the swift gains of territory 
in the Anbar area of Iraq and North Syria the UK proscribed the terrorist group in 
July 2014.235  Since then IS have perhaps become one of the most notorious and 
influential groups within the Middle East and North Africa, posing a direct 
terrorist threat not only to those regions, but to the nation states around the world.  
The level of violence directed towards all those that oppose their own religious 
interpretation and political doctrine has been merciless, with beheadings of UK, 
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US and Japanese citizens’, and Syrian opposition forces, and massacres of Sunni 
Muslim cities such as Tikrit in Iraq.236  Attacks inspired by IS, have more recently 
been committed in Paris in November 2015 and on a Tunisian holiday resort 
resulting in 38 UK citizens’ deaths.  In Nice on Bastille Day, a lone actor inspired 
by IS killed 86 civilians and injured 303, by driving a 17-tonne heavy good 
vehicle through a crowd.237  Atrocities such as these have been witnessed by the 
world at large due to the group’s efficient use of electronic communications 
technology. 
 
21ST CENTURY METHODS OF COMMUNICATION: HOW TERRORIST 
GROUPS USE THE INTERNET IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Utilising the Internet to market the IS brand, which is now available in over forty 
languages, the group has been able to infiltrate citizens’ homes and effectively 
influence them into joining the fight in Syria and Iraq, or to commit lone Islamist 
attacks in their home nation states.238  For Klausen, the Internet and social media 
outlets have been a gift to terrorist groups such as IS, allowing them to meet their 
strategic aims in recruitment, financing and publicising their cause.239  An 
example of an image that seems to resonate with this line of thinking is below. 
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Figure 1, taken from https://www.reddit.com/r/jihadpropaganda/ accessed 21 November 2016 
 
These images and IS’s propaganda is spread through the Internet by largely 
utilising social media outlets.  Such outlets consist of Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube, in addition to dedicated websites that publish online Islamist magazines 
translated into various languages, such as the Dar al-Islam and Dabiq, both 
created by IS, and Inspire created by al-Qaeda, found on the dedicated website 
Jihadology.240  IS have created a media ministry and effectively decentralised 
social media use.  In forming part of this ministry, IS have shown great awareness 
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building capabilities through mass Internet media attracting others to their cause.  
One of these tactics included the holding of a hostage John Cantlie, who read out 
messages from IS explaining the group had been misrepresented by Western 
media and they would be presenting the truth in future videos.241  These videos, as 
with all IS’s propaganda are skilfully produced to a high quality, with great care 
taken in terms of presentation.  For Milton, the mixing of fear and reason makes a 
potent combination.242 
 
In creating and maintaining the centrally controlled Ministry of Media, IS have 
managed to spread it multilingual propaganda effectively.  Such outlets to the 
Ministry include the al-Furqan Institute, l’tisaam Media Foundation, Anjad Media 
Foundations, and the English based outlet the al-Hayat Media Centre.243  The al-
Furqan manufactures DVDs, posters and brochures that the al’tisaam then 
disseminate through the Internet in various languages, including English, French, 
German and Russian.244  IS’s high quality glossy magazine Dabiq is also printed 
in several different languages and contains a larger quantity of articles and 
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presentations that seek to legitimise IS’s actions and the idea of the Caliphate, all 
aimed at recruitment.245  IS’s latest 15th issue of Dabiq starts with:  
The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – 
by Allah’s permission – until it burns the Crusader armies…246 
Along with various links to videos, all of which represent high quality filming, 
there are many articles dedicated to legitimising IS’s struggle against the West, 
and what they call the Crusaders.247  The articles themselves are extremely bias 
and clearly aim to spread their rather cynical take on Christianity, Judaism and all 
other forms of religion and non-religion that do not follow their own 
interpretation of Islam.248  With one photo showing a jihadi fighter holding a 
kitten and then one showing children playing, the magazine is clearly attempting 
to show a caring side to the IS.249  One particular story glamorises an individual 
Islamist fighter story and illustrates the terrorist attack that took place in Nice: 
Between the release of this issue of Dabiq and the next slaughter to be 
executed against them [the West] by the hidden soldiers of the Caliphate - 
who are ordered to attack without delay - the Crusaders can read into why 
Muslims hate and fight them, why pagan Christians should break their 
crosses, why liberalist secularists should return to the fitrah (natural 
human disposition), and why sceptical atheists should recognize their 
Creator and submit to Him. In essence, we explain why they must 
abandon their infidelity and accept Islam, the religion of sincerity and 
submission…250 
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Figure 2, taken from Dabiq (2016) Breaking The Cross, Issue 15, 1437 Shawwal, p.10, available at 
http://jihadology.net accessed 15 November 2016 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, taken from Dabiq (2016) Breaking The Cross, Issue 15, 1437 Shawwal, p.39, available at 
http://jihadology.net accessed 15 November 2016 
 
 
 
Figure 4, taken from Dabiq (2016) Breaking The Cross, Issue 15, 1437 Shawwal, p.68, available at 
http://jihadology.net accessed 15 November 2016 
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In attempting to rationale their terrorist actions one section of the magazine is 
titled, ‘Why we hate you and why we fight you’.251  As one would expect, the 
hatred starts with the fact Christians are in fact Christian, then the article moves 
on to describe how Western views are far too liberal, using images such as below.  
What must be remembered is that these messages may perhaps resonate with 
many people and simply seek to radicalise others in their call for support. 
 
Figure 5, taken from Dabiq (2016) Breaking The Cross, Issue 15, 1437 Shawwal, p.32, available at 
http://jihadology.net accessed 15 November 2016 
 
Social Media: Twitter, Facebook and YouTube 
Social media is open source and essentially available for all citizens’ to use 
worldwide.  IS have used this rather cynically to their advantage to disseminate 
their message.  In 2015 the Director of Europol confirmed the IS terrorist group is 
believed to directly control 50,000 different twitter accounts and coupled with 
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individual Islamists were sending up to 100,000 twitter messages per day in an 
attempt to market, radicalise others and plan an attack.252   
 
Berger and Morgan further this claim, arguing IS may actually have direct control 
of over 90,000 twitter accounts, thereby doubling the amount of daily messages 
sent.253  In August 2016, Twitter announced they had closed over 235,000 
accounts with links to IS over a six-month period.254  Such IS messages read: 
You can sit at home and play call of duty or you can come here and 
respond to the real call of duty…Kill the police and soldiers…carry out 
lone wolf operations…smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a 
knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high 
place, or choke him, or poison him…Muslims stand by its black brothers 
and sisters. Your [You’re] all welcome to Islamic State we will embrace 
you and love you.255 
For Ingram, although these messages and the dissemination of information 
regarding IS actions overseas have proved effective through social media; they 
are ‘more strategic plagiarists than geniuses’.256  According to Ingram, the group 
has simply mimicked the way in which international businesses and companies 
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253 J.M. Berger and J. Morgan (2015) The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS 
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narratives, Terrorist Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response, Dublin City University, Ireland. 
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have used social media to increase their position.257  This has resulted in their 
success at spreading their message, thereby gaining support and financial 
donations. 
 
IS have posted many videos on YouTube, which are often graphic and horrifying, 
showing the beheading and killing of their so called enemies.  They have also 
used it to spread their message and show recent supporters to their cause siting 
happily holding a firearm, knives and grenades.  These often too have a message 
of their own, encouraging others to join them in the fighting in Syria and Iraq.258  
As with Twitter, supporters use this format to continue IS’s message and add their 
own comments, often creating their own specific channel.259  Anjem Choudary 
represents one such example in the UK, where his YouTube channel remains live 
despite his criminal conviction for terrorist offences.260  
 
In order to combat terrorist use of social media, Internet companies have started 
using new software originally designed to remove copyrighted material.  Looking 
for ‘hashes’ that is a unique digital fingerprint assigned to specific videos posted 
online, the Internet companies’ software is now able to automatically target 
terrorist material.  Due to the advancing capabilities highlighted here, it is 
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Anjem-Choudary-s-followers-available-online-despite-jailing.html accessed 22 November 2016 
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possible that such groups will increase their usage of other means of 
dissemination.  First they could increase their use of specific Internet webpages 
allowing for anonymity of postings.  Second they could simply increase the use of 
the ‘darknet’, which UK law enforcement agencies’ are currently struggling to 
effectively police.  With all of these formats, the aim is to bring people round to 
their way of thinking. 
 
Regardless of this action, along with Facebook’s, Keith Vaz MP, former Chair of 
the Home Affairs Select Committee said: 
Huge corporations like Google, Facebook and Twitter…are consciously 
failing to tackle this threat and passing the buck by hiding behind their 
supranational legal status, despite knowing that their sites are being used 
by the instigators of terror. The companies’ failure to tackle this threat has 
left some parts of the Internet ungoverned, unregulated and lawless.261 
Katz highlights the difficulty faced by policing and security agencies as they 
endeavour to monitor social media.262  She explains how, with the benefit of 
encryption, IS are circumventing the blocking of their twitter feeds by having 
multiple backup accounts.263  Furthermore, a point that seems to be overlooked it 
that IS’s social media campaign is networked, rather than having a centralised 
person in control.  Many of IS’s recruits average the age of 24, meaning many 
have grown up with social media as part of their lives, which in turn means tools 
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262 R. Katz (2015) How Islamic State is still Thriving on Twitter, 11 April 2015, InSite Blog on Terrorism & 
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such as Twitter and Instagram come easy to them.264  For Katz this represents the 
real threat of IS as they use Twitter to launch recruitment and calls for lone 
jihad.265  Supporting citizens’ simply re-post or quote what they see from those 
they follow.266  This particular part forms IS’s unofficial communications strategy 
whereby the number of followers can be increased with the use of hashtags.267   
 
THE INTERNET AND APPLICATION PROTOCOLS, SMARTPHONES 
AND ENCRYPTION 
It must be remembered that citizens’ born in the early 1990’s have not known life 
without the Internet.  Due to the growth in technology the use of written letters 
and telephone landlines were the first to decline.  Research shows that in 1989 the 
main types of communication were by letters and landline.268  From 2014 less 
than three in ten 16-24 year olds continue with this method.  In fact less than 16% 
of UK households no longer have a landline and the UK Communications 
Infrastructure Report suggests this will decrease further bringing an end to their 
use as citizens’ prefer Internet telephony.269  Now, electronic mailing (emails) and 
text messaging are becoming a thing of the past.  Utilising smart phones, instant 
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direct messaging applications more commonly known as chat apps, such as 
Apples iMessage and Facebook Messenger, appears to be the current favourite.270 
To this end, the ownership of smartphones has dramatically increased, since 2000 
to 2014, which effectively allows for many different types of electronic 
communication methods.271 
 
The Internet 
Internet technology and the growth in use have been extensive, as people tend to 
favour making a call via the smart phone or tablet over the Internet.  The number 
of citizens’ making an Internet call (VOIP) has tripled between 2009 and 2014.272  
In addition to this vast increase in volumes of information sent and received, it is 
estimated that in 2016 one zettabyte of data will travel over the Internet, with 
Cisco predicting this will double by 2019.273  It is important to note that in 
addition to this growth in use, the Internet is not territorially bound making it 
difficult for law enforcement to trace information sent through.  Emails for 
example are not confined to the country of origin or receipt, rather they move 
freely across borders utilising the quickest path possible.  This means of course an 
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email between two people in the UK may actually travel via another country.  The 
servers of email services for many companies, such as Hotmail and Gmail, are 
based outside the UK.274  Therefore, although UK legislation may require Internet 
and service providers to hold data for a certain length of time, the transnational 
nature means external agreements must be drafted. 
 
The Internet structure is made up of three categories.275   
 
Figure 6, what the Internet structure looks like, taken from https://www.cambiaresearch.com/articles/85/surface-
web-deep-web-dark-web----whats-the-difference accessed 20 November 2016 
 
The ‘surface web’ represents webpages that can be found using standard search 
engines such as Bing and Google.276  This is what the majority of users see and 
can find.  The ‘deep web’, or ‘invisible web’, represents parts of the open web 
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that are simply not indexed by standard search engines.277  Although sinister 
sounding, this part of the web has many legitimate uses such as, web email, online 
banking and PayPal, and videos on demand such as those available through 
Amazon.278  It makes up almost 90 per cent of Internet usage figures.279  The 
‘dark web’ or ‘darknet’ is a small proportion of the invisible web that consists of 
tens of thousands of websites.280  To clarify the current acronyms and types of 
Internet companies:  
• Communications Service Providers (CSPs) provide services that 
transport information electronically.  Examples of CSPs include 
companies such as British Telecom, Skype and TalkTalk, Facebook 
and Twitter. They may be based anywhere in the world, and offer 
communications services and Internet access; 
• Companies that simply provide Internet access are referred to as 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs); 
• Companies that provide applications or services, over the physical 
networks provided by CSP’s and ISP’s are called Applications 
Service Providers (ASPs).  Examples of ASP’s include Google, 
Whatsapp, Snapchat, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and Apple. 
 
Attributing the Communication 
Aggravating the current problem surrounding terrorist communication is the 
difficulty in attributing Internet communication to a specific user of a device.  
Devices, such as computers, laptops and smartphones when utilising a network, 
use an IP address.  There is only one IP address assigned to an Internet router, 
which can of course accommodate many devices.  It has been noted by Brown 
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that this infrastructure of the Internet makes it difficult for the policing and 
security agencies to attribute a particular communication to the sender, and 
thereby offers a ‘cloak of anonymity’.281  Firstly, many family members and 
friends effectively share the IP address and also share devices.  Secondly is the 
fact that IP addresses change depending upon where the person is accessing the 
Internet from, such as from the home to coffee shop or place of work.  More 
seriously is the fact that thirdly a person can utilise software that purposefully 
creates ghost, or proxy IP addresses that are then untraceable.282   It is therefore 
sometime impossible for the agencies to discover which device was used and by 
whom.283 
 
In an attempt to remedy this problem, the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 
2015 (CTSA) was enacted, partly to, ‘address the difficulty that arises when IP 
addresses are shared by a number of users simultaneously, by requiring the 
retention of “relevant internet data” in addition to the shared IP address’.284  
However, this attempt appears to have failed because the CSP can only provide 
the data of the subscribed person, usually the bill payer, not the details of the 
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person using a particular device at a particular time.285  This represents what has 
been termed a ‘capability gap in communications data’ that has ‘a serious impact 
on the ability of law enforcement to carry out their functions’.286  Intensifying this 
gap further is the fact there is now a fragmentation of telecommunications and 
communications data service providers.  This is built in to their respective 
business models highlighting the difference between a UK landline call and a 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP).  Landline calls are much more traceable 
with the provider knowing the endpoints of both parties to the call, whereas, the 
majority of VOIP services, such as Skype, operate over through an Internet 
connection.287  Many Internet and Over-The-Top (OTT) providers are based 
overseas, which makes obtaining data from them by the UK policing and security 
agencies more difficult.288  OTT providers in particular are free at the point of 
access and require little to none subscriber data, and additionally 
‘communications data relating to a single communication may not be in a single 
location due to the collaboration of companies’.289 
 
Application Protocols and Encryption 
When terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) first 
started using encryption technology it was in its infancy.  During the investigation 
into Rajib Karim communications to Anwar al-Awlaki, it became clear to the 
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policing and security agencies that Karim used a multi-layered approach to 
encrypting his messages.  This whole process was vastly time consuming, as 
Karim would first write the message into a Microsoft Excel document using 
macros to encrypt it, then copy and paste that into a Microsoft Word document.  
This document would then be saved using the ‘password protect’ feature that is 
unbreakable should the password used be long and complex.  The document was 
then compressed and encrypted using another piece of software called RAR, again 
unbreakable, and then posted online through a URL shortened to render the 
metadata anonymous.290  It took UK law enforcement nine months to decrypt 
Karim’s computer.291  For Graham, things have now moved on whereby the 
‘ubiquity of encryption in commercially available messaging tools and devices 
has made it increasingly easy for terrorists to communicate securely’.292   
 
Encryption has now legitimately developed as a commercial communication 
technology and commodity, and is readily available, whereby two main forms 
exist: 
1) Encryption in transit: this provides security during the transmission; 
2) End to end encryption: this renders the message unreadable to all but the 
sender and intended recipient.   
                                                
290 R. Graham (2016) How Terrorists Use Encryption, Combating Terrorism Center, available at 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/how-terrorists-use-encryption accessed 21 November 2016 
291 V. Dodd (2011) British Airways worker Rajib Karim convicted of terrorist plot, Guardian, 28 February 2011, 
available https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/28/british-airways-bomb-guilty-karim accessed 21 
November 2016 
292 R. Graham (2016) How Terrorists Use Encryption, Combating Terrorism Center, available at 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/how-terrorists-use-encryption accessed 21 November 2016 
 92 
The first example represents technology used by the banking industry to make 
communication safe and secure for customers.  The second type, in addition to 
device encryption, seems to follow a similar rationale having been developed for 
smart phone and tablet device usage.  End-to-end encryption is when the contents 
of a message are converted into an unreadable form, whereby only the person 
with the correct decryption key can read it.  Both communication and device 
encryption is legitimately important in securing an individual’s privacy, given it is 
perhaps safe to say the majority of smart phone users for example, store private 
information, photos and notes in their phones memory, which can then be stored 
on an iCloud server.293  It is also important to mention that particularly since the 
introduction of applications such as Apple Pay, smart phone and server encryption 
forms an essential part of providing the customer with a high level of safety.294   
 
In order to ensure this high level of security, the network provider or company 
overseeing the communication exchange, is often unable to decrypt a message, or 
gain entry into an individual’s data stored on their smart phone.295  Whilst these 
represent genuine uses for encryption and introduces an increased level of 
customer security, what often follows such legitimate technological advances is 
criminal exploitation.296  This is where the problems faced by terrorist 
communication are felt on the capabilities gap in increasing the pressures on 
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policing and security agencies in the 21st Century.  Apples security on the iPhone 
for example is extremely high, whereby the device and the internal memory disk 
are individually encrypted.  Remaining with Apple for the moment, since 2014 
they have provided data encryption built in to its software, and accordingly they 
have stated that: 
Apple has no way to decrypt iMessage and Face Time data when it’s in 
transit between devices.  So unlike other companies’ messaging services, 
Apple does not scan your communications, and we wouldn’t be able to 
comply with a wiretap order even if we wanted to.297 
 
Messaging Applications 
21st Century messaging application technology follows a similar format to 
Apple’s iMessage service.  More commonly known as ‘chat apps’, when they 
were first developed the encryption technology used stopped at the service 
providers’ server, meaning that policing and security agencies could obtain the 
electronic communications data.  This also meant of course that cyber criminals 
could also hack into the service providers’ server and obtain the same data.  This 
led to one of the first chat apps to employ end-to-end encryption, called Telegram.  
Al-Qaeda operatives were very quick to start using this technology illustrating 
terrorist exploitation of this legitimate development.298  Currently there are now 
many direct messaging applications, in addition to Apples iMessage, all offering 
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end-to-end encryption protocols, such as Whatsapp, Facebook Messenger, 
Instagram, Wickr, Line, Signal and Google.299   
 
Figure 7, Whatsapp notice 5 December 2016, taken from my Whatsapp account 
The technology used is similar to that used by the military on personal computers, 
rendering it near impossible to break.  In addition, most chat apps now 
automatically delete messages after an hour or a day, depending upon the users 
settings.  The growing user trend in this type of software has caused concern for 
UK law enforcement.  The encryption allows terrorists to communicate freely and 
if caught, evidential problems may ensue because the messages are no longer 
available, or traceable.  According to GCHQ, such devices and applications have 
become the ‘command and control network’ of terrorists.300  The terrorists who 
attacked Paris for example utilised messaging apps in addition to using disposable 
‘burner’ phones to congregate in safe houses in Belgium.301  This allowed them to 
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plan and thereby carry out their attack on 15 November 2015 resulting in 130 
deaths with hundreds more injured.302   
 
It is worth mentioning that it would not be difficult for the would-be-terrorist to 
quickly learn about all the available encryption techniques.  In April 2016, the IS 
French online magazine Dar al-Islam demonstrated the importance of securing 
communications.303  This further illustrates how the Internet assists terrorists in 
creating and maintaining an international presence, and according to Ban Ki-
moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, ‘the Internet is a prime example 
of how terrorists can behave in a truly transnational way’.304  These issues have 
led to Wainwright, Director of Europol to comment:  
…as the communications of terrorist networks and criminal groups have 
moved increasingly [online], it’s opened up a whole new wave of 
problems for us even in the open internet, let alone the Darknet.305 
 
The Darknet 
Utilising specific software and Internet configurations, the darknet allows for a 
‘world of complete freedom and anonymity, where users say and do what they 
like, uncensored, unregulated, and outside of society’s norms’.306  An illegal 
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market place exists, such as the well-known ‘Silk Road’; where people can buy 
and sell illegal items such as drugs, counterfeit goods, child pornography, books 
and firearms.  Europol in their 2016 TE-SAT report, which illustrates the 
development of a ‘professional, service-based underground economy’, has 
identified the proliferation of cyber-crime and terrorism.307  IS is also known to 
operate through this medium, in raising funds and selling books on how to carry 
out jihad, and how to make bombs and create homemade firearms.308  The darknet 
works by sending and receiving messages through a network that involves a 
process known as ‘onion rooting’.309  This process protects the identity of the 
people involved in the electronic communication by wrapping layers around it.  
According to Lakhani this renders the communication impenetrable and therefore 
untraceable.310  A software programme called ‘Tor’ is one of the most popular 
networks, and is used by IS because this permits them to hide their location and 
identity.  Encrypted jihadi forums exist, along with chat rooms where terrorists 
and supporters can communicate freely, without fear of detection.311  Parts of this 
network allow the transfer of unique funds undetected, and make purchases of 
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explosives, and firearms (of a type that are illegal in the UK), and fraudulent 
passports along with other items.312 
 
Figure 8, the Dark Wallet, taken from N. Bertrand (2015) ISIS is taking full advantage of the darkest corners of 
the Internet, Business Insider UK, http://uk.businessinsider.com/isis-is-using-the-dark-web-2015-
7?r=US&IR=T accessed 5 December 2016 
 
Figure 9, semtex explosive, taken from J. Patrice (2016) Bombs used by ISIS in Brussels terror attacks are for sale 
online, NewsGrio, http://www.newsgrio.com/articles/world/uk/244032-bombs-used-by-isis-in-brussels-terror-
attacks-are-for-sale-online.html accessed 5 December 2016 
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Figure 10, Items for sale through the Darknet taken from B. Chacos (2013) Meet Darknet, the hidden, 
anonymous underbelly of the searchable web, PC World, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046227/meet-
darknet-the-hidden-anonymous-underbelly-of-the-searchable-web.html accessed 5 December 2016 
 
Figure 11, ability to buy a new identity, taken from M. Zimmerman (2015) Darknet danger: Organs, murder, 
credit card info all for sale on Internet’s underbelly, http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2015/04/23/darknet-
danger-organs-murder-credit-card-info-all-for-sale-on-internet.html accessed 5 December 2016 
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Figure 12, Silk Road taken from B. Chacos (2013) Meet Darknet, the hidden, anonymous underbelly of the 
searchable web, PC World, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046227/meet-darknet-the-hidden-anonymous-
underbelly-of-the-searchable-web.html accessed 5 December 2016 
 
It is not very difficult to find using a ‘normal’ search engine, such as Google, and 
neither is it difficult to download the Tor software programme.313  Tor has been in 
operation since October 2003 and is described as providing an open network, ‘that 
helps you defend against traffic analysis, a form of network surveillance that 
threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential business activities and 
relationships, and State security’.314  But in actual fact Tor allows a person to 
access the deeper realms of the darknet, called ‘Onionland’.315  Utilising Tor, 
                                                
313 See https://www.google.co.uk/#q=Tor accessed 30 November 2016 
314 See https://www.torproject.org accessed 21 November 2016 
315 See http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046227/meet-darknet-the-hidden-anonymous-underbelly-of-the-
searchable-web.html accessed 21 November 2016 
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‘Onionland’ allows criminals a free space to work and effectively, ‘cloak 
themselves in obscurity with specialised software that guarantees encryption and 
anonymity between users, as well as protocols or domains that the average person 
will never stumble across’.316 
 
The main concern is that terrorists could be able to launch more advanced attacks, 
and by utilising Tor, become harder for policing and security agencies to detect 
and prevent attacks.  Europol’s 2016 TE-SAT report confirms that IS has an 
advanced level of encryption knowledge.  Coupled with Anders Breivik’s step-
by-step guide on how to use Tor and Onionland, and the use of the darknet, it is 
clear that the ‘likelihood of future attacks being based on new modus operandi 
with a stronger cyber dimension’ is an increasing reality.317  ‘Terrorists have 
certainly demonstrated their flexibility and willingness to learn and further 
develop their technical skills’.318  To this end policing the darknet represents a 
very real challenge for policing and security services.  For Brown law 
enforcement agencies’, ‘face a serious capabilities gap’, both in terms of expertise 
and budget.319  To tackle the latter, the UK’s former Treasury Minister George 
Osborne MP committed an extra £1.9 billion to be invested in cybercrime, in 
                                                
316 http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046227/meet-darknet-the-hidden-anonymous-underbelly-of-the-searchable-
web.html accessed 21 November 2016 
317 Supra as per Europol (2016) 
318 Ibid 
319 C. S. D. Brown (2015) Investigating and Prosecuting Cyber Crime: Forensic Dependencies and Barriers to 
Justice, International Journal of Cyber Criminology, Vol 9, Issue 1, January-June 2015, p.92, available at 
http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/Brown2015vol9issue1.pdf accessed 21 November 2016 
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November 2015.320  This investment will partially be used to increase the lacking 
expertise, whereby according to news reports, GCHQ is planning to share their 
cryptography and intelligence analysis knowledge with other private companies in 
a hope to collaborate on an effective approach to cybercrime.321  In addition 
GCHQ and the NCA have co-located a Joint Operations Cell (JOC) in order to 
increase their abilities.322  
 
It is clear, that propaganda spread through open sources such as social media, 
through to mainstream Internet providing dedicated websites, to the Darknet 
allowing for the purchase of illegal weapons and information useful to a terrorist, 
overall IS’s digital communicational strategy has proved first class.  Such 
propaganda has led directly to the radicalisation of citizens’ resulting in terrorist 
attacks being committed, or thwarted.  Such radicalisation was seen in the UK in 
2015, where a 15-year-old boy from Blackburn used Internet communication to 
plot with Australian counterparts to behead Australian police officers at the 
ANZAC day celebrations.  Having received a life sentence, the UK now has the 
youngest convicted terrorist.323  In the UK in 2015 seven major planned IS attacks 
                                                
320 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-speech-to-gchq-on-cyber-security accessed 22 
November 2016 
321 R. Perez (2016) GCHQ to fund startups to fight cyber-crime, SC Magazine available at 
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/gchq-to-fund-startups-to-fight-cyber-crime/article/524540/ accessed 20 
November 2016 
322 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/736-gchq-and-nca-join-forces-to-ensure-no-hiding-place-online-
for-criminals accessed 21 November 2016 
323 BBC News (2015) Anzac Day terror plot: Blackburn teenager admits inciting attack, 23 July 2015, available at 
retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-33633915 accessed 20 November 2016 
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were prevented by the policing and security services, with intelligence suggesting 
more were being planned.324   
CONCLUSION 
Terrorist groups and self-starters have embraced modern communication 
technology, using it from marketing up to coordinating an attack.  Given these 
technological advancements have brought about economic and societal change, it 
is of little surprise that it has had a similar effect of terrorism and criminality.325   
It is interesting to note that in response the then UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced that if he was leading the next government, he would 
introduce legislation in 2016 to eliminate ‘safe spaces’ for terrorists to 
communicate.326    
 
It is estimated that technology doubles every two years.327  Although beyond the 
ambit of this thesis, this figure is now vehemently contested with some recent 
debates suggesting technological advancements are slowing down.  However, for 
Tim Simonite the growth in mobile telephonic smart phone applications, the 
                                                
324 S. Coates (2015) PM: seven terror attacks in UK stopped in last year, The Times, 16 November 2015, available at 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4615198.ece accessed 20 November 2016 
325 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504187/Operational_Case_fo
r_Bulk_Powers.pdf accessed 23 November 2016 
326 Ibid 
327 See https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/210872-extremetech-explains-what-is-moores-law accessed 23 
November 2016 
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figure of two years could prove to be a little low.328  It is reasonably well known 
the legislature is slow in keeping up with the growth in technology, and it is 
surmised this would continue for the foreseeable future.  A unique threat has been 
created, whereby the vertical effects of terrorist groups’ communication radicalise 
others, then the horizontal effect that allows people to operate under an anonymity 
cloak, who have advanced independent operational abilities with potential access 
to explosives and firearms purchased on the darknet. 
 
Considering this predicament, legislation, namely the IPA, has been created 
aimed at policing the Internet.  A cooperative approach with ISP’s is essential to 
this aim, ensuring the dark sides of the web are monitored and then removed 
should they be deemed illegal.  It is also essential the Government collaborate 
with smart phone application providers to allow targeted decryption of messages.   
                                                
328 See https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/  accessed 23 November 
2016 
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CHAPTER THREE. PART ONE. THE UK’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO 
TERRORISM COMMUNICATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE 
NECESSITY OF BULK COMMUNICATIONS DATA 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will look at the legislative measures the UK Government has 
introduced in their attempt to deal with terrorist electronic communication and the 
resulting terrorist threat.  The technological advances have been made clear in the 
previous chapter, now the emphasis will alter to assess the UK’s policing and 
security agencies tasks, in carrying out efficient and effective surveillance on 
terrorist activity and terrorism communications.  Starting with the legal 
surveillance powers in the UK and focusing on those aimed at dealing with 
counterterrorism, the chapter will focus on the main contentious issue facing the 
UK’s legal response to terrorism communication in the 21st Century that are the 
bulk interception and retention of electronic communications data powers, and 
bulk equipment interference. 
 
The UK’s surveillance legal framework changed on the 29th November 2016 with 
the enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).  This Act does not 
entirely replace the existing foundations stone to the surveillance framework, 
provided by The Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).  For the 
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purposes of the thesis, the IPA does replace the bulk powers found under RIPA 
and introduces a new decryption power.  This chapter will show that the 
surveillance structure consists largely of RIPA and the IPA, which delivers the 
required structural integrity.  The chapter will start with an in-depth analysis on 
the IPA, focusing on the extent of the powers of bulk data surveillance, which 
reveals legislative definitional difficulties within the UK’s key approach.  The 
analysis then examines the broadness of the powers, albeit with restricted access 
to the data collated, illustrating the minimum protection afforded to citizens’, 
especially when dealing with open source data, considered to be private.  Case 
examples will be used to demonstrate how complicated and difficult terrorist 
communication can be, and whether the materials communicated cross the legal 
terrorism threshold.   
 
The need for the IPA will become clear once the chapter has highlighted the 
difficulty faced by the UK’s law enforcement agencies’ in deciphering friend 
from foe, particularly in light of the extensive technological advancements made 
in electronic communications.  Part Two of this Chapter will then focus on other 
counterterrorism-focused measures, illustrating the apparent ineffectiveness, 
which may change as a result of the IPA. 
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THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2016 
The IPA was enacted on the 29th November 2016.  In bringing a number of 
legislative surveillance of communications powers contained in other UK statutes 
into one statute, it contains nine parts with 272 sections.  This makes the IPA a 
substantial statute designed to make it easier for relevant agencies to apply for 
authorities and warrants as well as making it easier for the courts to determine 
under which statute the authority or warrant was issued.  At the preamble of the 
Act it states: 
An Act to make provision about the interception of communications, 
equipment interference and the acquisition and retention of 
communications data, bulk personal datasets and other information; to 
make provision about the treatment of material held as a result of such 
interception, equipment interference or acquisition or retention; to 
establish the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and other Judicial 
Commissioners and make provision about them and other oversight 
arrangements; to make further provision about investigatory powers and 
national security; to amend sections 3 and 5 of the Intelligence Services 
Act 1994; and for connected purposes. 
Forming a significant part of the UK’s legal surveillance framework, it provides 
structural support to already existing powers located under RIPA, the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994 (ISA) and the Security Services Act 1985 (SSA).329  Although 
RIPA continues to provide the foundation stone to this legal framework, the IPA 
is significantly larger amending parts of RIPA, the ISA and additionally the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006.  Bringing them within the IPA’s ambit, it focuses 
more on electronic communications data surveillance and bulk powers, in line 
with 21st Century technology and to combat terrorist communication discussed in 
                                                
329 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 251 
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the previous Chapter.330  It could be argued that the IPA has missed the 
opportunity to bring the UK’s legal surveillance framework within the ambit of 
one piece of legislation, meaning that the various surveillance powers and 
authorisations remain scattered throughout other statutes.  RIPA for example still 
governs the different types of surveillance, such as random or overt (i.e. the use of 
CCTV), and directed or covert, where the targets are monitored from static 
observation points and followed, and intrusive surveillance where premises and 
property is interfered with.  Prior to the IPA, RIPA did also govern the 
interception of communications and electronic communications data, whereby 
communications are monitored either under a direct-targeted authority or a bulk 
data warrant.  RIPA also governs the use of covert human intelligence sources 
(CHIS) more commonly known as informants.  However, both Houses of 
Parliament and the various committee stages gave careful consideration to the 
IPA, who seemingly decided that it was unnecessary for the Act to merge all the 
various powers into one.  The IPA appears to be focused entirely on powers 
related to the surveillance of electronic communications data, and is arguably 
already adequately large. 
 
This particular point was emphasised by the Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC in the 
Intelligence and Security Committee’s report into the IPA.331  Grieve’s Report 
found that the IPA, although makes, ‘some attempt to improve transparency’, the 
                                                
330 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s259 
331 The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP (2016) Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the 
draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 9 February, HC 795, p.1 
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Intelligence and Security Committee were, ‘disappointed to note that it does not 
cover all the agencies’ intrusive capabilities.332  As a general overview, Part One 
of the Act proffers a new human rights approach from the UK Government, 
dealing specifically with privacy protections including offences and penalties for 
the misuse of electronic communications data surveillance.333  It appears the UK 
Government has learnt from previous case decisions and critiques, and ensured 
there is a form of judicial scrutiny, wider safeguards to protect personal data and 
privacy rights.  It also serves to remove certain powers to obtain communications 
data previously authorised under RIPA, such as some local authorities and those 
listed under Schedule 2 of the IPA.334  Part Two of the IPA introduces the use of 
targeted interception, which needs to be considered alongside Part five dealing 
with the use of targeted equipment interference.  Part Two continues to introduce 
two further types of interception warrant, which are targeted examination and 
mutual assistance.335  The list of person able to request an interception warrant are 
the same as listed in section 6 of the RIPA, albeit with the introduction of some 
language simplification.336   
 
Parts Three and Four deal with the obtaining and the retention of, and access to 
electronic communications data.  Parts Six and Seven introduce new bulk powers, 
                                                
332 The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP (2016) Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the 
draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 9 February, HC 795, p.1 
333 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 11 
334 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 12 
335 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 15(1) 
336 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 18(1) 
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the retention of such and the use of personal datasets, with part eight providing a 
new oversight regime, and part nine providing the Secretary of State the powers to 
review the operation of the IPA, initially within the first six months and then 
subsequently five years after, and to report to Parliament with the findings.337  
The authorisation processes are similar in nature to those already provided for 
under RIPA, requiring the Secretary of State to sanction the warrant, however, as 
will be discussed later, the Act does introduce a ‘double lock’ system whereby an 
independent judicial commissioner must review the authorisation prior to any 
police action, and the authorisation of the warrant is to be reviewed at a later stage 
by a new Independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner.338   
 
Given the restraints placed on this thesis, it is proposed to concentrate on the new 
legalised bulk powers of interception, acquisition and equipment interference, and 
their impact on privacy, whilst discussing the new oversight regime and 
safeguards, with particular reverence to judicial review principles. 
 
The Bulk Powers: The general rationale 
The bulk powers of surveillance are perhaps the most important parts of the IPA.  
They are aimed at closing the UK’s law enforcement agencies’ technological 
capabilities gap covered in Chapter Two.  They are not entirely uncontroversial, 
because they have the potential to affect the whole population, or a large section 
                                                
337 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s260.  See also House of Lords Second Reading 27 June 2016, Volume 773, 
Column 1361-1362, available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2016-06-
27/debates/1606278000466/InvestigatoryPowersBill  
338 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 19 and 23 
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thereof, although in practice this is unlikely, and are aimed at identifying potential 
terrorists that remain unknown to the policing and security agencies.  It is quite 
simply about finding potential investigative leads, perhaps better explained as 
allowing law enforcement an opportunity to ‘find the needle in the hay stack’, as 
highlighted in Chapter Two, and developed further below when looking at issues 
surrounding the traceability and typecasting of terrorists.  The bulk powers 
contained in the IPA are split into 4 sections: 
• Section 136 Bulk interception warrants; 
• Section 158 Power to issue bulk acquisition warrants;  
• Section 176 Bulk equipment interference warrants; 
• Section 199 Bulk personal datasets. 
The former Director General of the Security Service (more commonly known as 
MI5) Lord Evans evidenced the essential part they play in countering the terrorist 
threat, using an example of how the agency might use the bulk powers provided 
during the First Sitting Committee Debate on the IPA in March 2016.339  He 
suggests that using these powers allows law enforcement find people who ‘might’ 
be members of IS and thereby ‘may’ pose a threat by: 
…look[ing] at all individuals from the UK who are known to have 
travelled into or out of the Middle East and the area around Syria over the 
past six months.340 
Once this task is complete, law enforcement can then narrow the field of search 
by looking for electronic communications data on individuals who have been in 
Molenbeek for example, because, ‘it looks as though quite a lot of the problems 
                                                
339 Supra as per First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, at Column 23  
340 Ibid  
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have emerged from that particular part of Brussels’.341  The next steps continue to 
narrow the field as Evans explains: 
…Put all those elements of data together and you will end up with 
perhaps a few dozen…You might then say, “Let’s take all those phones 
and see which of those telephones has been in first or second-order 
contact with known extremists”…That might refine it down from 150 to 
half a dozen. Then you might start to think, “Actually, there’s quite a high 
likelihood, although one cannot be certain, that these half a dozen might 
be people of security interest”…At that point, having gone through those 
various layers of putting different sorts of data together, comparing, 
contrasting and seeing what comes out, you might say, “Perhaps for those 
half a dozen, some more targeted form of surveillance is justified”…Once 
you have done that, [subject to authorisations] you might then find that 
some of them are self-evidently not, because they are BBC journalists 
who have been following the story or similar…But you might find that 
you have one or two who look as though they might be IS activists…so 
you put some resource into establishing what they are doing and who they 
are associating with.342 [My emphasis] 
This represents the, ‘sort of process in which the Security Service have used these 
sorts of capability over the last 10 years or so’, and according to Evans it has been 
‘absolutely central’ to law enforcement agencies’ in identifying individuals 
involved in terrorist planning.343  The information attained is then fed through into 
more intensive investigations, enabling policing and security agencies to prevent 
terrorist attacks.344  Regardless of the centrality, these powers form part of the 
agencies capabilities and it is quite clear from this statement that UK law 
enforcement have been using bulk collection powers for over the last ten years, 
with little to none legal regulation.  According to Evans, the IPA merely places 
                                                
341 Ibid 
342 Ibid 
343 Ibid 
344 Supra as per First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, at Column 23  
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legal regulation in an attempt to remedy the lacking provisions, transparency and 
accountability.345 
 
BULK INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
DATA AND CONTENT: THE LEGAL DEFINITIONS 
The entire framework provides extraordinarily vast surveillance powers to State 
agencies, particularly law enforcement agencies’ when acting in the interests of 
national security.  One of those powers allows for the bulk interception and 
acquisition, and retention of electronic communications data.  In order to 
understand the extent of these powers, the legal definition of electronic 
communications data and what is meant by interception must first be elaborated 
on.   
 
Electronic communications data is data in the course of transmission, which does 
not include the content, and the interception of communications is the action of 
procuring data in transition.346  Electronic communications data remains defined 
in RIPA as: 
…the times while a communication is being transmitted by means of a 
telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time when the 
system by means of which the communication is being, or has been, 
                                                
345 Ibid at Column 23 
346 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 2(7) 
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transmitted is used for storing it in a manner that enables the intended 
recipient to collect it or otherwise to have access to it [My emphasis].347 
 
However, due to the inclusion of the word ‘storing’, the interception may 
ultimately lead the policing and security agencies to look at some, if not all of the 
content, as per the general understanding of the word ‘content’.348   Confusingly, 
should law enforcement require access to data that is not in the course of 
transmission, then this is known legally as ‘content’, which has not been defined 
in RIPA.  This has now been addressed and under section 261(6) of the IPA, 
content is defined as: 
“Content”, in relation to a communication and a telecommunications 
operator, telecommunications service or telecommunication system, 
means any element of the communication, or any data attached to or 
logically associated with the communication, which reveals anything of 
what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning (if any) of the 
communication, but -  
(a) any meaning arising from the fact of the communication or 
from any data relating to the transmission of the 
communication is to be disregarded; and 
(b) anything which is systems data is not content. [My 
Emphasis] 
 
This appears to mean that should the content be inadvertently obtained as part the 
electronic communications data, for example the content of a text message or 
email in transmission, it is to be disregarded.  However, the IPA has not taken the 
opportunity to redefine ‘communications data’.  It is therefore difficult to assess if 
this definition of ‘content’ has remedied the confusion surrounding the word 
                                                
347 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 2(7).  See Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 261(5) 
348 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 1(1) and 1(A)(3) and Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s 48(1)(4), 
Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 3(1)(a), and Security Service Act 1989, s 1(2)(3) 
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‘storing’ under RIPA.  In 2013, the UK’s Court of Appeal in R v Coulson 
ultimately held that electronic communications data is to be classed as being in 
the course of transmission, when it is stored on an Internet server.349  This in turn 
means, that what may at first be generally considered to be content, such as an 
email, is in fact communications data, whilst it is being, or has been sent, or is in 
fact stored on an Internet server.   
 
The impact of Coulson cannot be understated, as it permits UK law enforcement 
agencies’ access to the contents stored on an Internet server.  Storing information 
by this method has increased exponentially in the 21st Century, particularly since 
the introduction of the online ‘Cloud’ systems.  These ‘clouds’ allow vast 
amounts of data to be stored, as covered in Chapter Two, such as that saved on 
smartphones or other smart devices, or word documents and research papers.  It is 
debateable whether or not the definition of ‘content’ under the IPA has remedied 
this given it remains untested by the courts.  
 
Bulk Communications Data: Interception, Collection and Retention 
Bulk interception of electronic communications data was provided for under 
section 8(4) of RIPA.  Section 136 of the IPA has now replaced these provisions, 
maintaining law enforcement capabilities and introducing further safeguards.  The 
idea behind this power is to allow law enforcement agencies’ to effectively 
monitor the Internet traffic and for the interception of large volumes of electronic 
                                                
349 R v Coulson [2013] EWCA Crim 1026. 
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communications in order to acquire the communications of terrorists and serious 
criminals that would not otherwise be available.350  Should the warrant be 
authorised it could potentially establish links between known suspects, and also 
serve to increase the understanding of their behaviour.  It could also assist law 
enforcement to understand new technologies, and how connections and multiple 
methods of electronic communications are made.351 
 
It was argued during the IPA’s passage through Parliament that the initial 
collection and retention of bulk data lacked the requisite necessity and 
proportionality, despite a warrant having been granted.352  Anderson so much as 
agreed with this point, confirming that the, ‘bulk powers are extraordinarily broad 
in scope’.353  Eric King, the Director of ‘Don’t Spy On Us’ voiced concerns with 
regards the level of interception practiced by GCHQ in particular, 
disproportionately that permits the collection of, ‘50 billion pieces of 
communication every single day’.354  For King, it is this initial collection stage 
that lacks safeguards and accountability, and is deployed as a phishing exercise at 
the will of the security agencies.355  He provided an example whereby GCHQ 
                                                
350 Operational Case for Bulk Powers, p26, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504187/Operational_Case_fo
r_Bulk_Powers.pdf  
351 Draft Codes of Practice: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Paragraph 6.3, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561091/16-10-
18_Interception_code_of_practice_draft.pdf accessed 8 December 2016 
352 Supra as per First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, at Column 13 
353 Ibid at Column 7 
354 Ibid at Column 13 
355 Ibid 
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intercepted, ‘50 million pieces of webcam traffic’, with three to eleven per cent of 
material containing undesirable nudity, under a computer programme named 
Optic Nerve.356  Once collected, GCHQ, ‘deployed facial recognition on it’ 
without any further warrants being required’.357  A computer programme 
completes this process, with little or no input from a human source.358  With the 
processing complete, it is the next stage that requires authorisation via a targeted 
warrant.359  In admitting that the security agencies however, require the power to 
collect data and analyse it, King confirmed that the more one knows and 
understands about the inner workings of the security agencies the ‘more 
reassured’ one becomes.360  There certainly exists within the political 
establishment a clear difference of opinion between those that know and 
understand this work to those that do not in offering support for the IPA and 
increased State powers.  Considering the sheer amount of terrorism related 
electronic communications data traffic and the successful expert use by IS as 
covered in Chapter Two, such powers are essential in reducing and combating the 
threat posed. 
 
In procedural terms, a bulk interception warrant can be issued under section 136 
of the IPA, should conditions A and B be met.  Condition A represents the main 
purpose of the warrant, which must be one or more of the following: 
                                                
356 Ibid  
357 Ibid  
358 Ibid at Column 14 
359 Ibid at Column 13 
360 Ibid at Column 20 
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(a) the interception of overseas-related communications; 
(b) the obtaining of secondary data from such communications.361 
 
Condition B is that the warrant authorises the person to whom it is addressed to 
secure any of the following activities: 
(a) the interception, in the course of their transmission by means of a 
telecommunication system, of communications described in the 
warrant; 
(b) the obtaining of secondary data from communications transmitted by 
means of such a system and described in the warrant; 
(c) the selection for examination, in any manner described in the warrant, 
of intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant; 
(d) the disclosure, in any manner described in the warrant, of anything 
obtained under the warrant to the person to whom the warrant is 
addressed or to any person acting on that person’s behalf.362 
 
Importantly the IPA defines secondary data in relation to communications, which 
could include: 
1. messages sent between items of network infrastructure to enable the 
system to manage the flow of communications; 
2. router configurations or firewall configurations; 
3. software operating systems; 
4. the period of time a router had been active in a network; 
5. the location of a meeting in a calendar appointment; 
6. photograph information.363 
Interestingly, section 136(5) permits under the warrant the interception of 
communications that are not specifically described in the warrant.   This means 
that law enforcement agencies’ are able to use unconstrained methods not reliant 
upon the type of surveillance device being used or the type of communication 
                                                
361 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 136(2) 
362 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 136(4) 
363 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 137.  See also Investigatory Powers Bill Explanatory Notes, p.50, 8 June 2016, 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0040/17040en.pdf accessed 8 
December 2016, 
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being intercepted.  Surveillance legislation has been somewhat hindered in the 
past, focused on the types of devices and surveillance techniques used.  For 
example as evidenced in Khan v UK, the Interception of Communications Act 
1985 (ICA) failed at the time to offer a progressive surveillance framework, instead 
being limited by surveillance technology such as cordless telephones and private 
networks.364  
 
Bulk Acquisition  
Following the same procedural authorisation process is section 158, which deals 
with the power to issue bulk acquisition warrants.  According to the bulk 
acquisition draft code of practice, this type of warrant authorises the obtainment 
of electronic communications data from a communication service provider 
(CSP).365  This may comprise of the systems data and the communications 
content.366  Here the UK Government have introduced a two-stage process, firstly 
obtaining the bulk electronic communications data from a CSP, and secondly 
selecting from that data, communications to be examined.367  This type of warrant 
is not targeted and thereby not constrained to a specific operation.  It is therefore 
limitless in terms of the amount of electronic communications data that can be 
obtained.  This is a seriously invasive power and as such only members of the 
                                                
364 Khan v UK [2000] 31 EHRR 1016, ECHR 195. See I. Leigh (1986) A Tappers Charter? Public Law, 8-18.  See also 
Effick [1994] 99 Cr. App. R. 312, and Halford v UK [1997] EHRLR 540 
365 Bulk Acquisition Draft Code of Practice, Published for consultation alongside the Investigatory Powers Bill, 
Home Office, Spring 2016, at 1.2, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505412/Bulk_Acquisition_dr
aft_code_of_practice.PDF accessed 22 December 2016 
366 Ibid at 2.8 
367 Ibid at 3.1 
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security agencies can apply for the warrant, such as the Secret Intelligence 
Service and GCHQ.   
 
The Type of Data: Access and Procedure 
Two issues arise from both the bulk powers of interception and acquisition of 
electronic communications data.  These are the type of communication and then 
the problems associated with Internet Connection Records (ICR).  Firstly, once 
the electronic communications data is intercepted and then stored, law 
enforcement such as the Secret Intelligence Service can acquire the 
communications data under the IPA.368  With similar provisions present to those 
governing interception, it must be evidenced that obtaining such electronic 
communications data is necessary for one of the purposes set out in the IPA, and 
that it is necessary and proportionate to do so.369  Additional safeguards are 
provided currently by the office of the Interception Commissioner, currently the 
Rt. Hon. Sir Stanley Burnton, (although this position will be amalgamated to 
create a new Independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner), who oversees the 
security agencies arrangements for access to the data.370 
 
Procedurally, in accessing the collected communications data, it is important to 
note at this point that the level of authorisation required depends on the level of 
information requested, and by whom.  Public authorities for example, can only 
                                                
368 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 158(1) 
369 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 158(1)(b).  See also Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 2(7) 
370 See https://www.mi5.gov.uk/interception-of-communications accessed 29 April 2016, and http://www.iocco-
uk.info accessed 29 April 2016 
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request service use information and subscriber information.  Policing and security 
agencies however, may be able to access all three types, dependent upon the 
specific agency.  Whilst a designated police inspector may request and authorise 
subscriber information, only a superintendent may authorise a request for traffic 
data and service use information.  In order to understand further, RIPA divides 
communications data into three categories: 
1) Traffic Data that identifies the person or suspect, the apparatus used, 
and the location or address of where a communication is transmitted 
including the information about a computer file or a program, which 
has been accessed or run in the course of sending or receiving a 
communication.371  Traffic data includes location software used by 
mobile telephones (geodata) when either stationary or moving, and 
private Wi-Fi networks.  According to the Acquisition Code, website 
addresses beyond the Uniform Resource Locator (url) first slash are 
not traffic data, but classed as contents.  IP addresses remain classed 
as traffic data;372   
2) Service Use Information relates to the use of a specific 
telecommunications service.  The service provider records and holds 
the usage frequency and specific details of the service used by the 
citizen, such as the amount of data downloaded;373   
3) Subscriber information includes data such as their postal address, 
telephone numbers and email address.  It can also cover their bank 
account data and personal information divulged at the time the citizen 
requested an account with the service provider.374  [My emphasis] 
 
However, providing the interception of electronic communications is necessary 
and proportionate, the law enforcement agencies’ can use their powers of 
                                                
371 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 21(4)(a), 21(6) 
372 Acquisition Code, paragraph 2.20 states, ‘…traffic data may identify a server or domain name (i.e. a web site) but 
not a web page’.  As pointed out by the Interception of Communications Commissioners Office, there is a degree 
of ambiguity arising out of the absence of any definition of ‘content’ within RIPA.  See the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner’s submission to D. Anderson Q.C. (2015).  Also note the Acquisition Code 
provides at 2.26 and at 42 that IP addresses can be stored by a service provider in conjunction with subscriber 
information, in which case it would need to be treated as subscriber information, not traffic data. 
373 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 21(4)(b) and s 22(4) 
374 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 21(4)(c) 
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interception through RIPA and the IPA, which is issued under any international 
mutual assistance agreement.375   
 
Internet Connection Records: The definition and controversy 
ICR’s have caused some controversy and are covered specifically by section 62 of 
the IPA.  According to the UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May they are the modern 
day equivalent of an itemised telephone bill, a fact others uncompromisingly 
dispute.376  The Shadow Home Secretary Andy Burnham for example has argued 
they are much more enlightening than an itemised bill, revealing an itinerary style 
that includes location data.377  Regardless, May laboured the point that: 
…Internet connection records do not provide access to a person’s full web 
browsing history. An Internet connection record is a record of what 
Internet services a device or person has connected to, not every web page 
they have visited.378 [My emphasis] 
 
ICR’s however, are not a real record per se, or indeed similar to that of a call data 
record held by telephone service operators.  At best they may be a collection of, 
or a subset of retained electronic communications data.  The problem here is that 
‘an operator subject to a retention order will have to decide on a case-by-case 
basis what data the operator shall retain, and it will not be the same for all 
                                                
375 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ss 4, 6.  See also Investigatory Powers Act 2016, ss 10, 15, 18, 20, 
40, 56, and Schedule 9, 1 
376 House of Commons Second Reading, 15 March 2016, Column 830, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160315/debtext/160315-
0001.htm#16031546000001  
377 Ibid  
378 Ibid at Column 820 
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operators and could be very different indeed’.379  The next issue is with regards 
the definition of ICR’s under the IPA, whereby section 62(7) states that ICR’s 
means communications data that:  
…may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, a telecommunications 
service to which a communication is transmitted by means of a 
telecommunication system for the purpose of obtaining access to, or 
running, a computer file or computer program, and, comprises data 
generated or processed by a telecommunications operator in the process 
of supplying the telecommunications service to the sender of the 
communication (whether or not a person).380 
Clearly, as indicated in earlier text provided by the UK Government, ICR’s will 
be used by law enforcement to identify the communications service to which a 
device is connected; in an attempt to close the capabilities gap as discussed in 
Chapter Two.381  According to the Government an ICR does not represent a 
citizen’s full Internet browsing history, only a record of the services connected to.  
Therefore, following this statement, an ICR would only show the URL up to the 
first slash, as in www.blarblarblar.co.uk, as opposed to 
www.blarblarblar.co.uk/isis/mosul.  On this basis, ‘it seems reasonable to assume 
that in relation to app-based access to the Internet via smartphones or tablets the 
ICR would include the activation of the app, but nothing further’.382   
                                                
379 Andrews and Arnold Ltd. (2015) Written evidence (DIP0001) submitted to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, available at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-committee.pdf accessed 24 November 
2016 
380 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 62(7) 
381 Draft Investigatory Powers Bill: Guide to Powers and Safeguards, November 2015, Cm9152 
382 P. Bernal, Supplementary written evidence (IPB0018) submitted to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, available at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-committee.pdf accessed 24 November 
2016 
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The definition of ICR’s do not seem to be satisfactory in terms of precision and 
clarity, and the accompanying codes of practice offer no real practicable 
assistance as such.  The IPA describes the functions of ICR’s are to identify 
which ‘person or apparatus is using an internet service where, the service and time 
of use are already known, but the identity of the person or apparatus using the 
service is not known’.383  According to the IPA, ICR’s can be used to identify 
which internet communications service is being used, and when and how it is 
being used, and by whom.384 Finding who the specific person was who used the 
particular device is only possible however, by performing some sort of profiling.   
Additionally, the ICR could also be utilised to confirm the identity of the person 
who is obtaining access to, or running a computer file or computer program, 
which involves making available, or acquiring, material whose possession is a 
crime’.385  For Bernal, all three examples of how ICR’s can be used are ‘poorly 
suited to performing these functions’.386  ICR’s can potentially carry more 
communications data than required, hence be more intrusive on the individual’s 
privacy, and at the same time provide inadequate information to enable for law 
                                                
383 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 62(3) 
384 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 62(3) 
385 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 62(3) 
386 P. Bernal (2015) Supplementary written evidence (IPB0018) submitted to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, available at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-committee.pdf accessed 24 November 
2016 
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enforcement to make a decision as to whether or not target surveillance be 
initiated.387   
 
Prime Minister Theresa May’s statement is misleading therefore, because ICR’s 
cannot simply be equated to an itemised telephone bills because they do not 
record whom a citizen has been communicating with.388  Instead they show a 
record of websites visited which has the potential to reveal innocent intimate, 
personal and sensitive data.389  The information that can be attained from this 
Internet history is much higher than an itemised telephone bill, with the potential 
to tell the citizens’ political interests, general health, and sexuality.  According to 
Bernal this, ‘makes ICRs ideal for profiling and potentially subject to function-
creep/mission- creep’.390  It would appear that using ICR’s in this fashion is the 
only way of accurately assessing the identity of the user.  As covered in Chapter 
Two, IP addresses are useless to this regard.  Because of the amount of 
information that an ICR can yield, it is not surprising that the Government would 
want potential access to it in preventing serious crime, and pre-empting a terrorist 
attack.   
 
                                                
387 Ibid 
388 Ibid 
389 Ibid 
390 Ibid 
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These powers are not only aimed at terrorism however, given that ICR’s are often 
used to combat online child sexual exploitation.391  Ministers Simon Hoare and 
Lucy Frazer noted that ICR’s had led to the identification by police of at least 600 
child abusers in the UK, where it was shown that, ‘92% of the communications 
data requested proved helpful’.392  Anderson’s 2015 report further highlights this 
fact, where only 1% of communications data was used in investigating terrorism, 
against 15 % used for sexual offences and vulnerable or missing persons.393 
Terrorism 1% 
Firearms and explosives 5% 
Financial offences 10% 
Sexual offences and Vulnerable or 
missing persons 
15% (9% and 6%) 
 
Harassment or stalking and 
Homicide, attempted murder & 
threats to kill 
15% (7% and 8%) 
Drugs offences 25% 
Offences against the person and 
Offences against property 
22% (11% for each) 
                                                
391 House of Commons Second Reading, 15 March 2016, Column 830, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160315/debtext/160315-
0001.htm#16031546000001 
392 First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, Investigatory Powers Bill, Publications on the Internet, Column 
13 and 20, 24 March 2016 available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/160324/am/160324s01.ht
m accessed 30 August 2016 
393 Supra as per D. Anderson (2015) p.135 
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Other offences 7% 
Table 1, percentage of electronic communications data used for specific crimes, taken from D. Anderson (2015) 
A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, London: The Stationary Office. 
 
Internet Connection Records: Vulnerabilities 
The problem with operators holding ICR data is the linked risk to criminality, 
meaning that the potential for new vulnerabilities are fashioned by the gathering 
and retaining of ICR’s.  In terms of cybercrime and cyber terrorism, the databases 
of ICR’s could potentially be interfered with, or in other words hacked into, and 
used maliciously.  The recent hacking of TalkTalk provides an example of this 
vulnerability to data privacy.  According to news reports, as opposed to being 
carried out by professional criminals, it was in fact a bored 17 year old who 
wanted to ‘show off’.394  Cyber security is becoming increasingly important in the 
21st Century, and it is concerning to note that some service providers do not have 
adequate high levels of security built in to their frameworks.395  It is clear from 
news reports that, even for those that do have high levels of security, companies 
such as Apple and Sony, and some banking corporations, have all been vulnerable 
to hacking.396  It therefore follows that ICR databases may provide an attraction 
                                                
394 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37990246 accessed 7 December 2016 
395 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-38223805 accessed 7 December 2016.  See also 
http://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2016/06/uk-inquiry-threatens-fine-isps-internet-data-security-fails.html 
accessed 7 December 2016 
396 See for example: L. Bell (2016) Millions of Apple devices at risk of attack due to a security bug, Wired Cyber 
Security, 22 July 2016, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-security-bug-hackers-steal-your-
password accessed 7 December 2016.  See https://www.ft.com/content/f6c1c0b3-af81-3ac8-812c-d26a66e5ba8a 
accessed 7 December 2016. See also https://hakin9.org/hacking-social-media-threats-vulnerabilities-threats-anti-
threats-strategies-for-social-networking-websites/ accessed 7 December 2016 
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for cyber criminals.  Additionally, the vulnerabilities are intensified by the 
potential for human error or internal corruption.397  
 
Internet Connection Records and Open Source Intelligence: The privacy 
conundrum 
Although the necessity of these bulk powers to attain ICR’s have proved useful, it 
remains the case that electronic communications data surveillance represents the 
new contemporary method of collecting information about an individual.  This is 
understandable given the growth in technology and the use of citizens’, which 
continually expands as highlighted in Chapter Two.  For Clarke, this has resulted 
in this type of surveillance becoming the guiding principle for ‘social control, 
particularly by managing populations through collection, sorting, management 
and risk assessment of data.398  Further evidence of this move is located in the 
2008 Home Affairs Select Committee’s report titled ‘A Surveillance Society’, 
where it was concluded that the ‘foundation for all new surveillance is the 
database’.399  According to Haggerty, data surveillance has moved from the 
traditional top-down, or panoptic state approach to more of an informational 
gathering exercise carried out by retailers, employers, insurers, HMRC, and 
                                                
397 Ibid 
398 R. Clarke (1991) Information Technology and Dataveillance, in C. Dunlop and R. Kling (eds), Computerization and 
Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices (Academic Press, Inc. Waltham) 
399 Home Affairs Select Committee, A Surveillance Society? Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008 (HC 2008-2009 58-I) 
 128 
information intermediaries such as social networks and online gaming 
companies.400   
 
In a rather surprising twist law, enforcement agencies have copied the approach 
taken by private companies and implemented this use to their own procedures.  
Following the changes in technology, as Trottier proffers, data surveillance in 
terms of social media policing forms part of this new contemporary framework.401  
This move however, is essential in dealing with the issues raised in Chapter Two, 
concerning how terrorist groups communicate by exploiting social media and 
electronic communications.  Considering private companies and private 
individuals use Open Source Intelligence and Social Media Intelligence, to 
monitor other people in way that might assist in private civil litigation matters, it 
is not a tall ask to permit the same ability for Law enforcement, in assisting them 
to prevent a terrorist attack. 
 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is defined as the collection, analysis and use 
of data from openly available sources for intelligence purposes.402  Whilst there is 
some overlap, Social Media Intelligence (SMI or SOCMINT) involves the 
analysis of social media, Facebook and YouTube for example, in order to measure 
                                                
400 K. Haggerty (2006) Tearing Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon, in D. Lyon, Theorizing Surveillance: The 
Panopticon and Beyond (Willan).  See R. Jones (2000) Digital Rule: Punishment, Control and Technology, Punishment 
and Society 2:5.  See also R. Boyne (2000) Post Panopticism, Economy and Society 29, 285.  See also W. Bogard (2006) 
Welcome to the Society of Control, in K. D. Haggerty and R.V. Ericson eds, The New Politics of Surveillance Visibility 
(University of Toronto Press) 
401 D. Trottier (2012) Social Media as Surveillance: Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World, (Ashgate Publishing) 
402 B.J. Koops, J. Hoepman and R. Leenes (2013) Open source intelligence and privacy by design, Computer Law and 
Security Review 29:676 
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and arguably monitor the ‘millions of people digitally arguing, talking, joking, 
condemning and applauding online’, in order to facilitate the identification of 
criminal activity, ‘indicate early warning of outbreaks of disorder, provide 
information and intelligence about groups and individuals, and help understand 
and respond to public concerns’.403  Considering IS’s decentralised electronic 
communications strategy raised in Chapter Two, monitoring individuals that like 
or re-tweet for example, an IS’s message is essential.  They both represent the 
new 21st Century categories of intelligence used by the UK policing security 
agencies.404  As above, private companies and individuals, for example a solicitor, 
also use this type of intelligence in identifying fraudulent civil claims for personal 
injury.  Considering the extensive use of the Internet and open sources data, it is 
not surprising to see an increase in the utilisation for intelligence. 
 
The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report of 2015 highlighted the fact, 
that the Internet carries the communications of 2.4 billion Internet users. In one 
minute, those 2.4 billion transfer 1,572,877 gigabytes of data, including 204 
million emails, 4.1 million Google searches, 6.9 million messages sent via 
Facebook, 347,222 posts to Twitter and 138,889 hours of video watched on 
YouTube.405  This highlights the point that increasingly people are living their 
                                                
403 D. Omand (2012) #Intelligence, Centre for Analysis of Social Media, Demos, 24 April, available at 
http://www.demos.co.uk/project/intelligence/ accessed 22 August 2016 
404 D. Omand, J. Bartlett and C. Miller (2012) Introducing Social Media Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security 
Review 27:1 
405 Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and security: a modern and transparent legal framework, HC 1075 
2014/15, 12 March 2015, paragraph 55 
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lives online.  Having the ability to tap into this dearth of information has proved 
essential for law enforcement agencies’.  To this end, the potential value of 
OSINT and SOCMINT available to law enforcement agencies’ was first realised 
during the investigation into the London 2011 riots.406  This allows for 
intelligence-led policing, where predictive analytical software is used to anticipate 
and predict crime.407  According to the RUSI report of 2015, the majority of 
intelligence that was collected by UK policing and security agencies, up to 95%, 
originated from OSINT, not closed sources.408  It could be argued that this is a 
much more cost-effective method of conducting electronic communication data 
surveillance.409  James Clapper of the US Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence described social media in 2014 as being ‘huge for intelligence 
purposes’.410  Anderson also refers to the increasing use and central reliance on 
OSINT and SOCMINT in his 2015 report.411   
 
                                                
406 P. Lewis et al (2012) Reading the Riots: Investigating England’s Summer of Disorder (Guardianshorts, London School of 
Economics and The Guardian, London 2012) Chapter 8 
407 C. Miller and S. Ginnis et al (2015) The road to representivity (Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at 
Demos/IPSOS Mori, September 2015) at http://www.demos.co.uk/project/the-road-to-representivity/ accessed 
12 July 2015 
408 The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent 
Surveillance Review Panel of the Independent Surveillance Review, Whitehall Reports, 13 July 2015, available at 
https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-reports/democratic-licence-operate-report-independent-surveillance-
review, paragraph 3.16 
409 Ibid  
410 See https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/leadership/director-of-national-intelligence  
411 Supra as per D. Anderson Q.C. (2015) p.55 
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This type of electronic communications data surveillance fits with the 
understanding of intelligence-led policing.412  For Tilley, this represents the best 
practical way for the police to do business, ‘more smartly, incorporating modern 
information technology and modern methods’, involving ‘developing and 
maintaining a detailed and up-to-date picture of patterns of crime and criminality 
in order to intervene most effectively’.413  Fitting in further with the risk-
management style of counterterrorism measures, intelligence-led policing has 
shifted from reactive to proactive in nature.414  Examples of the operational and 
procedural side to OSINT and SOCMINT systems include the EU’s Virtuoso 
OSINT software.  This allows law enforcement agencies’ to gather together 
OSINT and Raytheon’s Rapid Information Overlay Technology (RIOT) in to one 
place, allowing assessments to be carried out quickly, by tracking an individual or 
group over different social networking sites.415 
 
This area of surveillance lacks expressed legal regulation and legal analysis.  The 
acquisition of OSINT and SOCMINT is carried out without the consent or 
perhaps knowledge of the user.  Perhaps this is simply down to the assumption 
                                                
412 N. Tilley (2008) Modern Approaches to Policing: Community, Problem Orientated and Intelligence Led, in T. Newburn, 
Handbook of Policing (Willan) pp.373-383 
413 Ibid 
414 T. Newburn, T. Williamson and A. Wright (2008) Handbook of Criminal Investigation (2nd edition, Willan) p.653. 
415 B.J. Koops (2013) Police Investigations in Internet Open Sources: Procedural Law Issues, Computer Law and 
Security Review 29:654.  See also, S. Vaughan-Nicols (2013) Raytheon Riot: Defence Spying is Coming to Social 
Networks, ZDNet, 12 February, available at http://www.zdnet.com/raytheon-riot-defense-spying-is-coming-to-
social-networks 7000011191/, See also R. Gallagher (2013) Software that Tracks People on Social Media Created 
by Defence Firm, The Guardian, 10 February, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/10/software-trackssocial-media-defence accessed 23 August 
2016 
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that such open source information is accessible to the world, and therefore ‘fair-
game’ for law enforcement surveillance.  However, considering the amount of 
private, personal and intimate information disclosed via social media, coupled 
with the increase in police surveillance, often used to profile and target 
individuals autonomously, presents a serious concern in terms of privacy.  Current 
surveillance laws do not regulate OSINT or SOCMINT, so they remain vague and 
underexplored.  In assessing this issue, for Gillespie OSINT and SOCMINT do 
not require legal regulation because ‘when postings are public and available for 
all to see it unlikely that it could be concluded that the viewing of the information 
is covert in that there must be an awareness that those in authority could look at 
the postings’.416  
 
However, receiving little public attention or legal analysis, private information 
shared on a public format such as social media, remains private if one were to 
follow the framework of the EU’s 2002 e-Privacy Directive, discussed at length in 
Chapter Four.  Accordingly, Omand et al concluded that the use of OSINT and 
SOCMINT must be ‘grounded in respect for human rights and the associated 
principles of accountability, proportionality and necessity’.417 
 
                                                
416 A. Gillespie (2009) Regulation of Internet Surveillance, European Human Rights Law Review 4, 552 
417 D. Omand, J. Bartlett and C. Miller (2012) Introducing Social Media Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security 
Review 27:1, 7.  See also D. Omand, J. Bartlett and C. Miller for UK Cabinet Office (2010) A Strong Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (HMSO 2010), p 5. See also G. Deleuze (1992) Postscripts on 
the Societies of Control, October Winter Ed 59:3 
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The US has led the key developments in this area, where a 2012 survey of 1,221 
federal, State and local law enforcement agencies’ highlighted four out of five 
enforcement professionals admitted to using SOCMINT in the course of their 
investigations.418  Of the many stories provided, one in particular was emphasised 
whereby the law enforcement official stated that: 
…Further investigation (utilising Facebook) revealed the threats were 
credible and we conducted follow-up investigations, which revealed a 
student intent on harming others (detailed emails and notebooks). The 
student was in the process of attempting to acquire weapons. It’s my 
belief we avoided a ‘Columbine’ type scenario.419 
 
For Trottier, the EU Member States and UK have been slow to utilise fully 
OSINT and SOCMINT in comparison, describing it as still in a ‘formative 
stage’.420  It did however prove pivotal during the police investigation into the 
London Riots in 2011, where encrypted Blackberry instant messages and Twitter 
were used.421  It was also interesting to see the police using social media to 
enhance the chances of identifying suspects, by creating a Flickr account and by 
                                                
418 LexisNexis® Risk Solutions (2012) Survey of Law Enforcement Personnel and Their Use of Social Media in 
Investigations. www.lexisnexis.com/investigations available at 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/whitepaper/Infographic-Social-Media-Use-in-Law-
Enforcement.pdf accessed 10 November 2016 
419 Ibid 
420 D. Trottier (2015) Open Source Intelligence, Social Media and Law Enforcement: Visions, Constraints and 
Critiques, European Journal of Cultural Studies 18:4-5, 542. 
421 V. Dodd (2011) Police accessed BlackBerry messages to thwart planned riots, The Guardian, 16 August 2011, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/16/police-accessed-blackberry-messages-thwart-riots 
accessed 10 November 2016, see also K. Wynn and K. Blyth (2011) Predicting a riot: at what price privacy? 
Practical Law Company, available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-507-6354, see also C. Williams (2011) London 
Riots: BlackBerry Manufacturer offers to help police, Telegraph, 8 August 2011, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/blackberry/8689313/London-riots-BlackBerry-manufacturer-offers-to-
help-police-in-any-way-we-can.html.  See also J. Ball and P. Lewis (2011) Twitter and the Riots: How the News 
Spread, The Guardian, 7 December 2011 available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/07/twitter-
riots-how-news-spread accessed 23 August 2016 
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posting pictures they effectively conscripted the public to assist in the 
identification of individuals.422  Although perhaps beyond the ambit of the thesis, 
police forces across the UK have recently created Facebook accounts and often 
post pictures of wanted suspects.423  Exact figures are difficult to attain, as is the 
actual effectiveness however, in 2012 a news report suggested that there were 
4,908 reports in which Facebook and Twitter were factored.424   
 
Similar to the US, as part of OSINT and SOCMINT, the UK has started to use 
predictive profiling technological systems such as the IBM Predictive system.425  
In 2013, the UK launched the EMOTIVE project using an OSINT approach 
whereby the experimental automated software scanned up to 2000 tweets per 
second.426  In response to the potential growth in utilising open sources as part of 
law enforcement intelligence, the UK College of Policing in 2015 issued guidance 
on its use.427  It notes that ‘open sources of information are widely available but 
                                                
422 J. Bartlett, C. Miller, J. Crump and L. Middleton (2013) Policing in an Information Age, Centre for Analysis of 
Social Media, Demos, March, available at 
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may not be accurate, reliable or valid’.428  Despite this, when used in conjunction 
with other intelligence sources, it has been proved to be useful in seeking a 
prosecution for terrorist offences.429  This was seen recently with the prosecution 
of Anjem Choudary and Mohammed Rahman, following their online posts on 
YouTube, Twitter and on an extremist website, encouraging support for the IS 
terrorist group.430  Whilst this is an important point, Choudary was a key figure in 
al-Muhajiroun, a group that was proscribed by the UK.  Choudary was prolific in 
his quest, constantly re-inventing the group using different names following 
continuous proscription.  Some of the names used were Ghurabaa, Isman4UK, and 
Muslims Against Crusades.  In supporting IS law enforcement assessed 20 years’ 
worth of material, held on 333 electronic devices containing 12.1TB of data.431 
 
The law enforcement agencies’ use of OSINT and SOCMINT has yielding some 
positive results.  Concerns turn on two specific points however, being they 
potentially lack legal regulation and privacy safeguards.  It terms of legal 
regulation, it is not as simple to merely state the information in the public domain 
is fair-game for authorities to use as part of their data mining or profiling 
exercises, as this should almost be expected.  Rules exist through RIPA, the IPA 
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and the other Acts of Parliament as per above, controlling access to electronic 
communications data and equipment inference discussed below.  Bartlow, 
drawing on Semitsu’s words, confirms that: 
Facebook is a giant surveillance tool, no warrant required, which the 
government can use in a mind boggling creative range of ways with 
almost no practical constraints from existing laws.432 
 
Whilst there may be some obviousness to the fact that SOCMINT should not 
require privacy protection, Edwards and Urquhart note three rebutted points.433  
First is the potential it greatly advances intelligence in terms of data mining and 
profiling.  This is because, in addition to pictures, videos and interest links, the 
authorities peruse through the individuals friends list, or follows and followers, in 
order to draw up a type of social graph.434  Another important point to mention is 
the fact some social media sites automatically post an individual’s location upon 
posting.435  This type of profiling, could lead authorities to draw a ‘guilty by 
association’ conclusion.  Inferences can also be drawn from this type of data, 
utilising software such as EMOTIVE, whereby the analysis is done through 
automated algorithmic means targeting online behaviours, rather than involving at 
that early stage, human scrutiny.  It has been evidenced that an analysis of 
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Facebook ‘Likes’ can be used to indicate the most sensitive of data including 
sexuality for example.  According to a recent study carried out at Cambridge 
University, ‘by mining Facebook Likes, the computer model was able to predict a 
person’s personality more accurately than most of their friends and family’.436  
 
The second point surrounds the reliability of the content posted on social media.  
One may find oneself ‘tagged’ in a picture that is either not you, or has been 
doctored to a severe extent.437  One can also be added to groups and pages without 
actually accepting the invitation.438  The third and final observation point revolves 
around the constant changes in social media platforms that require the user to 
update their privacy settings regularly.  As highlighted by Edwards and Urquhart, 
‘different privacy settings and different changes, apply to different types of 
content, such as posts, comments, groups, photos and friends lists’.439  It is both 
well known that some users are deluded in their belief that all the information on 
social media is private, and that they have protected themselves adequately by 
updating their security settings.440  For these reasons, it is argued this, ‘contributes 
strongly to an argument that material placed on social media can still carry with it 
reasonable expectations of privacy’.441  This is continually highlighted through 
Facebook for example, whereby despite reassurances that information added to 
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Facebook will remain safe and secure, some users post a meaningless notice re-
affirming their privacy. 
 
Figure 13 taken from https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/10/facebook-will-make-all-posts-public-
not/ accessed 8 December 2016 
 
Despite the UK Government recent ability to provide legal regulation, there 
remains no specific guidance, or indeed a mention in the UK surveillance 
legislation regarding the acquisition of OSINT and SOCMINT data.  There is 
furthermore little evidence to suggest the policing authorities consider them as 
constrained by RIPA, or now the IPA by extension.442  This is not surprising 
given that open sources can be used by anyone, such as an employer who can 
Google search a prospective employee and access their social media, without a 
warrant or authority.  Therefore, one might argue why law enforcement state 
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agencies be handicapped by having to obtain an authority, not forgetting that 
access to such communications data could save citizens’ lives. 
 
Considering the reality of social media’s use it could be argued such data 
collection should fall within the meaning of RIPA and IPA, meaning that it is 
treated the same as covert and intrusive, and thereby within the remit of 
interception of communications data.443  This would create a safeguarding level of 
protection for an individual’s privacy, requiring the same authorisations, and 
internal and external controlling mechanisms.  Floinn and Ormerod purpose an 
interception warrant be necessary, especially when policing authorities utilise 
‘backdoor’ methods, by means of equipment interference, in order to acquire 
direct messages send through social media.444  Whilst one could assume such 
messages are no longer within the definition of communications data, section 2(7) 
of RIPA extends the period of transmission to ‘anytime when the system is used 
for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or 
otherwise have access to it’.445  This would fit with the earlier mentioned case R v 
Coulson where it was held voicemail messages stored for future use remained in 
transmission.446  The impact of the IPA on this legal authority is as yet unknown. 
 
                                                
443 M. O’Floinn and D. Ormerod (2011) Social networking sites, RIPA and Criminal Investigations, Criminal Law 
Review 10:766 
444 Ibid 
445 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 2(7) 
446 R v Coulson [2013] EWCA Crim 1026 
 140 
What is clear from RIPA and the IPA is the fact that the main aim is to intercept 
communications data in ‘real time’.  This is essential to law enforcement in 
keeping up with the potential terrorists, and allows them to pre-empt the next step, 
as the terrorists’ progress with their plans.  It remains unclear if an interception 
warrant would be appropriate, given it would have to remain in place for an 
indefinite period.  For Edwards and Urquhart it ‘remains an open problem if an 
interception warrant could appropriately be issued after a social media post had 
been read and perhaps replied to’.447  This could have further impact on an 
individual’s right to privacy and data protection, particularly for those not 
suspected of criminal activity.  Access to this type of data is invaluable to the 
UK’s policing and security agencies.  It has been shown that the intrusive power 
of communication interception is one of the most important techniques that can be 
used, by only a small number of policing agencies for specific purposes, in the 
investigation of terrorism.448  It is in this sense that interception of 
communications data, OSINT and SOCMINT, supports criminal investigations by 
providing pivotal intelligence.449  The Director-General of the Office of Security 
and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) pointed out the importance this power permits: 
Intelligence [from interception] has led directly to the prevention of 
terrorist attacks and serious crime, the success of operations aimed at 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
saving of lives. Overall, RIPA interception is a critical tool in 
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investigations into the full range of threats to national security.450 [My 
emphasis] 
In Anderson’s 2015 report, policing and security agencies in the UK laboured the 
point that inception was vital to the success of their work.  Of this the Security 
Service said that interception powers were crucial where intelligence gained is 
unique to electronic communications data.451  According this would be hard to 
replicate.452  The National Crime Agency (NCA) went further and confirmed that 
the intelligence gathered from interceptions electronic communications data 
assisted them in prioritising their work.  They continued: 
…For some areas of NCA activity…there are no practical alternatives to 
using…interception…In 2013-14, interception played a critical role in 
investigations that resulted in…Over 2,200 arrests; Over 750kg of heroin 
and 2,000kg of cocaine seized; Over 140 firearms seized; and Over 
£20,000,000 seized. Police impressed upon [Anderson] that intercepted 
material may be useful in other types of cases, ranging from corruption 
investigations to domestic murder.453 [My emphasis] 
The Director General of the Security Service in response to Rifkind’s 2013 report 
into access to communications data stated: 
…access to communications data of one sort or another is very important 
indeed. It’s part of the backbone of the way in which we would approach 
investigations. I think I would be accurate in saying there are no 
significant investigations that we undertake across the service that don’t 
use communications data because of its ability to tell you the who and the 
when and the where of your target’s activities. It tends to be relatively 
reliable. It’s relatively accessible at the moment in a number of areas, and 
from our point of view it’s a very, very important capability…454 
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Whilst it is accepted there are issues and concerns over citizens’ data protection 
and privacy rights, the key points raised here and in Chapter Two, highlight the 
fact that in today’s communications culture and issues related to law enforcement 
having to carry out surveillance, these powers are essential.  Safeguarding a 
citizen’s right to life must be law enforcements primary concern.  Data protection 
and privacy rights must at these times take a back seat.  In order to access some 
types of communications data, such as emails that have not been sent but rather 
simply saved on the server, or on a note taking application on the smartphone 
device, law enforcement argue they need the power to interfere, or otherwise hack 
into the equipment. 
BULK EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE: COMPUTER NETWORK 
EXPLOITATION 
Bulk equipment interference is currently provided for under the section 176 of the 
IPA and sections 5 and 7 of ISA.  According to the UK Government, equipment 
interference is used increasingly by law enforcement to mitigate the inability to 
acquire intelligence through conventional bulk interception, and to access data 
directly from computers and other devices, which may never have otherwise have 
been obtainable.  Alongside the proposed power comes another draft code of 
practice made pursuant to the IPA.455  These types of warrants are only available 
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for operations overseas, whereby an example put forward illustrating the use 
states: 
Intelligence suggests that a [Islamic State]-inspired cell in a particular 
location in the Middle East is plotting an imminent bomb attack against 
UK interests in the region. Little is known about the individual members 
of the terrorist cell. However, it is known that a particular software 
package is commonly – but not exclusively – used by some terrorist 
groups. After using equipment interference to obtain equipment data from 
a large number of devices in the specified location, analysts apply 
analytical techniques to the data, starting with a search term (‘selector’) 
related to the known software package, to find common factors that 
indicate a terrorist connection. A series of refined searches of this kind, 
using evolving factors that are uncovered during the course of the 
analytical process, gradually identify devices within the original ‘pot’ of 
data collected that belong to the terrorist cell. Their communications 
(including content) can then be retrieved and examined. As the cell 
members can only be identified through a series of refined searches that 
cannot all be assessed in advance at the time the warrant is issued, second 
stage access controls are required to govern all of the data selection within 
the operation. Accordingly, a bulk equipment interference warrant is 
suitable.456 
 
For Anderson however, the UK Government has failed in this instance to make its 
case evidencing the need for this bulk power.457  He goes onto emphasise, the 
differences between the targeted equipment interference power and the bulk, 
where he notes his concerns lie ‘particularly in relation to equipment interference, 
in that, if one looks at the so-called targeted power and, in particular, at its 
potential thematic use, it is quite extraordinarily broad’.458  ‘The code of practice 
indicates that the power is very broad indeed and that matters because the 
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safeguards on the targeted power are less than the safeguards on bulk.  For a start, 
you do not need to be aiming only at somebody outside the UK, or people outside 
the UK. You can quite properly target it inside the UK’.459  
 
Bulk Equipment Interference: ‘Legalised hacking’ 
Following the R v Coulson authority, procedurally utilising Computer Network 
Exploitation (CNE) or Equipment Interference, the UK policing and security 
agencies can legitimately hack into Internet servers, such as cloud storage 
systems, and view the content without the person affected knowing.460  Martin 
raises two complaints that were made by Privacy International and a global 
coalition of Internet Service Providers (ISP) claiming the UK’s GCHQ lacked 
clear lawful authority to conduct specifically CNE operations.461 Since Martin’s 
assessment, the enactment of the IPA and the Coulson case, the government has 
introduced the Equipment Interference Code of Practice 2016, which confirms 
that an application must be made under s5 or s7 of the Intelligence Services Act 
1994: 
…a warrant under section 5 of the [ISA] should be sought wherever 
members of the Intelligence Services, or persons acting on their behalf or 
in their support, conduct equipment interference in relation to equipment 
located in the British Islands that would be otherwise unlawful…If the 
equipment is located outside the British Islands, and the interference 
would be otherwise unlawful, the Security Service should seek a warrant 
under section 5 of the 1994 Act. In the case of SIS [Secret Intelligence 
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Service/MI6] and GCHQ, an authorisation under section 7 may be 
obtained instead of a warrant under section 5.462 
 
Bulk equipment Interference introduces in essence legalised hacking and is 
perhaps one of the most intrusive powers available to law enforcement.  The fact 
these powers can be used on mass potentially places a camera into people’s 
homes by hacking into their personal computers and smartphones, and activating 
them.  The 21st Century citizen, for the main part at least, is totally reliant of their 
use of technology.  The amount of sensitive data people store on their 
smartphones and other devices continually increases, and at the same time the 
sophistication and fortitude of cyber criminals has increased.  In order to facilitate 
access to people’s smartphones and other devices, the IPA sets the scene 
introducing two new powers, the national security notice and the technical 
capabilities notice.  Both these elements target applications providers and 
encryption.  In contrast, two points are prevalent.  Firstly it would be logistically 
impossible, in terms of law enforcement resources to hack into every citizen’s 
piece of digital equipment, and secondly as pointed out in Chapter Two, terrorists 
are using encryption to hide their electronic communications data.463  This means 
that smartphones and other smart devices, once decrypted, may hold vast 
quantities of, and quality intelligence essential to law enforcement.   
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The Equipment Interference Code of Practice has been introduced to also assist 
those working in counterterrorism to understand the procedure.464  This code is 
one of many newly introduced by the Government that clearly show the 
authorisation processes that must be taken by the policing and security agencies.  
It worth mentioning here that the Security Service is governed by the Security 
Service Act 1989 and is primary concerned with internal threats to the UK’s 
national security.  The Secret Intelligence Service (more commonly referred to as 
MI6) is governed by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and are primarily 
concerned with external threats by obtaining and providing information relating to 
the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands, and to perform 
other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons in the interests of 
national security.465  Under the same authority, GCHQ’s functions are to monitor 
or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions, and to obtain and 
provide information derived from or related to such emissions or equipment, and 
from encrypted material in the interests of national security, or in support of the 
prevention or detection of serious crime.466  The service’s role here is essential, 
particularly in the 21st Century and when analysing the issues highlighted in 
Chapter Two, with regards the monitoring of electronic communications data.   
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Broad Powers with Restricted Use and Access: Evidence of necessity 
Within this broad yet restricted framework, according to the security agencies, 
accessing communications data or other information saved on computers or other 
devices, plays a pivotal role in gaining valuable information, allowing them to 
build an accurate picture of the suspect, and serves to make up for the loss of 
intelligence that may otherwise be unobtainable through other surveillance 
techniques, such as end to end encryption.467  Therefore ‘it can sometimes be the 
only method available by which the security services can acquire the data’.468  
The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind’s research findings into the murder of Fusilier 
Lee Rigby on the 22nd May 2013, found that such bulk powers allow the security 
services to see what the suspect has been looking at and downloading from the 
Internet.469  One of the terrorists, Adebowale in fact came under the security 
services gaze following his interest in online extremist material.470  Although 
parts of Rifkind’s report has been sanitised, it appears rather clear that in addition 
to the many extremist publications available online, Adebowale had been looking 
at ‘Inspire’ magazine, created by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to 
disseminate extremist information on the internet in English.471  According to the 
Security Service in 2012-13: 
                                                
467 Ibid  
468 Ibid  
469 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) p.59 
470 Ibid at p.59 
471 Ibid at p.59-60 
 148 
Inspire seeks to promote home-grown lone actor attacks, providing the 
ideological backing and practical instruction for users to commit attacks... 
[It] presents a variety of risks to the UK, including providing *** 
[sanitized text] instruction for violent attacks…we can now say that 
Inspire has been read by those involved in at least seven out of the ten 
attacks planned within the UK since its first issue [in 2010]. We judge 
that it significantly enhanced the capability of individuals in four of these 
ten attack plots…472 [My emphasis] 
Despite these findings, it is interesting to note that the Security Service would not 
carry out any intrusive surveillance on of individual if they had only read the 
Inspire or Dabiq magazine.  This is where we see the term proportionality added 
to necessity, as the Security Service confirm it would not be sufficient to qualify 
for intrusion.473  Some individuals may well simply look at the material to satisfy 
their curiosity or perhaps have extremist views and enjoy reading it.  However, 
there is no precise way at that stage of knowing if they are using the material in an 
instructive way to plan and carry out an attack.  The Security Service confirmed: 
That whilst there is a potential risk posed by those who access extremist 
media, they also caution that it does not follow that everyone who does so 
then engages with violent extremism.474 
 
Through the IPA authorities, law enforcement must evidence that the action 
required is necessary and proportionate.475  Both are international human rights 
principles that must be applied to electronic communications data surveillance.  
Representing an ECHR mechanism, any interference with a qualified right, in this 
case Article 8 the right to privacy must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
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This means that law enforcement must show a ‘pressing social need’, in addition 
to showing that the action required is proportionate.  When reviewing these 
essential elements it becomes quite clear that the threshold is reasonably high, in 
terms of authorising state action.  The disparity between those who merely read a 
terrorist publication and intend no violent action, to those that intend to carry out 
violence is limitless.  It is therefore questionable as to whether merely engaging 
with online extremist material such as Inspire or Dabiq, should be considered as 
sufficient grounds to justify intrusive action.476 
 
The End of Encryption: National security and technical capabilities notices 
Towards the end of the IPA lies perhaps one of the most intrusive powers ever 
placed on the statue book.  The ‘national security notice’ places an operator under 
an obligation to carry out any conduct, including the provision of services or 
amenities, facilitating anything done by the intelligence service.477  Comparable to 
the provision of bulk powers, the Secretary of State must make the order based on 
proportionality, which then must be approved by an independent Judicial 
Commissioner.478  Should the action be proportionate and necessary, there is in 
essence no time limit applicable within the IPA, simply what the Secretary of 
State feels is reasonable.479  This means that any notice could last three days, or 
three months or three years.  However, judicial authority will be required, which 
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should safeguard this power from any type of abuse.  Likewise, under s252 of the 
IPA, the Secretary of State can give any relevant service operator a ‘technical 
capability notice’.  Following a Judicial Commissioners approval, should the 
Secretary of State consider the necessity of the notice is required and 
proportionate; he may impose an obligation onto the operator to remove any 
electronic protection applied.480  Otherwise known as encryption, this power 
places the operator under the obligation to decrypt the communication or device, 
permitting law enforcement agencies’ unrestricted access as per the conditions of 
the notice.  This power can be imposed extra-jurisdictionally, which places many 
operators in a difficult position in terms of privacy protection requirements.481  It 
also has the potential to weaken the security model of many device and 
applications providers. 
 
Dealing with the latter point, as discussed in Chapter Two encryption is as 
ubiquitous as computing itself, and many people and companies rely on it for 
security.  Apple in particular noted their concern that removing encryption will 
put law-abiding citizens’ at risk from cyber criminals, rather than actually affect 
the cyber criminals who can continue to access other means of encryption.482  As 
with ICR, equipment interference could also impede the operation of smartphones 
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and other devices, rendering that particular device or server easier for criminals to 
access.  Apple states that, ‘surely such an intrusive power, if allowed at all, should 
only be targeted at the most serious of criminal suspects’, rather than on mass that 
overwhelmingly and inevitably includes innocent people.483  Apple in fact made a 
formal submission to the UK Joint Committee saying: 
We believe it would be wrong to weaken security for hundreds of millions 
of law-abiding customers so that it will also be weaker for the very few 
who pose a threat. In this rapidly evolving cyber-threat environment, 
companies should remain free to implement strong encryption to protect 
customers.484 
 
It could also affect their position in the international sense given many Internet 
service providers are located overseas, meaning they are put in the impossible 
position of choosing which law and which authority to follow, and which to 
disregard.  Apple for example has offices registered in Ireland, meaning they are 
subject to EU data protection laws, and the USA where US law controls access to 
that data by law enforcement.  Any failure to follow requirements under Title III 
of the US Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, would subject Apple to 
criminal sanctions for any unauthorised interception of content in transit.485  What 
must be remembered here of course is that the EU has been instrumental in 
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forming UK data protection law since 1995, so it may be likely that the IPA 
powers are compatible.486  These issues will be returned to when assessing the 
IPA’s legitimacy with EU law. 
 
Bulk Personal Datasets 
For now it is important to discuss the issue of bulk personal datasets facilitated by 
section 199 of the IPA, that have created quite a lot of criticism surrounding the 
authorisation and safeguards, and the storage of such information, along with the 
legitimate security risks of illegal hacking.  The datasets represent information 
that includes personal data relating to a number of individuals.  As with all 
proposed bulk powers, initially an automated computer programme processes the 
data, filters out the unnecessary and unwanted information, and effectively serves 
to profile individuals.487  Lynskey contends that this may be abused if adequate 
safeguards are not placed correctly, and ‘that decisions based on processing such 
datasets may profoundly affect individuals without their knowledge or consent’ 
falling within the data protection scope.488  Accordingly the IPA is antithetical 
towards data protection, conflicting with an individual’s autonomy and 
personality-enhancing aspects, by facilitating profiling.489  The IPA distinguishes 
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between ‘specific’ and ‘class’ bulk data sets.490  For Lynskey, ‘specific’ could 
mean for instance the national insurance number database, and the ‘class’ could 
be ‘all information held by football clubs about their season ticketholders, or 
CCTV data held by local borough councils’.491  The proposed introduction of 
these powers caused political concern with regards access to health records.  
Section 206 of the IPA does introduce additional safeguards for such information, 
where an explicit reason for such collection and access be made by a statement 
from the head of the intelligence service. 
 
Additionally, this type of mass surveillance profiling sits uneasy with rights such 
as the presumption of innocence and freedom from discrimination.492  This is 
simply because the profiling computer programme used, authorised by the initial 
warrant, effectively singles out an individual based on the fact he is part of a 
group or has particular characteristics, ‘that correlate to suspects or persons of 
interest to the security and intelligence agencies, and cannot therefore have 
negative freedom’.493  According to Lynskey, the individual, ‘may not know they 
a part of a group, or why this group is set apart from others, and he also may not 
know what future impact this categorisation might have on him. This Kafkaesque 
scenario shall become a reality for some UK residents under the IPA’.494 
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According to the Security Service, the personal datasets are held for analysis 
whereby analysts will ‘only look at the data relating to the minority who are of 
intelligence interest’.495  Therefore, although a large number of individuals may 
have personal information stored, for the majority of cases this will never actually 
be looked at.  They form an essential element in the identification of subjects of 
interest, or other individuals who ‘surface during the course of an 
investigation’.496  This assists the Security Service to establish communicational 
links between terrorist groups and potential terrorists, allowing them to filter out 
innocent citizens’ as quickly as possible, focusing instead on those that pose a 
threat.  According the Security Service confirm: 
The analysis of BPD is a critical part of our response to the increasingly 
complicated and challenging task of defending the UK's interests and 
protecting its citizens’ in a digital age.497 
The main aim is to protect citizen’s lives and ultimately, this is what the bulk 
powers are trying to achieve.  This is not a new power and the Security Service 
has been carrying out this function since the enactment of the SSA 1989.  At this 
point it is perhaps relevant to discuss positive case studies illustrating these 
powers in the practical sense.   
                                                
495 See https://www.mi5.gov.uk/bulk-data accessed 12 December 2016 
496 Ibid 
497 Ibid 
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BULK POWERS: THE CASE STUDIES 
Financially, these powers have made an impact on the amount of fraud committed 
in the UK, whereby the, ‘HMRC started using interception to support 
investigations into MTIC fraud.  As a result the level of attempted fraud has 
reduced substantially from an estimated high of £5 billion in 2005/2006 to an 
estimated current figure of £750 million’.498  Moving back to the terrorist threat in 
the late 2000s, bulk data enabled GCHQ to trigger a manhunt for a known 
terrorist linked to previous attacks on UK citizens’. At a time when other 
intelligence sources had gone cold, GCHQ was able to pick up the trail by 
identifying patterns of activity online believed to be unique to the suspect. 
Follow-up searches of bulk data provided further leads for the investigation. This 
work in turn highlighted links to extremists in the UK. Through a series of arrests, 
the network was successfully disrupted before any attack could place’.499  
Similarly in 2010 a UK ‘intelligence operation identified a plot, which came from 
the top of al-Qaida’s leadership structure, to send out waves of operatives to 
Europe to act as sleeper cells and prepare waves of attacks’ using a unique 
communications method.500  Working with international partners, GCHQ was 
able to identify operatives by querying bulk data collection for these distinctive 
communicative patterns.501 
 
                                                
498 D. Anderson, (2015) A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review London: The Stationary Office, p337 
499 Ibid 
500 Ibid 
501 Ibid 
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It has been said by the UK’s intelligence community that the nature of the 
international Islamist terror threat means that bulk data is the, ‘first and last line of 
defence’.502  The same has been said for the retention of such data collected where 
the studies have shown they can be put to great use in preventing and detecting 
serious crime.503  One particular case study highlighted that:  
‘UK authorities received intelligence from US authorities that an 
individual using email had sent a movie file of a woman sexually abusing 
a four-month-old girl. The log-on IP address for this account was 
registered to a male from Northampton. Further enquiries established that 
a girlfriend of the individual had three children all less than four years 
old. After investigation both were convicted of the serious sexual abuse of 
the children’.504   
 
This shows the necessity for bulk powers in terms of pre-empting crime and 
terrorist activity.   
 
Terrorist Communication: The Rationale for Bulk Powers 
Due to the terrorist group IS’s propaganda and marketing campaign, coupled with 
the encryption capabilities, leads to a situation whereby it has become difficult to 
distinguish friend from foe.  Determining who is and who is not a potential 
terrorist has become increasingly difficult in the 21st Century.  Porous borders 
within the EU, and terrorist attacks committed within the EU and the UK, by EU 
and UK citizens’, also known as ‘home-grown’, or ‘lone jihad’, mean it has 
become increasingly difficult for the law enforcement agencies’ to make this 
                                                
502 Ibid 
503 Ibid 
504 Ibid at pp339-340 
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determination.505  Friend or foe is now the question and conjoined with the fact 
terrorists lack a specific typecast has led to the EU and UK adopting risk 
management strategies to pre-empt and thereby prevent a terrorist attack.506  This 
is because this type of threat is posed from individuals outside of any terrorist 
organisational structure or franchise, and they could be relatively anyone within 
the UK and EU population, and could attack at any given moment.  In identifying 
potential terrorists, the UK Security Service highlighted this difficulty as 
explained to Sir Malcolm Rifkind: 
In order to maximise our chances of detecting such individuals, we use a 
set of factors identified as being common, but not unique, to many lone 
actors: an inability to cope with stress and anxiety; a pre-existing history 
of violence; mental health issues; blaming others for (personal or group) 
grievances; an immediate need to act to rectify grievances; social 
isolation; and significant interest in extremist material encouraging lone 
actor attacks. We use the factors, drawing on psychologists in our 
Behavioural Science Unit (BSU) where appropriate, in conjunction with 
other intelligence to inform risk assessments.507 
 
Traceability and Typecasting  
The key problem facing the UK is the traceability and typecasting of potential 
terrorists.  This threat is not exclusive to the UK and is reflective of a larger 
international problem.  Moeckli and King propose that the main problem facing 
policing and security agencies is the overall lack of the traceability of the terrorist 
threat to a clearly defined group, such as ETA, or the many factions of the Irish 
                                                
505 C. Walker (2008) Know Thine Enemy as Thyself: Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-Terrorism Laws, 
Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 32, 275-301, 276.  See also https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/al-
qacc84_idah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-e2809cinspire-guide-2-nice-operatione2809d.pdf 
506 Ibid 
507 The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, HC 795, 2014 at p.81 
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Republican Army (IRA) based in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.508  
The 21st Century international terrorist threat emanates from stateless organs, 
ubiquitous in nature, aimed at threatening the value systems of the Western world, 
rather than showing a particular grievance aimed at a specific State.509  Carter 
moves the analysis away from stateless groups and traces a new evolution of 
tactics, and subsequent growth in prevalence of the ‘self-radicalised’ terrorist, 
which commenced following al-Qaeda’s successful attack on the United States on 
11 September 2001.510  Following this analytical line, Carter goes on to postulate 
that the current terrorist threat comes from individuals whom lack formal ties to 
international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab.511   
 
Although terrorism emanating from foreign citizens’ tasked by a stateless 
international terrorist organisation remains a threat, it is UK and EU citizens’ that 
have been influenced or otherwise radicalised, who then go on to commit acts of 
terrorism within their home country, more commonly known as home-grown 
terrorists, or lone wolves or Islamists, that poses the most tangible menace.  As 
above, it is important to note that the UK and EU are not the only western 
countries facing this type of threat.  Carter and Carter furnish evidence for the 
transnational nature of this home-grown threat when they conclude that the same 
                                                
508 D. Moeckli & T. King (2010) Human Rights and Non-discrimination on the “War on Terror”, Publication 
Review, European Journal of International Law 1109-1111, 1109. For ETA see https://thebluereview.org/rise-fall-
eta/ and for the IRA see http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/IRA.htm accessed 18 April 2016 
509 Ibid 
510 G. Carter and D. L. Carter (2012) Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized terrorism, Police 
Practice and Research, 13:2, 138-154, 139 
511 Ibid 
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risks are posed to the USA.512  Although beyond the ambit of this thesis, to better 
understand the nature of the home-grown terror threat it is important to briefly 
note the radicalisation process brought about by terrorist communication.  
According to Gartenstein-Ross and Gossman et al, is believed to involve four 
stages: 
1. Pre-radicalisation: an individual alters their lifestyle prior to 
radicalisation, such as relationships, employment and social life; 
2. Self-identification: an individual is influenced by internal and external 
push/pull factors, attributing to the exploration of extremist 
philosophies, ideologies and values; 
3. Indoctrination: an individual intensifies their beliefs and adopts 
extreme philosophies, ideologies and values with no exceptions; 
4. Soldier: accepting their duty to participate in the struggle as a warrior 
fighting those who oppose the ideology in an attempt for the ideology 
to achieve realisation.513 
 
State powers of surveillance can lead to those individuals within this process, at 
almost any stage, coming to the attention of the security services.  However, this 
does depend on a number of factors.  It is proposed the home-grown terrorist 
threat be broken down into two subdivisions to aid the thesis.514   
 
The Self-Starting Terrorist 
Firstly, there are the self-starting terrorists who are in contact with other like-
minded extremists, seek inspiration and encouragement from them, but who have 
not been tasked by a stateless terrorist organisation to commit a violent act (such 
                                                
512 Ibid, 138 
513 D. Gartenstein-Ross and L. Grossman (2009) Homegrown terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. An empirical 
examination of the radicalisation process, Washington DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies Press.  See 
also M. D. Silber and A. Bhatt (2007) Radicalisation in the West: The homegrown threat, New York: Police 
Department, Intelligence Division.  See also Ibid, 140 
514 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) p.80 
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as IS and al-Qaeda).515  These types of start-ups are made much more effortlessly, 
and ensure a decent level of safety from electronic communications data 
surveillance capture for the would-be-terrorist, due to the amount of commercial 
encryption available on the open market, and the darknet.  They are however, 
more likely to come to the attention of the policing and security agencies, 
somewhat due to their online presence, but more so because they may be 
socialising and meeting other persons whom are already known to the agencies, 
and may already be a ‘Subject of Interest’.516  Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, former 
Chairman of the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) highlighted this 
in the 2013 Committee report into the killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby.517  This report 
highlights further how the UK’s Security Service in particular works in practice, 
when identification of the would-be terrorist is essential.   The issue surrounding 
finitely of resources faced by the UK agencies is also highlighted jointly in this 
report, which results in the UK Security Services need to prioritise their 
investigations, enabling the allocation of resources.  They do this by ascribing a 
priority level determined on the available evidence at the given time: 
• Priority 1 (P1a and P1b) is the highest, meaning there is intelligence 
to suggest attack planning; 
• Priority 2 (P2H and P2M) is used when there is intelligence to suggest 
a high or medium risk such as terrorist training; 
• Priority 3 (P3) is used when intelligence is uncorroborated; 
• Priority 4 (P4) is assigned to those individuals where there is a risk of 
re-engagement with extremist activity.518 
 
                                                
515 Ibid 
516 Ibid 
517 Ibid 
518 Ibid, p13 
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The importance of this priority system cannot be overlooked, given that P3 and P4 
cases are often paused or suspended in favour of concentrating on the higher 
levels.  This is emphasised by Rifkind findings when questioning the Security 
Service as to the delay in identifying the terrorist Adebowale, which took the 
Digital Intelligence Team (DIGINT) five months.519  The average for P3 cases is 
69 days, but the Director General of the Security Service confirmed: 
If there was a P1 case that meant that we had significant urgency behind 
it, then we could do it much, much quicker.  We have a finite amount of 
resource and we need to focus it on the highest priority work. No delay is 
desirable, but it is the reality of what we do that we carry delays in lower 
priority casework.520 
It is accepted that P1 cases must take priority; after all they bear a more 
significant immediate risk, however, as evidenced the timescales surrounding the 
lower level cases must be improved.  Particularly P4 cases given Carter and 
Carters research findings showing radicalisation is in essence resocialisation, 
coupled with the high levels of recidivism in the UK and the issue of 
radicalisation in prisons, though beyond the ambit of this thesis. 
 
In addition to the priority of the overall investigation, Subjects of Interests are 
identified and placed into a tier system dependent upon their level of 
engagement.521  As per the written evidence submitted to Rifkind’s report, as of 
                                                
519 Ibid, pp.63-64 
520 Ibid, p.64 and p.88 
521 A Subjects of Interest is an individual who is being investigated because they are suspected of being a threat to 
national security. 
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October 2014 the Security Service were investigating several thousand individual 
Subjects of Interest with links to Islamist extremist activity in the UK: 
• Tier 1: Main targets of an investigation, likely to be involved in all 
aspects of the investigated activities; 
• Tier 2: Key contacts of the main targets, likely to be involved in a 
significant portion of the investigated activities; 
• Tier 3: Contact with other Tier targets and likely to be only 
marginally involved with the investigated activities.522 
 
This is where the importance of the intelligence-led policing framework and 
philosophy for preventing acts of terrorism come to fruition.  The idea here is to 
allow for the collection and analysis of electronic communications data and other 
information related to terrorism, which results in actionable intelligence aiding 
law enforcement to develop tactical responses to the threats, or emerging 
threats.523   
 
The Lone-Actor Terrorist 
The second types of home-grown terrorist proposed are ‘self-radicalising lone-
actors’, sometimes referred to as ‘lone-wolves’ or ‘lone Islamist’.  They have 
often been influenced and thereby radicalised at home via the Internet and 
terrorist communication, indirectly in some circumstances, and consequently 
inspired to commit an act of terror, doing so outside of any command type 
stateless structure, and without direct material assistance from any group.524  The 
                                                
522 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) pp.13-14 
523 Supra as per D. L. Carter and J. G. Carter (2009) Intelligence led policing: Conceptual considerations for policy, 
Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 310-325, 317 
524 C. Bockstette (2010) Terrorists Exploit Information Technologies: Use of Strategic Communication Calls for 
United Response, in Pre Concordiam, Journal of European Security and Defense Issues, Terrorism, Volume 1, Issue 3, p.11 
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differences between the subdivisions become important when looking through the 
UK security agencies lens.  Simply put, the lone-actor subdivision allows the 
individual to remain under the securities radar, entirely in some cases, whereby 
the person’s identity poses a real challenge for the UK’s law enforcement 
agencies’.525  Examples of lone-actors are: 
• Anders Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011, Norway, killed 77 people in 
two consecutive terrorist attacks. Firstly, he killed eight people with a 
car-bomb placed at the Norwegian government headquarters in Oslo.  
Then an hour later, he went to the summer camp of the Worker’s 
Youth League (the youth organisation of the Labour Party) where he 
shot and killed 69 people;526 
• In Nice on Bastille Day, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel drove an 
articulated lorry into a crowd or people killing at 84 people.  Although 
the IS terror group claimed responsibility it has been insinuated he 
was in fact a lone-actor, with no known direct association to the 
group;527  
• Omar Mateen in June 2016 entered a homosexual club in Orlando, 
Florida, and killed 50 people by shooting them.  Shortly before the 
attack he pledged allegiance to IS;528 
• Ahmad Khan Rahami in September 2016 carried out four bombings 
or bombing attempts in Seaside Park, New Jersey, Manhattan, New 
York, and Elizabeth, New Jersey.  As law enforcement were 
apprehending him he shot and injured three police officers.  
According to the US policing agencies, Rahami was not part of any 
terrorist group or cell, but was simply motivated and inspired by the 
communications of al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-
Awlaki;529 
                                                
525 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) p.5 
526 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/22/anders-breivik-inside-the-warped-mind-of-a-mass-killer/ 
accessed 30 December 2016 
527 B. Henderson and R. Sabur (2016) Nice terrorist attack on Bastille Day: everything we know so far on Monday, 
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529 M. Santora, W. K. Rashbaum, A. Baker and A. Goldman (2016) Ahmad Khan Rahami Is Arrested in Manhattan 
and New Jersey Bombings, The New York Times, 19 September 2016, available at 
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• In 2016 Adel Kermiche and Abdel Malik Petitjean went into a Roman 
Catholic Church in Rouen, France, and killed the Priest.  The two 
terrorists had only met in person a few days before the attack but had 
communicated through the encrypted messaging application 
‘Telegram’.530    
 
It is clear from this list that it is not only Islamist terrorism that poses a risk to UK 
security.  In the UK there has been an increase in far-right extremism, with new 
groups being created such as National Action, and Britain First.531  Although such 
right-wing groups have not be defined by the UK as terrorist, the threat posed has 
been assessed more harmful and dangerous than that posed by lone-Islamist 
actors.532  In 2016 Thomas Mair, who according to evidence presented had some 
connections to far right groups, killed Jo Cox MP utilising a knife and an illegally 
held firearm, and according to reports repeatedly shouted ‘Britain First’ during his 
attack.  Despite claims to the contrary, it has been dealt with as a terrorist incident 
and Mair was sentenced accordingly.533 As with Fusilier Lee Rigby’s killing, the 
defendants were tried for murder contrary to UK Common Law, and terrorism 
was a sentencing factor in both trials.  Also in Mair’s trial a substantial quantity of 
                                                                                                                                
Times, 21 September 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/nyregion/ahmad-khan-rahami-
suspect.html accessed 20 November 2016 
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a-terrorist/ accessed 21 November 2016 
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evidence was produced showing his links to far right extremism.534  As covered in 
Chapter One, the UK’s definition of terrorism changes when a firearm is used, 
too:  
…the use or threat of action, involving firearms or explosives, made for 
the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 
cause.535   
 
Clearly from Rifkind’s report findings in 2014, both types of home-grown 
Islamist terrorists pose a significant challenge for the UK law enforcement 
agencies’.  Another issue that must be considered is the fact that both self-starters 
and lone-actors show an increase in independent operational abilities, which 
simply compounds this issue further.536  This sudden increase in independent 
operational abilities, along with the issue of resources finitely, has led Rob 
Wainwright head of Europol to assert that the EU currently faces the highest 
terror threat since the US attack by al-Qaeda in 2001.537   
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CONCLUSION 
In the digital age most people do virtually everything online, including research, 
banking, shopping, finding new relationships, holiday planning and self-
diagnosing health concerns.  In conjunction with social media use, it has become 
almost impossible to separate people’s lives in the real world, to their lives online.  
Likewise, people are increasingly becoming reliant on smartphones and other 
similar devices, storing private pictures and other personal data, such as calendars 
and reminders. 
This means that bulk interception of communications data and bulk equipment 
interference are extraordinarily powerful tools to be wielded, having a much 
bigger impact upon individual privacy than traditional communications 
interception and surveillance might have had.  Intercepting electronic 
communications data and content is not the same as intercepting a landline call as 
evidenced in this chapter.  Additionally it is unhelpful and disappointing to note 
that the IPA does not expressly cover OSINT and SOCMINT collection, although 
the Government had plenty of time to implement such measures.   
It has been argued that electronic communications data, by nature of its digital 
form, is ideal for analysis and profiling individuals.  Data mining, or perhaps 
better-termed filtering arrangements as per section 62 of the IPA, will 
increasingly become autonomous as automated computer programmes carry out 
the first bulk interception step.  Aimed at the population, who as a whole are not 
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suspected of being involved in any criminal or terrorist activity, these bulk powers 
have the potential to effectively destroy the privacy rights of millions of people, in 
order to find the elusive terrorist in the haystack.  It has been substantiated that 
monitoring the whole population of the UK would be logistically impossible.  
However, in contrast it has been shown that due to the issues raised in Chapter 2, 
these powers are necessary.  The balance between collective security and 
individual data privacy rights in the UK are fairly stable because of the role and 
importance of judicial review, judicial independence, and the over-arching 
scrutiny provided by commissioners and parliamentary committees.   
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CHAPTER THREE. PART TWO. THE UK’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO 
TERRORISM COMMUNICATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE 
NECESSITY OF PRE-EMPTIVE LEGAL COUNTERTERRORISM 
MEASURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Adding more contention to the arguably unquantifiable threat posed is the sudden 
increase in independent operational abilities.  These are gained through information 
attained on the Internet, or through the terrorist travelling to areas of conflict to 
receive the equivalent to military training.   
 
Building upon the issues raised in Part One, Part Two will highlight further the 
requirement for mass data collection and pre-emptive legislative measures aimed at 
reducing the terrorist threat.  The pre-emptive measures that will be focused on 
include temporary travel restrictions and the criminalisation of neutral behaviour, 
such as the collection of data deemed to be useful to a terrorist.  Although the 
Chapter will highlight the interconnection between the risk society theory and 
predictive policing, it will remain within the legal research framework, 
discrediting terms used such as ‘mass data surveillance’ and ‘pre-crime’.  It will 
show that data retention is not the same as mass surveillance and that ‘pre-crime’ 
is a fabricated term used misleadingly, given that pre-emptive measures are in fact 
criminal offences.  
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The need for pre-emptive measures will be evidenced, highlighting that currently, 
counterterrorism legislation has failed to eradicate the terrorist groups’ 
propaganda and infiltrate terrorist encrypted electronic communications data.   
 
OPERATIONAL ABILITIES: ISLAMIST TERRORIST TRAINING 
The sudden increase in independent operational abilities as alluded to in Part One 
of this Chapter, could be attributed to the amount of extremist material readily 
available through the Internet, or the individual could have travelled to another 
country to receive terrorist training, known within the UK’s law enforcement 
services’ as ‘Jihadi tourism’.538  Reports suggest approximately 5000 EU citizens’ 
have been, and/or are currently engaged in terrorist related activities in conflict 
zones such as Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.  Estimates suggest that one 
in 15 returning suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, potentially pose a 
threat to their respective national States upon return.539  The methodology used to 
calculate these figures are unknown, mainly due to the difficulty in gathering such 
accurate data, and given they come from the UK security services and are deemed 
classified.  It is argued therefore that these estimates could in actual fact be much 
higher, or indeed lower, rendering the terror threat unquantifiable.  Adding to the 
issue finitely of resources, this serves to fashion an extraordinarily difficult if not 
                                                
538 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) p.6 
539 G. Buttarelli (2015) Counter-terrorism, De-Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters’, Joint debate during the 
extraordinary meeting of the LIBE Committee. European Parliament, Brussels, 27 January 2015 
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impossible task of monitoring potential terrorists and suspects, thereby accurately 
managing the risk. 
 
Islamist or Jihadi tourism purports its own danger, serving to not only increase 
independent operational abilities but also provide extensive hands-on military 
training in the use of firearms and explosives.540  Although travelling to conflict 
zones increases the likelihood of the individual becoming known to the law 
enforcement agencies’, the risk still remains somewhat unquantifiable.  What is 
clear from Rifkind’s 2014 report is that the independent operational abilities in 
conjunction with the methods used by lone actors and self-starting terrorists offer 
fewer opportunities for the security services to detect their activity.541  Because of 
the changes in nature, ‘the practices and policies necessary for prevention must 
change to reflect the threats’.542  In recognising the type of threats, which 
according to the Director General of the Security Service, is mounting, 
‘diversifying and is increasingly complex’, what can be seen is a sudden growth 
in risk management styles being employed by the police and security services 
when assessing intelligence.543   
 
A point that must be made due to the successful marketing and promotion of IS, is 
that this has led to many foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq.  According to 
                                                
540 Ibid 
541 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) p.82 
542 J. G. Carter and D. L. Carter (2012) Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized terrorism, 
Police Practice and Research, 13:2, 138-154, 138 
543 Supra as per The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP (2014) pp.81-82 
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the National Counterterrorism Centre Director Nicholas Rasmussen, in October 
2015 IS had ‘attracted more than 28,000 foreign fighters, including at least 5000 
westerners’.544 
 
 Table 2, Number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, created from information attained at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144 accessed 27 October 2016 
 
Jihadi Tourism: Seizure of Passports and Travel Documents 
In order to deal with and ultimately stop UK citizens’ leaving the UK to engage in 
terrorist related activity, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) 
introduced further pre-emptive measures.  The CTSA also had to address and 
implement measures to halt the return of those citizens’ returning to the UK after 
training and fighting with terrorist groups.  The main pre-emptive power is found 
under Part 1 Chapter 1 of the CTSA, which allows law enforcement agencies’ to 
seize passports and travel documents from persons suspected of involvement in 
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terrorism.  To this end Schedule One of the CTSA provides citizens’ can have 
their passport retained for up to 14 days from the day after the initial seizure.545  
Although a short-term measure, this time allowance can be extend with judicial 
approval, to 30 days from the day after the initial seizure.  Judicial approval is 
required whereby the Secretary of State must show that the relevant persons have 
been acting diligently and expeditiously in relation to the matters.546  These 
provision were debated heavily during the enactment stages that led Lord Carlile 
to state: 
We heard some criticism of Clause 1, but I say… [Lordships] have got to 
get real about what Clause 1 is dealing with. Let me give you [a 
hypothetical] example…Suppose a suspicious travel agent who is public 
spirited telephones the police and says, ‘I have just sold an air ticket in 
suspicious circumstances’, and the authorities decide it is worth following 
the person who has bought the air ticket. That kind of incident can occur 
within an hour, and it does not leave the time to go off to a judge to get 
permission to seize that passport. We have to allow the authorities to deal 
with the urgent provisions made in Clause 1 and Schedule 1.547 
Following this example and given that according to Rowley, the Metropolitan 
Police Assistant Commissioner, at the very least a total of 700 UK citizens’ have 
travelled to Syria, with apparently more than half having returned to the UK, 
where they now pose a significant threat.  The urgency and requirement for such 
emergency power can therefore be appreciated.548  Whilst the time limitations are 
not too restrictive, there is still the issue of due process and the impact upon the 
                                                
545 Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, see paragraph 5(2) and (3)(a) 
546 Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 see paragraph 8(4), (5), (6) and (7) 
547 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords Second Reading Stage, (13 
January 2015: Column 722 7.27pm) 
548 P. Wintour (2015) UK parents to get power to cancel children's passports over Isis fears, The Guardian, 20 July 2015, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/20/uk-parents-power-cancel-childrens-passports-
isis-fears accessed 24 July 2015 
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individual’s privacy, and in particular their Article 45 right of the EU Charter, 
Freedom of movement and of residence.549  Similar to that of the ECHR, any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms under the Charter must be 
provided for by law.550  Proportionality is the ultimate test of course and it must 
be deemed necessary in meeting recognised Union objectives, or to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.551  Ultimately these measures not only protect the 
public as a whole, but it also protects the vulnerable young adults and children 
from being further influenced and introduced to terrorist related activity should 
they be permitted to leave.   
 
The provisions under Schedule One are wide in nature and define involvement in 
terrorism-related activity as: 
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; 
(b) conduct that facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of 
such acts, or is intended to do so; 
(c) conduct that gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or 
instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so; 
(d) conduct that gives support or assistance to individuals who are known 
or believed by the person concerned to be involved in conduct falling 
within paragraph; (a) 
                                                
549 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT accessed 1 June 2015.  ‘The free movement of persons is a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens’. It entitles every EU citizen to travel, work and live in any 
EU country without special formalities. [Although the UK is not a member of Schengen]…Schengen cooperation 
enhances this freedom by enabling citizens’ to cross-internal borders without being subjected to border checks. 
The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens’, as well as to 
many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory.’ See 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm 
accessed 1 June 2015.  And see also: ‘Free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of the Treaty 
enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed by EU secondary 
legislation and the Case law of the Court of Justice.’ http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457 accessed 1 
June 2015. 
550 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1) 
551 Ibid 
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It is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts 
of terrorism or acts of terrorism in general.’552 
 
Should a constable or qualified officer have reasonable grounds to suspect a 
person is leaving the UK for the purposes of involvement in terrorism-related 
activity, or has arrived and is about to leave the UK to do so, then a number of 
powers are made available under Schedule 1, paragraph 2(5): 
(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in his or her 
possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified 
officer; 
(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take 
possession of any that the constable or officer finds; 
(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; 
(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in 
the possession of the constable or officer. 
 
In order to retain the travel documents for the specified length of times, 
authorisation from a senior officer must be attained.553  The documents can then 
be retained whilst the Secretary of State considers the case.554  They can also be 
retained whilst the authorities consider whether to charge the citizen with an 
offence, or subject them to further measures.555  A person who fails to hand over 
all travel documentation, or obstructs the process, if found guilty of the offence 
may be liable to six months imprisonment.556  The issue here of course is that the 
citizen may request a judicial review of the decision to retain his passport, 
                                                
552 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(10) 
553 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 4(1)(a) 
554 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 5(1)(a) 
555 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 5(1)(b)(c) 
556 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 15(1)(2)(3) 
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however, the intelligence and evidence gathered may be withheld from the 
suspect.557  This makes it almost impossible for a citizen to in fact make a 
reviewable argument.   
 
Temporary Exclusion Orders 
The UK by way of Part 1 Chapter 2 of the CTSA fashions further intrusive pre-
emptive measures aimed at preventing highly trained and militarily hardened 
terrorist from returning to the UK, who may then pose a direct or indirect risk to 
national security.  Termed ‘temporary exclusion orders’ they state: 
(1) A temporary exclusion order is an order which requires an individual 
not to return to the United Kingdom unless- 
(a) the return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the       
Secretary of State before the individual began the return; or 
(b) the return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the UK. 
 
Five conditions must be met before an order by the Secretary of State can be 
made and the order lasts up to two years.558  Importantly, they require the 
Secretary of State to reasonably suspect that the individual is, or has been, 
involved in terrorism-related activity outside the UK, and reasonably considers 
that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public 
in the UK from a risk of terrorism, for a temporary exclusion order to be imposed 
on the individual.559  Either the UK Court can grant the Secretary of State 
                                                
557 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 1, paragraph 10(2), dealing with the extension period to 30 
days. 
558 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 4(3)(b) limits the temporary exclusion orders to 2 years inclusive 
559 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 2 
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permission to make an order under section 3, or the Secretary of State can show 
he considers the urgency of the case requires a temporary exclusion order to be 
imposed without obtaining permission.560  The Act provides exceptionally wide 
powers to the executive, however, there is some protection afforded to the citizen 
by way of judicial supervision.   
 
Firstly, the Secretary of State must include a statement outlining the urgency of 
the case and the requirement the order be imposed without obtaining the 
permission of the court.561  Notice of the order must be provided to the court 
immediately after the temporary exclusion order is imposed, and the court must 
review the decision within 7 days of the order being made.562  If the urgency of 
the order satisfies the court they must affirm the imposition, however, should the 
court determine the order is flawed they can quash it.563  Judicial supervision, 
somewhat similar to that found in the IPA, is to be welcomed as a safeguarding 
development.  Some other safeguarding clauses, such as the two-year limitation, 
was debated heavily during the enactment stages, leading Lord Carlile to state:  
I do not understand the two-year period contained in these amendments. 
The issue which we are dealing with and which is covered in this clause 
is, unfortunately, going to last for more than two years…having a two-
year sunset clause…would send out a completely incorrect message to 
                                                
560 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 2(7)(b) 
561 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 2, paragraph 2 
562 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 2, paragraph 3 
563 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 2, paragraph 4 
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those who are minded to go abroad and participate in jihad…We have to 
show some enduring determination over this issue.564 
Although the ECHR rights and the EU Charter rights under Union law appear to 
have lacked discussion, the Marquess of Lothian raised a valid concern: 
…looking at the time factor here, what is the legal and international status 
of someone who has been subjected to a temporary exclusion order?565 
 
International Status 
This question has relevance given the legal and practical implications for the 
citizen subjected to this type of order.  An important distinction must be made 
here, that the order is temporary, not indefinitely.  In essence, this is not rendering 
that person stateless.  There are two United Nations Conventions that the UK has 
long been a signatory, one of which serves to prevent a State from rendering a 
citizen stateless.  The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954 
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.566  The 1961 
Convention represents an international instrument safeguarding citizens’ from 
inappropriate and unfair threats of statelessness.  What is interesting however, is 
the Home Secretary, using Royal Prerogative power can already revoke UK 
citizenship entitlement, so long as the person concerned holds a dual 
nationality.567  Taken in conjunction with the current terrorist threat, the 
                                                
564 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee Stage, (20 
January 2015: Column 1212) 
565 Marquess of Lothian, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee Stage, (20 
January 2015: Column 1213) 
566 See http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html accessed 27 July 2015 
567See http://www.findlaw.co.uk/law/government/constitutional_law/citizens_guide_to_government/500456.html 
accessed 21 July 2015 
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requirement for this genre of power to be on the statute book is clear.  This is 
where the previous Prime Minister David Cameron’s dexterity could be perused 
in his use of words, describing the actions of UK citizens’ fighting for IS, as 
disloyal.568  Articles 8 and 9 of the 1961 Convention expressly forbid the 
deprivation of nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.  
Although the religious beliefs and political aspirations shown by members of IS 
are abhorrent, this would appear to satisfy the above definition.569   
 
However, under the Convention, if a citizen has committed acts inconsistent with 
the duty of loyalty to the State, the State retains the right to deprive that citizen of 
nationality, even if this leads to statelessness.  One could argue the actions of IS 
terrorists are certainly inconsistent with the UK.  In addition, Article 19 of the EU 
Charter prohibits collective expulsion, or the expulsion of a person to a State 
where there is a risk of torture, the death penalty or other inhuman, degrading 
treatment.  Although limited by law, it is argued this particular aspect of the UK’s 
legislative measure will increasingly come under judicial scrutiny.  The CJEU for 
example is not disinclined in striking down measures that are disproportionate in 
nature, particularly when such citizens’ could be permitted to return to the UK 
and subjected to other forms of pre-terrorism sanctions, in accordance with other 
                                                
568 See http://www.ibtimes.com/uk-cannot-strip-returning-islamic-state-fighters-british-citizenship-cameron-clegg-
1675618 accessed 21 July 2015 
569 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/who-are-isis-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-
and-the-levant-9541421.html accessed 23 July 2015 
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existing legislative measures.570  Lord Macdonald of River Glaven appears to 
have at least recognised the impact of these measures and the potential for such 
friction between the executive and the courts: 
…we should not give away our freedoms in response to terrorism…[it] 
would be a good idea if  [we] were to include a sunset clause…[because 
the] practicalities of this measure—how it will work in practice—…are 
most in doubt. Those practicalities will significantly impact on the rights 
of people on whom the orders are imposed…I support the idea of a sunset 
clause so that the House can thoroughly review how the legislation is 
working in practice.571 
Mere suspicion that a citizen has engaged with terrorism-related activity is the 
required threshold.  Considering the length of time the temporary exclusion order 
may be in place and the intrusive nature of these orders, the threshold should be 
raised and the executive be satisfied the citizen would pose a serious threat upon 
return.  The decision made is reviewable and can be appealed by the citizen, 
however, the same rules with regards to disclosure exist as per the removal of 
passports and travel documents.572  The potential repercussions for a citizen 
returning to the UK following the making of a temporary exclusion order, are 
severe should they be found guilty of an offence, sentenced for up to 5 years 
imprisonment.573   
 
                                                
570 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, s 2, and the extension to these measures brought 
about by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 16 
571 Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee 
Stage, (20 January 2015: Column 1214) 
572 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 3, paragraph 4 
573 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 10 
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Clearly the UK Government is trying to reduce the terrorist risk posed, as is their 
duty to protect life and safeguard its citizens’.  These powers are relatively new 
and therefore, data illustrating how they work in practice is short.  In 2015 
Germany took a similar approach to the UK in attempting to stop jihadi 
tourism.574  According to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, those 
traveling to join IS had increased dramatically in early 2015, which posed a direct 
threat to their nation state.575  This new legislative Act followed an early Act in 
2014 that provided authorities with the power to revoke or refuse an identity card 
for IS supporters, which included the proscription of the IS group and on all 
activity in support of IS in Germany.576  In order to satisfy UN international 
norms, those persons who have been refused an identity card will instead be 
issues with a substitute identity document stating ‘not valid for travel outside of 
Germany’.577  Forming part of the risk management strategy inherent in the 
international and national response to the terrorist threat, some members of 
Germanys opposition party provided argumentation similar to that, as raised by 
UK MP’s during the enactment stages of CTSA, in that the powers are 
unconstitutional as they criminalise neutral behaviour, because the moment of 
crime is far in advance of the actual crime.578  In introducing such measures, the 
                                                
574 See http://www.dw.com/en/german-cabinet-approves-bill-to-stop-radicals-traveling-to-middle-east/a-18233282 
accessed 22 November 2016 
575 See https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-new-anti-terrorism-legislation-entered-into-force/ 
accessed 22 November 2016  
576 Ibid 
577 Ibid 
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state is simply trying to achieve good actionable intelligence, safeguarding 
citizens’ lives.   
CRIMINALISING NEUTRAL BEHAVIOUR: NEEDLES IN 
HAYSTACKS, RISK SOCIETY AND PRE-EMPTIVE MEASURES 
Since the introduction of the various bulk powers and decryption under the IPA, it 
is highly likely that legislative pre-emptive measures introduced will increase in 
use.  In attempting to manage the potential terrorist threats posed, the retention of 
electronic communications data for a period of 12 months and the bulk powers 
allowing such data to be screened by an algorithm, have proved essential in 
finding potential needles within the continually growing haystacks.  As 
technology grows and the algorithms become more effective, the use of current 
pre-emptive measures will prove essential in the prevention of terrorist attacks.  
However, allowing such abilities to the state have resulted in academic debates 
surrounding mass surveillance, risk society, predictive policing and so called ‘pre-
crime’ measures. 
 
Mass Data Surveillance 
According to Ratcliffe et al, in terms of CCTV camera use and its effects on 
crime reduction in the UK, citizens’ are subjected to mass surveillance.579  
However, in terms of electronic communications data and ICR records that are 
retained for 12 months, and from the legal definition of surveillance under RIPA, 
                                                
579 J. Ratcliffe, T. Taniguchi and R. B. Taylor (2009) The Crime Reduction Effects of Public CCTV Cameras: A 
Multi-Method Spatial Approach, Justice Quarterly, 26:4 
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retention does not equate to mass surveillance.   It would simply be impossible for 
UK law enforcement agencies’ to actively conduct surveillance on the entire data 
pool.  The algorithmic screening of the electronic communications data stored 
means that the majority of UK citizens’ data would not come under the remit.580   
 
Risk Society: The resulting increase in state powers 
Collecting and storing vast amounts of data adds to the critical debate on the 
balancing of collective security with individual privacy, and essentially to the 
managing of risk.  For Beck, the term ‘risk’ is a modern concept that:  
‘…inherently contains the concept of control…presumes decision making 
[and involves] talking about calculating the incalculable’.581 
According to Beck’s conceptualisation in 2002, he suggests citizens’ might 
increasingly become a paranoid ‘risk society’ as the international terror threat 
grows.582  By linking prediction and risk, whereby fear of a potential terrorist 
attack leads to an increase in state law enforcements’ capabilities, the result has 
arguably led to the development of computer algorithms to screen the vast 
amounts of data stored, in order to search out the needles in the haystacks 
autonomously and quickly.583  According to Furedi’s analysis, ‘fear plays a key 
role in twenty-first century consciousness’, which has inevitably led to citizens’ 
                                                
580 I. Brown and D. Korff (2014) Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in a Global Digital Environment, European 
Human Rights Law Review, 3:243-251.  See also A. S. Reid and N. Ryder (2010) For Whose Eyes Only? A Critique 
of the United Kingdom’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Information and Communications Technology 
Law, 10:2, 179-201 
581 U. Beck (2002) The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited, Theory, Culture and Society, 19:4, 39-55, 40 
582 Ibid 
583 Ibid.  See also I. Kerr and J. Earle (2013) Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big 
Picture Privacy, Stanford Law Review Online, available at https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-
big-data-prediction-preemption-presumption/   
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acceptance of increased state monitoring and thereby, for Garland at least, 
control.584  It is worth noting here that as citizens’ increasingly accept state 
monitoring of stored data due to the risk society theory, conjoined with 
technological advancements, the automated computer algorithms used may 
become progressively effective at screening the vast amounts of data for potential 
terrorists.  Leading of course to intelligence-led policing evolving into a type of 
predictive-led policing. 
 
Predictive Policing and Pre-Emptive Measures: Pre-crime 
Whilst the term predictive policing remains simply within the understanding of 
intelligence-led policing, it has nevertheless resulted in critics suggesting the UK 
is moving towards a ‘pre-crime’ scenario.585  However, law enforcement cannot 
simply conduct surveillance or make an arrest without authorised legal powers, 
and a specific identifiable criminal offence being committed.  As such, the term 
‘pre-crime’ does not exist in legal terms.  In fact it is simply a fabricated term 
used by Hollywood in the movie ‘Minority Reports’.  As discussed further below, 
collecting or disseminating terrorist related data through the Internet is a criminal 
offence.586  The same can be said for encouraging another to commit an act of 
terrorism.  These are not pre-crime measures, but pre-emptive criminal offences, 
                                                
584 F. Furedi (2007) The only thing we have to fear is the ‘culture of fear’ itself: How human thought and action are 
being stifled by a regime of uncertainty, available at http://frankfuredi.com/pdf/fearessay-20070404.pdf.  See 
also D. Garland (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford University Press)  
585 J. Richards (2016) Needles in Haystacks: Law, Capability, Ethics, and Proportionality in Big Data Intelligence-Gathering, in A. 
Bunnik, A. Cawley, M. Mulqueen and A. Zwitter, Big Data Challenges (Palgrave Macmillan) p74.  See also L. Zedner 
(2007) Pre-crime and post-criminology?  Theoretical Criminology, 11:2 
586 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 57, 58, and Terrorism Act 2006, ss 1, 2 
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aimed at preventing the would-be-terrorist from committing the physical act.  
They are a crime.   
 
Following Beck’s conceptualisation above, pre-emptive measures are littered 
throughout the UK’s legal counterterrorism structure, simply because of the 
extraordinary terror threat.587  As with the IPA, RIPA and the CTSA, there has 
been a growing tendency and common theme to address anticipatory risk.588  For 
Walker, these measures have habitually been reactive to the politics of the last 
atrocity.589  In response, the UK has enacted certain provisions aimed at 
criminalising the collection of terrorist material for terrorist purposes, and, at 
criminalising the encouragement and dissemination of terrorist publications.  
Again for Walker, the process of the radicalisation of young Muslim men became 
a primary focus following the terrorist attack on London on the 7th July 2005.  In 
response to the gamut ferociousness and the devastating nature of recent terrorist 
acts, early State intervention is essential, before rather than after the attack.590 
                                                
587 Supra as per U. Beck (2002) 
588 C. Walker (2008) Terrorism: Terrorism Act 2000 s.57-direction to jury on defense of possession of items for 
defensive purposes, Case Comment, Criminal Law Review 72-80, 74 
589 Ibid 
590 For attack ion Turkey see http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/13/world/ankara-park-blast/. For Ivory Coast 
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STATUTORY PREVENTATIVE MEASURES: POSSESSION OF 
ARTICLES AND COLLECTING MATERIALS AND INFORMATION 
FOR USE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES  
Statutory preventative measures form part of this anticipatory risk management 
approach, although enacted prior to Walker’s point made above, and not in direct 
response to a terrorist attack.  Under section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000 if a 
person possesses an article in circumstances that give a rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that such a possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, 
preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism, they commit an offence.  
Similarly, under section 58 a person commits an offence if they collect or made a 
record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism, or they possess a document or record containing 
information of that kind.  This includes photographic and electronic 
communications data, both of which will increasingly become available to law 
enforcement by way of the IPA.   
 
Although section 58 introduces measures requiring less proof of intent than 
section 57, both are designed to allow for the early prosecution of the would-be-
terrorist, during the planning stage, rather than simply waiting for them to commit 
the physical act planned.  Also known as anticipatory offences, these sections 
provide a correlative broad scope, meaning that more citizens’ are potentially 
brought under the scope of terrorist activity, therefore providing law enforcement 
agencies’ with an avenue to conduct surveillance, largely under the IPA and 
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RIPA.  This has resulted in argumentation surrounding what exactly amounts to 
an article for the purposes of section 58.   
 
In R v K the UK Court of Appeal made it clear that section 58 was not intended to 
criminalise possession of theological or propagandist material, and therefore must 
provide practical assistance.591  The Court further made it clear that ‘a document 
that simply encourages the commission of acts of terrorism’ does not fall within 
the definition, thereby effectively curtailing the scope of section 58.592  A year 
later in R v G, R v J the UK House of Lords appears to have built upon this 
judgement confirming that the defendant must be aware of the nature of the 
information contained in the article.593  Ultimately, J then argued infringement of 
his ECHR Article 7 and 10 rights in the ECtHR, which failed.594  According to 
Ackerman this judicial interpretation adds weight to the argument that the UK’s 
counterterror legislation is overbroad and merely moderated by the judiciary, 
police and CPS restraint, possibly providing an excuse for executive excess.595  
Ackerman continues to argue the real threat to the public comes not from 
terrorism, but from counterterrorism measures such as these.596  Gearty raises 
similar concerns, noting that the Convention rights are under ‘sever attack from a 
                                                
591 [2008] EWCA Crim 185, [13] 
592 Ibid 
593 [2009] UKHL 13, [47]-[50] 
594 Jobe v UK [2011] 48278/09: ECHR Article 7 no punishment without law and Article 10 Freedom of Expression. 
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variety of sources’.597  According to Imran, what is now clear is that many ‘of the 
questions raised in K may be rendered superfluous by the intervention of 
alternative provisions that reduce the necessity for reliance on section 58’.598 
 
Inciting Terrorism: Encouragement and glorification 
A person commits an offence of incitement under section 59 of the Terrorism Act 
2000, if they incite another to commit an act of terrorism, within or outside UK 
borders, if the act would constitute one of the following offences: 
1) Murder (contrary to UK Common Law); 
2) A s18 offence of wounding with intent under the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861; 
3) Administering poison to a person under s23 Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861; 
4) Damage to property endangering life, as under s1 Criminal Damage 
Act 1971. 
 
The issue here is that the offence of incitement is restricted to these four 
constitutions and evidentially it renders a high threshold, hence it can be quite 
difficult to prove.  To fill the vacuum between incitement and encouragement, 
thereby serving to lower the threshold allowing UK law enforcement to broaden 
the net of suspicion, sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 may serve to 
provide Imran’s reduction, and provide ever more ‘expansive possibilities for the 
prosecution and conviction’.599  Enacted as a result of the terrorist attack on 
London, on 7th July 2005, and to reflecting the provisions of Article 5 of the 2005 
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Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, section 1 makes it 
an offence to encourage an act of terrorism, and section 2 makes it an offence to 
disseminate terrorist publications.  Section 1 in particular may have perhaps been 
enacted as a result of the earlier ruling in R v K. 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND GLORIFICATION OF TERRORISM 
The Terrorism Act 2006 was aimed at criminalising ‘speeches at meetings, 
sermons at places of worship, chants and placards at demonstrations, broadcasts 
and material posted on the Internet’, as discussed in Chapter Two.600  A person 
will commit an offence of publishing a statement to directly encourage terrorism 
if: 
(a) he publishes a statement or causes another to publish such a 
statement; and 
(b) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he  
(c) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged 
or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate 
acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or 
(d) is reckless as to such and 
(e) the statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the 
members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences.601 
 
For Jones et al, the ‘notion of direct encouragement causes little difficulty’.602  
The criminal act of publishing the material with intent is little different from the 
                                                
600 A. Jones QC, R. Bowers and H. D. Lodge (2006) Blackstone’s Guide to The Terrorism Act 2006, (Oxford University 
Press) p.13 
601 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(2)(b)(i)(ii) 
602 Supra as per A. Jones QC, R. Bowers and H. D. Lodge (2006) p.16 
 189 
offence of incitement under the Terrorism Act 2000.  The section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 offences can be committed with intent, or recklessly as to 
whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or 
otherwise induced.603  However, because this provides for indirect encouragement 
the breadth applicable of which is helpful to law enforcement agencies’ in terms 
of scope.  
 
Indirect Encouragement: Glorification 
The glorification element posed one of the most contentious issues during the 
passage of the Terrorism Act 2006 through UK Parliament.604  The main concern 
centred on how broadly the offence had been drawn and the possible implications 
on civil liberties and human rights, namely Article 10 ECHR the freedom of 
expression.  The Third Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights raised 
such concern in 2005.  The Committee accepted on balance that a new law was 
required but considered: 
…that the offence of encouragement in clause 1 is not sufficiently legally 
certain to satisfy the requirement in Article 10 that interferences with 
freedom of expression be “prescribed by law” because of (i) the 
vagueness of the glorification requirement, (ii) the breadth of the 
definition of “terrorism” and (iii) the lack of any requirement of intent to 
incite terrorism or likelihood of such offences being caused as ingredients 
of the offence.605 
                                                
603 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(2)(b)(i) and (ii) 
604 Supra as per A. Jones QC, R. Bowers and H. D. Lodge (2006) p.13 
605 Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters, House of Lords, House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Third Report of Session 2005–06, HL Paper 75-I HC 561-I, 
summary p.3 
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In order to render the new offence ECHR compatible, the Committee 
recommended the references to glorification be deleted, ‘insert a more tightly 
drawn definition of terrorism’ and ensure intent or at the very least a subjective 
recklessness test assessing the likelihood be inserted into the provision.606  It was 
also recommended that a reasonable excuse or public interest defence be inserted 
to further satisfy ECHR standards.607  However, the Government refused to 
implement the amendments suggested by the House of Lords and the then Labour 
Home Secretary Charles Clarke stated in Parliament that section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 intended to provide an exemplary description of what would 
constitute glorification.608  As a result, under section 1 the statement made must 
glorify the commission or preparation, including past, future or in general terms, 
terrorist attacks, and is a statement that members of the public could reasonably 
be expected to infer that they should emulate the glorified conduct.  Clarke 
however, made it clear that this description was not exhaustive.   
 
Therefore a statement made that provides indirect encouragement is not limited to 
such glorification.  Forming part of the UK’s pre-emptive approach this section, 
coupled with section 5 creates a broader offence of preparation of terrorist acts, 
being closer to containing an offence of involvement, future intention, or even just 
espousal of the cause, rather than the commission of an established crime.609  It 
                                                
606 Ibid 
607 Ibid 
608 Ibid 
609 R v Rowe [2008] Crim LR 72, see commentary 
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was argued this would appear to close off paths to enlightened discussion and 
debate utilising materials, as this could perceived as supporting acts of terrorism, 
rather than condemning it.610  Given the gravity of the radicalisation problem 
outline above one can appreciate the political approach to the necessity of these 
powers.  A similar approach is seen when looking at dissemination of terrorist 
materials. 
 
Dissemination of terrorist publications 
Following section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, a person engages in conduct 
falling within if he distributes or circulates a terrorist publication, including the 
sale or lending of a publication, or the offering for sale or loan, or provides a 
service to others that enable the obtainment of the publication, including the 
transmission of the publication electronically.  The offence of dissemination is 
completed if he intends his conduct to directly or indirectly encourages, or 
provides assistance in, the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism, or is reckless as to such.611  The Third Report of the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights raised the same concerns as those for the glorification of 
terrorism.  They argued this provision ‘suffers from some of the same 
compatibility problems as those identified in relation to the proposed 
encouragement offence’.612  This included ‘the lack of connection to incitement to 
                                                
610 Ibid 
611 Terrorism Act 2006 s 2(1) 
612 Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters, House of Lords, House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Third Report of Session 2005–06, HL Paper 75-I HC 561-I, 
summary pp.3-4 
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violence and the absence of any requirement that such incitement be either 
intended, carried out with reckless indifference, or likely’.613  Again the 
Committee suggested a reasonable excuse or public interest clause be inserted, 
primarily aimed at providing a defence and protection for legitimate activities of 
the media and academics.614  The requirement for this power, on balance appears 
to be necessary given the amount of data disseminated through the Internet, 
within which section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes specific provision for the 
application of sections1 and 2 to Internet activity, thereby preventing terrorist 
material from making its way onto the Internet and attempting to halt terrorist 
communication.  As highlighted, the enthused and encouraged would-be terrorist 
could potentially attempt to join terrorist groups currently fighting overseas. 
 
These pre-emptive tools have proved to not be as effective as first hoped.  In fact 
only three people have ever been successfully prosecuted under the Terrorist Act 
2006.  They could now be somewhat reinvigorated however, given the bulk 
powers under the IPA, and decryption methods.  Taken as a whole, the legislation 
discussed to this point serves to provide severe human rights restrictions, 
specifically an individual’s right to data privacy and to their freedom of 
expression, protected by both the ECHR and EU law. 
                                                
613 Ibid 
614 Ibid 
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CONCLUSION 
In addition to the unquantifiable threat highlighted in Part One of this Chapter, 
Part Two has illustrated the frustrated scenario fashioned by sudden increases in 
independent operational abilities.  This has resulted in the introduction of pre-
emptive legislative measures and a risk management style of policing.  To this 
end the Chapter has highlighted the interconnection between the risk society 
theory and predictive policing. 
 
Such pre-emptive measures include temporary travel restrictions and the 
criminalisation of neutral behaviour.  Taking a doctrinal approach, terms used 
such as mass data surveillance and pre-crime measures have been discredited.  
Indeed, it would be physically impossible for law enforcement to conduct 
surveillance on the whole of the UK populations’ electronic communications data.  
It has further been shown that the term ‘pre-crime’ is simply a fabrication and 
misleadingly used, given that pre-emptive measures are in fact criminal offences.  
 
The requirements for pre-emptive measures have been evidenced throughout both 
Parts of the Chapter, the second Part in particular, highlighting that currently 
counterterrorism legislation fails to eliminate the terrorist groups’ propaganda and 
terrorist encrypted electronic communications data.  Both of which play an 
integral part in increasing the security risks posed to the UK.  It further fails to 
provide clarity in practical terms, given that the Terrorism Act 2006 appears to 
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have undercut ss57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, where it could be argued 
the latter merely provides ‘a useful side-arm’.615  Regardless, as with the balance 
between collective security and individual data privacy rights in the UK being 
fairly stable, that same can be said for the pre-emptive legislative measures 
examined.  Again this is because of the role and importance of judicial review, 
judicial independence, and the over-arching scrutiny provided by commissioners 
and parliamentary committees.  Since the passing of the IPA, an increase in the 
usage of these dedicated pre-emptive measures may increase, thereby serving to 
provide the state with positive outcomes. 
 
                                                
615 Supra as per A. Imran (2011)  
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CHAPTER FOUR. IMPLICATIONS OF THE UK’S LEGAL 
RESPONSE: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will assess if the bulk powers under the IPA can stand to legal 
challenges over breaches of data protection and privacy rights.  The chapter starts 
by examining the EU’s constitutional and legal influence on the UK legislature, 
specifically with regards to data protection and the rule of law.  This is simply 
because the EU has led the UK’s developments in terms of data protection and 
data privacy, and data retention of electronic communications data.   
 
From the CJEU’s ruling in Digital Rights Ireland, a new criterion will be 
developed from which to test new UK legislation, ensuring it remains within the 
limits set by EU law.616  Applying this criterion specifically to the IPA, the 
chapter will illustrate that once tested by the CJEU, the initial bulk interception 
powers may be constrained.  In addition, the new Judicial Commissioners role 
will be examined focusing on the available powers restricted to judicial review 
                                                
616 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
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rules.  The overall aim of this chapter is to assess if the IPA strikes the right 
balance, between individual privacy and collective security in the digital age, and 
stand to CJEU and ECtHR judicial scrutiny. 
 
UK DATA PROTECTION 
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) provides statutory control over how a 
citizen’s personal information is used by organisations, private businesses and the 
Government.617  Those responsible for using the data must abide by the data 
protection principles ensuring data is: 
• used fairly and lawfully; 
• use for limited and/or specific expressed purposes; 
• accurate and used adequately; 
• deleted when no longer required; 
• kept secure; 
• not transferred outside the European Economic Area without adequate 
protection.618 
Should the data contain sensitive information, such as sexual health, criminal 
records, ethnicity and religious beliefs, then stronger protections must be in 
place.619  When it was enacted, the impact of the DPA was felt right across the 
public and private sector.  For the purposes of this Chapter, the seventh data 
protection principle relates to security, and it states that ‘appropriate technical and 
organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing 
                                                
617 The Data Protection Act 1998, Introductory Text 
618 The Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1 
619 The Data Protection Act 1998, s2 and Schedule 3 
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of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, 
personal data’.   
 
This is particularly relevant to the issues raised in Chapter Two and three 
combined, where the use of Internet and e-mail raises issues when, private or public 
organisations, wish to monitor its use.  Briefly, an organisation has a right and even 
a duty to monitor the use of the Internet and e-mails to prevent it being used for 
unlawful purposes or to distribute offensive material.  However, running concurrent 
to this obligation is the fact an individual has a right to data privacy and protection.  
It is the duty of any organisation that provides access to e-mail and the Internet to 
balance these two conflicting principles.  In specific policing terms section 29 DPA 
deals with crime and taxation exemptions that permit personal data to be processed 
and withheld from the individual concerned, for the purposes of the prevention or 
detection of crime.  Such exemption must be proportionate, where the ‘data 
controller’ must record the data being processed.  This means of course that a 
person may not be able to ascertain what information law enforcement has 
collected. 
KEY HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: INFLUENCING THE UK’S 
APPROACH 
The right to data privacy is enshrined in the EU at the constitutional level though 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR or Charter) and at the 
legislative level by way of two directives, namely the Data Protection Directive in 
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1995 and the e-Privacy Directive in 2002.620  In the interests of fullness, the 2002 
Directive repealed the earlier 1997 version aimed primarily towards the 
telecommunications sector, so it is no longer relevant.621   
 
EU Constitutional Protection: The Treaty of Lisbon 
As a result of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, which came into effect 
in 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 was given legal status.  
Therefore, constitutionally speaking, data privacy and protection is afforded by 
Article 8 of the Charter that states individuals have a right to the protection of 
personal data, where: 
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data, which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
The Charter also states compliance must be subject to control by an independent 
authority however, the right afforded here requires implementation into EU 
surveillance legislative instruments to make them effective.  The EU’s 
instruments have so far failed in this regard, inadequately providing sufficient 
oversight.  Since the terrorist attack on the US on 11th September 2001, data 
protection appears to have been set aside almost as governments’ focus on data 
                                                
620 European Union Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data.  Also: Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.  
See also S and Marper v UK [2008] 48 ECHR 1581, [66]-[67], the Court noted the concept of private life is a broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 
621 European Union Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 15 
December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector 
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collection and mining.622   Analysis illustrates that ‘creating a stable and 
unequivocal system of data protection was not a priority’.623 
 
EU Legislative Protection 
The 1995 Directive was implemented in the UK by way of the Data Protection 
Act 1998, and the 2002 Directive was implemented by the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.  Following this in 2008, the 
EU adopted a Framework Decision aimed at providing similar legislative 
protection, but focused primarily on police and judicial co-operation when dealing 
in criminal matters.624  The e-Privacy Directive in 2002 dealt with most aspects of 
protecting privacy in electronic communications, such as: 
• Security: Article 4 requires the service provider to take appropriate 
technical security measures. Subscribers must be informed if there is a 
risk of a security breach; 
• Confidentiality: Article 5 requires legislative assurance of 
confidentiality of communications made through public electronic 
communications services, or to such.  Monitoring or storing 
communications is prohibited unless required for national security or 
crime prevention; 
• Location data: Article 9 prohibits using location data unless it remains 
anonymous, or has the users consent. It can only be used to provide a 
value added service, such as local weather details.  Article 10 
however, permits the use of location data in life threatening 
circumstances, such as mobile contact with emergency services; 
• Billing: Article 6 stipulates that billing data must be erased or made 
anonymous once the service providers’ purposes for retention has 
expired (i.e.: the bill has been paid).  Under Article 8, service users 
have a right to receive non-itemised billing; 
• Automatic call forwarding:  Article 11 provides service users the right 
to prevent automatic call forwarding by third parties; 
                                                
622 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco (2009) Shortcomings in EU Data Protection in the Third and The Second Pillars, 46 
Common Market Law Review 1485, 1496 
623 Ibid 
624 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters 
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• Unsolicited marketing: Article 13 prohibits unsolicited 
communication unless consented to by the service user.625 
 
For Hijman and Scirocco however, the protection afforded by way of these 
instruments lacked comprehensive cover for all data processing and thereby 
illustrate issues of practicality.626  Balancing an individual’s right to data privacy 
with the needs of national security has not been an easy task to complete, either 
within the UK or the EU.  For example the DPA introduced safeguards applied to 
access to communications data.  The problem is that law enforcement agencies’ 
could only make use of electronic communications data for a limited period, and 
were thereby ‘obliged to rely solely on data routinely retained by communications 
companies for their own purposes’.627  This usually meant that the data was 
deleted following the payment of the last outstanding bill.  In light of this, and the 
fact that no mandatory data retention regime existed, the EU introduced a number 
of Data Retention Directives.  The first dealt with fixed networks and mobile 
telephony only, and was incorporated into UK law by way of the Data Retention 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/2199).  These were then superseded 
by the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009/859), ‘which 
contained additional provisions relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and 
email’.628 
                                                
625 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] EWHC 2092, summary 
626 H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco (2009) Shortcomings in EU Data Protection in the Third and The Second Pillars, 46 
Common Market Law Review 1485, 1496 
627 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] EWHC 2092, [37]-[38] 
628 Ibid, [42] 
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The start of a new focus on data retention began when the EU’s Council Action 
Plan on Combating Terrorism highlighted the emphasis to broaden security.629  At 
this time, the EU focused on creating the next generation of Schengen, a visa 
information system and biometric passports, with a focus on information 
gathering, analysis and exchange.630  In meeting this agenda, the EU’s Action 
Plan paved the way for framework decisions aimed at simplifying information 
exchange between law enforcement agencies’, Europol and Eurojust, and called 
for a Data Retention Directive.631   
 
BULK RETENTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS DATA: 
KEY HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
Mitsilegas follows this change in the use of EU level surveillance and notes five 
transformational trends, which are the linking of immigration with security and 
counterterrorism, increasing biometric data, a sharp shift towards prevention, 
broadening the access to data by law enforcement agencies’ and taking a risk 
assessment approach.632  These links and growth in the use of surveillance 
highlights a utilitarian logic where, ‘information must be seen as a tool for 
collective benefits like fighting terrorism’, ensuring, ‘that information is available 
                                                
629 European Union Council, (2007) EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 9 March 
630 Ibid  
631 Ibid  
632 V. Mitsilegas (2010) The Transformation of Border Controls in an Era of Security: UK and EU Systems 
Converging? 24 Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 233 
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when needed’.633  This idea of the availability of data counters the EU’s data 
protection principle, the aim of which is to limit the use of data to a specified 
purpose. 
 
For Murphy, surveillance represents the broadest counterterrorism action taken by 
the EU.634  In the 21st Century, national surveillance systems, such as the UK’s 
IPA, subject to warrants and authorities can potentially affect a large section of 
the population and are not simply targeted towards immigrants, asylum seekers or 
suspected criminals.  The EU’s 2006 Data Retention Directive represents a classic 
example of targeting the whole population.  For this reason, Murphy describes it 
as unpalatable.635  The Directive: 
Aims to harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations 
of the providers of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks with respect to the retention of 
certain data which are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure 
that the data are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection 
and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its 
national law.636 
Prior to the terrorist attack in London on the 7 July 2005, the EU’s earlier 
attempts to create such a measure failed due to heavy opposition from the 
European Parliament.637  However, in the aftermath of this attack the UK 
                                                
633 Supra as per H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco (2009), 1490 
634 Supra as per C. C. Murphy (2015) p.147 
635 Ibid 
636 Article 1 of the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
637 Draft Framework Decision on the retention of data processed and stored in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or data on public communications networks for the purpose 
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effectively suppressed any opposition, arguing that mobile telephones were used 
in the coordination of the attacks, in addition to the earlier Madrid attack on 3 
March 2004, and unsubstantiated claims were made confirming 
telecommunications information was vital to the investigation.638  This Directive 
amended the earlier e-Privacy Directive and as such, following adoption of the 
Data Retention Directive on the basis of Article 95 EC (now Article 114 Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), Ireland supported by 
Slovakia brought forward an application to have it annulled by the CJEU.  In 
Ireland v European Parliament and European Commission the CJEU reached the 
decision that the amendment was within the legal scope under the now Article 
114 TFEU.639  In drawing a comparison to an earlier ruling concerning Passenger 
Name Record data, discussed in the next chapter, the Court confirmed the 
Directive merely aimed to harmonise the retention of data by private actors within 
the EU so that a distortion of competition within the internal market could be 
avoided.640  Whilst the legality of the Directive is sufficient as it was adopted 
correctly, this further rationale represents a startlingly poor decision indeed.  The 
reason behind the adoption in the first place was to provide lawful basis for the 
retention of data, both the traffic and location data of individuals, effectively 
                                                                                                                                
of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crime and criminal offences including terrorism 
2004/0813/CNS 
638 Commission (EC) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of 
data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC COM (2005) 438 final, Brussels, 21 September 2005.  See also: Euractiv.com, Data 
Retention: Parliament caves in to Council pressure, 14 December 2005, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/data-retention-parliament-caves-in-to-council-pressure/ accessed 
11 July 2016 
639 [2009] ECR-I-593, [82] 
640 Ireland v European Parliament and European Commission [2009] ECR-I-593, [60]-[69] 
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permitting a total derogation from Article 7 and 8 CFR, which would require the 
deletion of such information once the billing purpose was satisfied.   
 
The Breadth of the 2006 EU Directive 
It is particularly concerning when one notes the sheer breadth of the 2006 
Directive, which effectively includes a plethora of crimes for which the data may 
be utilised, to whom can access the data and the retention period.  The ‘excess of 
crimes’ argument stems from the fact Member States cannot agree upon a 
definition of serious crime, and therefore Member States have implemented the 
directive in their own very personable way, contrary to EU law.641  The same can 
be said for the different law enforcement agencies’ permitted access to the data 
stored, with some Member States allowing not only security and policing 
agencies, but military services, tax and customs officials and border authorities.642  
Retention periods also fluctuate given the Directive allows for such divergence, 
permitting between six to 24 months.643   
 
These facts prove inescapably the 2006 Directive derogated from the very 
purpose of EU directives.  Even though the situation may have been improved 
given the previous total lack of uniformity, some divergence remains, illustrative 
                                                
641 Council of the European Union, Document 9439/11, Brussels, 27 April 2011 
642 Commission (EC) Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Evaluation report 
on the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC COM (2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011 at p.9 
643 Article 6 Data Retention Directive, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
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of the failure of the instruments claim to harmonise the internal market.644  A 
rather peculiar clause within the Directive, although subject to EU Commission 
approval, allows the Member State to extend the retention period beyond the two 
years should particular circumstances exist.645  It is startling to note that the 
Commission only review the Member States decision checking for compliance 
with the internal market, rather than data protection rights.646  Coupled with the 
lack of clarity surrounding the necessity of this provision and the fact it has not 
been used deems it somewhat superfluous, and arguably unpalatable given the 
lack of focus on fundamental data protection.647   
 
It terms of human rights infringements, the Directive directly reversed the 
requirements under the e-Privacy Directive 2002, which as per above required 
immediate deletion of traffic and location data once the billing process has been 
completed.648  This was challenged through the judicial process where the CJEU 
dismissed the first claim that was based on the legality under what is now Article 
114 TFEU, as discussed above.649  However, in 2010 the Irish High Court granted 
                                                
644 The Commission noted a wide range of retention periods existed prior to the Data Retention Directive, from 3 
months to 4 years.  Commission (EC) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC COM (2005) 438 final, Brussels, 21 September 2005, p.1   
645 Article 12 and Article 12(2) Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC 
646 M. Vilasau (2007) Traffic Data Retention v Data Protection: The New European Framework, Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 52, 58 
647 Commission (EC) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of 
data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC COM (2005) 438 final, Brussels, 21 September 2005, p.13 
648 Article 6 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.   
649 C-301/06 Ireland v European Parliament and European Commission [2009] ECR-I-593 
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a motion brought by a campaign group known as Digital Rights Ireland, where 
they specifically requested the CJEU look at the compliancy of the Directive with 
Article 5(4) Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and with certain fundamental 
rights protected under the CFR.650  Additionally in 2012 a number of applicants 
brought an action in the Austrian Constitutional Court claiming the national law 
transposing the Directive infringed Article 8 CFR.  The two claims were merged 
together by the CJEU where it was finally held that the Directive was invalid, 
overall, because the EU legislature had exceeded the limits imposed by Article 7, 
8 and 52(1) of the CFR.651   
 
They decided the Directive failed to provide sufficient safeguards against 
unlawful access to and the use of retained data, particularly by public 
authorities.652  The CJEU, although noting the sheer breadth of the Directive and 
that in effect, no limits on the power to retain data existed, they failed to expressly 
lay down particular restraints or conditional requirements, should such retention 
be necessary.653  Although it remains unclear, the Court did elucidate to what will 
be developed further below into the Digital Rights Criterion: 
1. The protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life 
requires that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection 
of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary. 
Consequently the legislation in question must lay down clear and 
                                                
650 Ibid 
651 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
652 Digital Rights Ireland, [57]-[59], [60]-[67] 
653 Digital Rights Ireland, [58], [59] 
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precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in 
question and imposing minimum safeguards sufficient to give 
effective protection against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful 
access to and use of that data;654 
2. Any legislation establishing or permitting a general retention regime 
for personal data must expressly provide for access to and use of the 
data to be strictly restricted to the purpose of preventing and detecting 
precisely defined serious offences or of conducting criminal 
prosecutions relating to such offences;655 
3. Above all, access by the competent national authority to the data 
retained must be made dependent on a prior review by a court or an 
independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access 
to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose 
of attaining the objective pursued, and which intervenes following a 
reasoned request of those authorities.656 [My emphasis]  
Albeit the Court invalidated the Directive, a generalised rationale for the existence 
of such a data retaining measure was legitimised:  
‘…the retention of data for the purpose of allowing the competent 
national authorities to have possible access to those data...genuinely 
satisfies an objective of general interest’.657 
 
The impact of the CJEU’s Digital Rights Ireland decision on the UK cannot be 
overstated, given if effectively neutered any national law giving effect to the 
Directive, which was transposed into UK national law by way of the Data 
Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009.658  Immediately following the 
CJEU’s landmark decision, the then Home Secretary Theresa May put before the 
                                                
654 Digital Rights Ireland, [52], [54] 
655 Digital Rights Ireland, [61] 
656 Digital Rights Ireland, [62], this was also highlighted by Bean LJ in R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson 
MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092, [91] 
657 Digital Rights Ireland, [44] 
658 The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations SI 2009/859, adopted pursuant to the European Communities 
Act 1972 s 2(2). Regulations under the ECA 1972 depend upon the existence of a valid EU instrument. See also: 
A. Roberts (2015) Privacy, Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, The Modern Law Review 78(3) 522-548, 536 
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UK Parliament the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill, specifying the 
UK must merely retain the powers under the invalid Directive, by fashioning such 
primary legislation.659  This is made clear in the opening words of the statute, 
confirming: 
An Act to make provision, in consequence of a declaration made by the 
[CJEU] in relation to Directive 2006/24/EC, about the retention of certain 
communications data.660 
To ensure Digital Rights Ireland had no bearing on the legislation, it did not 
purport to transpose any EU law.661  It was introduced on the 14 July 2014 and 
rushed through UK Parliament as emergency legislation, receiving Royal Assent 
some four days later on 17 July 2014.662  A sunset clause was applied to alleviate 
MP’s fears surrounding rushed and under-debated, far reaching powers under the 
legislation, repealing it on 31 December 2016.663   
 
As a result and following the enactment Ministers David Davis and Tom Watson 
brought a judicial review action to the UK High Court, arguing the provisions 
were incompatible with the EU law, namely the CFR and CJEU’s decision in 
Digital Rights Ireland, and additionally the ECHR.664  Lord Justice Bean 
                                                
659 Supra as per D. Anderson QC (2015) p.16. See also V. Mitsilegas (2015) The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: 
Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (London: Springer, 2015) p.39 
660 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] EWHC 2092, [44]-[46] 
661 A. Roberts (2015) Privacy, Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
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662 Supra as per D. Anderson QC (2015) p.15 
663 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, s 8(3) 
664 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] EWHC 2092 
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discussed the Digital Rights Ireland cases, specifically referring to the CJEU’s 
interpretation of Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR.  Bean LJ replied in part on an earlier 
decision reached by Lord Kerr in the UK Supreme Court, in Rugby Football 
Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd., confirming the CFR has direct 
effect in UK national law, when implementing EU law.665  Given UK data 
protection law has been within the scope of EU law since 1995, Bean LJ really 
had no option but to illustrate the fact he was dealing with the implementation of 
EU law.666   
 
Referring to the ruling in Digital Rights Ireland rendering the Directive invalid, 
Bean LJ went on to say: 
The invalidation of the Data Retention Directive by the CJEU put in 
doubt the legal basis for requiring the continued retention of 
communications data under the [UK’s Data Retention (EC Directive)] 
2009 Regulations. Although the 2009 Regulations remained in force, they 
had been made under s. 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to 
implement the Data Retention Directive and were already subject to a 
legal challenge that had been stayed pending the outcome of the Digital 
Rights Ireland case. We were told that following the Digital Rights 
Ireland judgment, some CSPs [Crown Prosecution Service] expressed the 
view that there was no legal basis for them to continue to retain 
communications data, and indicated that they would start to delete data 
that had been retained under the 2009 Regulations.667 [My emphasis] 
Therefore, in the absence of a clear legal power to retain electronic 
communications data, the UK’s law enforcement agencies’ ability to use the Data 
Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 was endangered.  In disseminating the 
                                                
665 See Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd., (formerly Viagogo Ltd) [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [27]-[28] 
666 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
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667 R (on the application of David David MP, Tom Watson MP, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis v The Secretary of State for the Home 
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CJEU’s judgement in Digital Rights Ireland, Bean noted the Court’s failure to 
stipulate possible conditions however, following the ratio it is clear that 
‘legislation establishing a general retention regime for electronic communications 
data infringes rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR unless it is accompanied 
by an access regime which provides adequate safeguards for those rights’.668   
 
The claimants’ application for judicial review succeeded and the High Court 
declared that section 1 of the DRIPA was inconsistent with EU law in so far as: 
a) it does not lay down clear and precise rules providing for access to 
and use of communications data retained pursuant to a retention 
notice to be strictly restricted to the purpose of preventing and 
detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting criminal 
prosecutions relating to such offences; and 
b) access to the data is not made dependent on a prior review by a court 
or an independent administrative body whose decision limits access to 
and use of the data to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of 
attaining the objective pursued.669 [My emphasis] 
 
The High Court therefore made an order suspending section 1 of DRIPA 
postponed until 31 March 2016 to give Parliament time to consider their 
judgement and introduce measures consistent with EU law.670  The High Court’s 
decision is not surprising given that inherently, bulk collection of evidence has 
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not been particularly welcomed or upheld, quite separately from constitutional EU 
law principles, within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.671 
 
European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence 
The ECHR and the ECtHR provides an additional layer of judicial accountability 
of UK statutes.  Although the examples illustrated below do not cover electronic 
communications data, they do concern the state retaining data of persons neither 
charged nor convicted of a criminal offence.  The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has 
illustrated that the state cannot simply retain the information for future use, or as a 
‘just in case measure’.672  This has been evident for some time, and by way of 
example, under section 64(1A) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1997 (PACE), 
the state was permitted to keep on file DNA and fingerprints evidence of those 
either not charged or convicted of the crime suspected for.  This also included 
DNA from those who volunteered to give samples for elimination.  Challenged by 
way of R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police in the House of Lords, it 
was held the Association of Police Officers (ACPO) policy allowing retention of 
DNA and fingerprints was lawful.673  Later the case became known as S and 
Marper v UK where the ECtHR decided that a blanket and indiscriminate policy 
amounted to a breach of Article 8 ECHR.674  This particular case highlights the 
clash between the UK judiciary and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, where Lord 
                                                
671 R (GC) v Commissioner of the Metropolis [2011] 1 WLR 1230 
672 Ibid 
673 [2004] UKHL 39 
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Steyn in dismissing the appeal affirmed, whilst accepting the necessity that the 
Court interpret the ECHR in a harmonious way with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence: 
The whole community, as well as the individuals whose sample was 
collected, benefits from there being as large a database as it is 
possible…The benefit to the aims of accurate and efficient law 
enforcement is thereby enhanced.675 
The dichotomy is interesting here, given Lord Steyn favoured the interests of the 
wider community over the individual, and the ECtHR ultimately favoured the 
opposite, highlighting particular areas of concern: 
…have due regard to the specific context in which information at issue is 
recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these 
records are used and processed and the results that may be obtained.676  
In light of the final ECtHR ruling, ACPO decided to do nothing, believing it 
should follow the earlier ruling in the House of Lords.  This inevitably led to the 
database being further challenged in R (GC) v Commissioner of the Metropolis in 
the UK Supreme Court.677  It held that the ECtHR’s decision should be followed 
and therefore retaining the database was unjustified interference with Article 8 
ECHR.  Although the decision was welcomed, the Supreme Court did not make a 
declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998 with regards 
section 64(1A) PACE, stating Parliament had intended discretion be used as to 
what could be kept on the database.  The Court did however, clarify that should 
Parliament not remedy the situation within a reasonable time then citizens’ would 
have viable public law challenges.  As a result Parliament introduced the 
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Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, where section 1 brought about the removal of 
DNA and fingerprints being stored on the database for those citizens’ not 
convicted.   
 
Considering the ECtHR’s approach and particular emphasis in S and Marper, that 
in order for the powers to be in accordance with the rule of law, and ECHR 
compatible, there must be adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and 
sufficiently clarify the discretionary scope, given to authorities with a focus on the 
way the powers are exercised.678  The Court findings are not that surprising given 
their earlier ruling in Klass v Germany where they emphasised proportionality and 
a focus on the individual’s rights.679  It is clear that blanket policies do not sit well 
within the ECHR framework, and where the ECtHR see the dignity of the 
individual prevailing over the interests of the wider community.  Whilst the 
ECtHR disapproves of blanket policies the CJEU appears to be somewhat in 
favour, providing that minimum safeguards are put in place.  It was evident from 
the Digital Rights Ireland Case that the collection of data was not the main issue, 
rather the safeguards surrounding the access to it. 
 
More recently however, in Zakharov v Russia the ECtHR held that any 
authorisation for the use of surveillance powers must be capable of:  
‘…verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person 
concerned, in particular, whether there are factual indications for 
                                                
678 [2008] (Application Numbers 30562/04 and 30566/04), [95] 
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suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed 
criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance 
measures, such as, for example, acts endangering national security’.680   
Accordingly, the ECtHR here has made it quite clear that privacy, and the 
freedom of expression are important principles.  Therefore, the ECtHR opinion 
would be that it is unjustifiable for a Government to collect the private 
communications data of potentially millions of people that it does not suspect in 
criminal involvement or terrorist related activity.681  Ensuring restrictive laws 
provide for data protection and privacy may become increasingly important when 
the UK leave the EU, in terms of intelligence exchange, as explored in the next 
Chapter. 
 
CREATING A NEW DATA RETENTION LAW: THE DIGITAL RIGHTS 
CRITERION 
Returning to EU law, in order for UK legislation to fit with constitutional EU law 
and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, and the ECtHR, the following criteria is 
proposed ensuring compatibility: 
1. Primary legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing 
the scope and application of the measure; 
2. Minimum safeguards must be imposed sufficiently reducing the risk 
of abuse or unlawful access to the data; 
3. Access to the data must be expressly provided for, limiting the 
number of persons authorised to have such access and restricted to the 
purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious criminal 
offences; 
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4. Access to the data will only be granted after a prior assessment has 
been made by an independent administrative body or court, with the 
primary focus on human rights and proportionality of the measure; 
5. Retained data will be deleted after 12 months unless an independent 
administrative body or court decides otherwise, having weighed the 
evidence and conducted a proportionality test 
 
Focusing on EU law, it could be argued the IPA is purely domestic legislation and 
thereby not subject to the CFR, namely Article 8 right to data protection.  DRIPA 
was arguably different, enacted to give effect to a EU instrument.  One could 
generalise and state that the EU lacks competence in legislating within the field of 
fundamental rights and Member States must only respect the CFR when 
implementing EU law.  However, legally it is much more complex as the CJEU 
expansively magnify the term ‘implementing EU law’ particularly when Member 
States seek to rely on a derogation from EU law principles.682  The IPA in fact 
specifies under Schedule 10 Part 1, that the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 do not apply in relation to any 
personal data breach which is to be notified to the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner in accordance with a code of practice.683  Considering UK data 
protection laws have been founded on EU law, particularly the e-Privacy 
Directive, it is argued the IPA is based upon EU derogation and it will 
undoubtedly be classed as implementing EU law by the CJEU.  For this reason, 
the Act must respect the CFR and implement the digital rights criterion.   
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The Investigatory Powers Act 2016: Striking the right balance 
It has been recognised the IPA needs to strike the right balance between 
individual privacy and collective security in the digital age.  It has been said that 
holding privacy and security concerns to be irreconcilable is unhelpful and 
constraining given ‘we all share an interest in maximising both our individual 
privacy on the one hand and collective security on the other.684  Particularly since 
Digital Rights Ireland, it is vital any new intrusive surveillance powers that are 
passed are done so with due regard to the CFR.685  Although the IPA was written 
to last, not just for the remaining time the UK is within the EU, the importance 
that UK counterterrorism legislation meets the CFR will still be important, in 
securing and maintaining intelligence exchange.  Accordingly, the right to data 
protection includes data security and was described in Digital Rights Ireland as 
the essence of this right.686   
BULK POWERS: DIGITAL RIGHTS CRITERION 
In the previous Chapter it was shown that the bulk powers of interception, 
retention and equipment interference have been instrumental, and sometimes 
pivotal in preventing acts of terrorism and other serious crimes.  The idea is to 
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gather large volumes of data, which is then subject to stringent controls, used to 
filter out irrelevant material so the security services can simply focus on the small 
fraction that provides intelligence on known and potential threats.687  The issue 
here is regardless of the filtering process many innocent citizens’ electronic 
communications data would have been collected in the course of the action.  King 
argues that whilst there ‘needs to be formidable intrusive powers for law 
enforcement agencies’ to operate’ they must be targeted only and proportionate, 
rather than catchall bulk powers.688  The bulk powers are extraordinarily broad in 
scope and the ‘catchall’ part to the bulk collection does not sound proportionate 
however, the practical effect of the breadth is limited by what can follow after the 
device has been accessed, or the telephone line tapped.  It has been put forward 
that this stage makes the former proportionate.689 
 
The question is of course does the IPA meet the Digital Rights criterion.  The IPA 
clearly satisfies the first test insofar as it forms primary legislation that lays down 
clear and precise rules government the scope and application of the measures.  
The many accompanying code of conducts, although not law, may perhaps go 
some way in further satisfying this test.  The access to the data is expressly 
provided for, with the bulk powers in particular stating that only intelligence and 
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https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2016-06-27/debates/1606278000466/InvestigatoryPowersBill   
688 First sitting Committee Debate Session 2015-16, Investigatory Powers Bill, Publications on the Internet, Column 
14, 24 March 2016 available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/160324/am/160324s01.ht
m accessed 30 August 2016 
689 Ibid at Column 6, 24 March 2016 
 218 
security agencies can apply for the necessary warrants.  This therefore limits the 
number of persons authorised to have such access and it is restricted to the 
purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious crime.  
 
In order to pass the digital rights criterion, measures must introduce minimum 
safeguards that sufficiently reduce the risk of abuse or unlawful access to the data, 
and that the access to the data will only be granted, after an independent 
administrative body or court has made a prior assessment, with the primary focus 
on human rights and proportionality of the measure.  It is clear the UK 
Government has listened to the recommendations made, and perhaps learned from 
past mistakes, by taking a human rights approach highlighted by the opening Part 
to the IPA that imposes certain duties, and introduces general privacy protections 
and safeguards.690    
 
The intrusive powers can only be used when it is necessary and proportionate to 
do so, and requires an independent judicial commissioner to review the Secretary 
of State decision before the warrant is valid.691  IPA’s new double lock system 
creates a number of new posts, including judicial commissioners and an 
Independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner.692  This new position brings 
                                                
690 Investigatory Powers Bill 2015 
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together the responsibilities of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Chief 
Surveillance Commissioner.693  Additionally, the commissioners will be provided 
with inspectors, technical experts and independent legal advisers, and should an 
individual suffer as a result of an error the IPC will have the power to inform 
them.694  These provisions certainly increase the difference between the IPA and 
all other surveillance legislation including RIPA.  
 
Judicial commissioners, in deciding whether the warrant is necessary on relevant 
grounds and whether the conduct authorised is proportionate, must apply the same 
principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.695  
The meaning of judicial review was discussed during the First sitting Committee 
stage of the IPA and criticised by Sara Ogilvie from Liberty as being inherently 
limited in terms of jurisdiction.696  In response Suella Fernandes confirmed that 
the double lock involves, ‘an intensive analysis of necessity and 
proportionality’.697   
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Checks and Balances: Judicial Commissioners and other mechanisms 
In labouring the point Ogilvie argued that the level of judicial review would 
naturally be less intensive due to the ‘national security’ argument.  Although 
Fernandes did offer some assurance in that the process, is not meant to be a 
‘rubber-stamping’ exercise, it certainly appears that way considering section 
229(6) confirms that judicial commissioners must not act in a way that is contrary 
to the public interest, or prejudicial to national security, the prevention or 
detection of serious crime, or the economic well-being of the UK.698  Adding 
further contention is the fact a judicial commissioner must not jeopardise the 
success of an intelligence or security operation, compromise the safety of those 
involved, or unduly impede the operational effectiveness of an intelligence 
service.699  Although these particular sections are not to be applied when 
performing the ‘double-lock’ function, it does place a peculiar intent on the role, 
effectively requiring the commissioner to either agree or disagree with the 
Secretary of State.700  
 
David Davis MP and Shami Chakrabarti both voiced similar concerns, referring to 
where the IPA specifies the judicial commissioners have to make their decisions 
based on judicial review principles, rather than based on the evidence.701  Both 
Davis and Chakrabarti do have an agenda however, with the latter having been the 
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director of Liberty for some years.702  For Murray et al, it seems relatively clear 
from the IPA, that ‘the judicial commissioner will be asked to review the 
Secretary of State’s action in issuing a warrant on judicial review principles alone, 
this is whether the action was illegal, unfair (illegitimate), irrational or 
disproportionate’.703  This is simply another layer of accountability on state action 
by the judiciary.  Although the IPA does not appear to read this way, it could be 
further argued that the judicial commissioners position would be untenable, if the 
access to the data and evidenced put forward to the Secretary of State remain 
unavailable to them.  Murray remains concerned that this lack of evidential 
transparency ‘does not offer judicial independence required by the rule of law’, 
and is not representative of an independent judiciary supposedly at the ‘heart of 
the warrant process’.704    
 
Notably, in terms of English public law, this new judicial position may challenge 
the doctrine of separation of powers, as the commissioners will be asked to, ‘cross 
the waterline between secrecy and transparency’, and effectively draws judges 
into ‘the realm of executive decision-making, thereby threatening the impression 
of impartiality on which the legal system ultimately depends’.705  Prior 
independent judicial authorisation however, is a new measure, so it is perhaps not 
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possible to know with absolute certainty how it will work in practice.  Inescapably 
and to balance this view, the result of judicial approval means that public bodies 
do not simply have unlimited power to ‘intrude upon the privacy of citizens’ 
without proper justification and authorisation’.706  
 
Governmental Committees: Holding law enforcement to account 
The ISC simply adds another additional layer to state and law enforcement 
agencies’ accountability.  It was first established by the ISA to, ‘examine the policy, 
administration and expenditure of the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, 
and the Government Communications Headquarters’.707  Since then the Justice and 
Security Act 2013 has increased the ISC’s remit, including the oversight of 
operations, and has been granted greater powers.708  The ISC can now look at other 
intelligence related work carried out by the Cabinet Office and Defence Intelligence 
for the Ministry of Defence, and the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism.  The 
members of this Committee are appointed by Parliament, who then reports back to 
Parliament and to the Prime Minister, often dealing with sensitive information.   
 
The ISC members, drawn from both the House of Commons and House of Lords, 
are able to hear classified material, meaning they can hold the intelligence agencies 
to account.  On the 7th November 2013 the ISC held its first ever open evidence 
session with the heads of the Security Service, GCHQ and SIS.  Although the 
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sessions are closed when assessing information that is deemed highly classified, the 
Committee intends to hold further public sessions in future.709  In the ISC’s latest 
2015-2016 Annual Report, headed by the Chair the Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve, the 
members confirmed they are of the view that the agencies’ powers provided by the 
IPA are justified.  In November 2015, a Joint Committee was appointed to 
commence pre-legislative scrutiny of the IPA.  Given the role of the ISC in 
overseeing the intelligence agencies and its ability to take evidence on classified 
matters, the Committee provided the pre- legislative scrutiny focusing on ‘those 
aspects of the draft Bill which relate primarily to the agencies’ investigatory 
powers’.710  In addition to the ISC report, the Joint Committee on the draft IPA 
made a total of 86 recommendations.711  Whilst the former report focused on the 
overseeing arrangements surrounding the policing security agencies, due to its 
ability to take evidence on classified matters, the latter report focused on issues of 
clarity, judicial oversight and the justification for the various powers.   
 
The Home Affairs Select Committee is another mechanism use to hold Government 
and law enforcement agencies’ to account.  This was seen on 6th December 2016, 
where David Armond the Deputy Director General of the NCA was questioned on 
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EU policing and security issues.712  This hearing led on from the earlier October 
2016 focusing on UK policing after the UK’s exit from the EU.713 
 
In response to the issues raised by the various Committees, according to Prime 
Minster Theresa May, the IPA starts with a presumption of privacy, where 
privacy protections form the ‘backbone’ of the Act, and safeguards introduced 
further ‘bolster’ this in ensuring that high thresholds exist when sanctioning the 
most intrusive powers, and it limits the public authorities that can use the 
powers.714  The questions of trust between the citizens’ and the State are 
important ones.          
 
PRIVACY AND TRUST: BALLANCING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
The previous chapter has made it clear that powers of surveillance, particularly 
the proposed bulk powers, impinge upon individual privacy.  Goold states:  
A public that is unable to understand why privacy is important-or which 
lacks the conceptual tools necessary to engage in meaningful debates 
about its value-is likely to be particularly susceptible to arguments that 
privacy should be curtailed.715 
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Whilst different perspectives and theories exist with regards the term ‘privacy’, 
this chapter has focused on the terms legal meaning.  Privacy is important as it not 
only allows individualised expression and autonomy, but the concept can 
empower citizens’ to challenge state decisions.  In R v Spencer the Supreme Court 
of Canada described the protection of privacy as a prerequisite to individualised 
security, autonomy and self-fulfilment, which is essential in maintaining a 
thriving democratic society.716  Privacy is not an absolute right as per the ECHR 
or the EU’s CFR, but rather qualified and limited.  On the one hand the State must 
protect the qualified rights insofar as possible, but on the other it must has a duty 
to protect the lives of it citizens’ and keep them safe from criminality.  In order to 
achieve this, the state must intrude on the privacy of individual citizens’, usually 
of course as part of targeted intelligence-led policing, where proportionate, 
necessary and lawful to do so.   
 
In terms of balancing individual privacy rights and maintaining collective 
security, debates turn on the level of individual privacy verses the level of State 
powers of surveillance.  This focal point is unhelpful and dismisses less tangible 
aspects such as the individual’s horizontal and vertical relationships, forming their 
perspectives on the social norm of privacy.717  Sir Thomas Erskine May rather 
poetically captures the issue, stated in 1863: 
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Men may be without restraints upon their liberty: they may pass to and fro 
at pleasure but if their steps are tracked by spies and informers, their 
words noted down for crimination, their associates watched as 
conspirators-who shall say that they are free? Nothing is more	revolting to 
Englishmen than the espionage that forms part of the administrative 
system of continental despotisms. It haunts men like an evil genius, chills 
their gaiety, restrains their wit, casts a shadow over their friendships, and 
blights their domestic hearth. The freedom of this country may be 
measured by its immunity from this baleful agency.718 
Modern attitudes towards surveillance are perhaps not as robust as during May’s 
time, however, an element of mistrust exists.719  It is also relevant that attitudes 
towards privacy depend heavily on the citizen’s own perspective, informed by 
history, experience, environment, education and development.720  Research has 
illustrated such positions are exceedingly contextual.721   
 
Fears of the Surveillance Society: The Snowdon revelations 
Anderson insinuates societal vertical relationships depend heavily on trust.722  He 
leads the reader to what he calls is the ‘Snowden effect’, referring to the leaking 
of classified and sensitive US National Security Agency (NSA) documents by 
Edward Snowdon in 2013.723  The documents emphasised the relationship 
between the NSA and the UK’s GCHQ, whereby intelligence exchange ensued 
initiating widespread trepidation over the potential violations of human rights, 
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arguably flouting legal protection for individual data privacy.724  The documents 
highlighted the fact that a programme called ‘PRISM’ allowed US Federal 
agencies direct access to Internet servers, infiltrating Internet firms such as 
Microsoft, Apple, Facebook and Google.725  Hopkins reports that between May 
2012 and April 2013, 197 PRISM programme intelligence reports were passed to 
the UK’s counterterrorism law enforcement agencies’.726  The NSA, according to 
the leaked documents, was additionally recording millions of telephone 
conversations of US citizens’ despite the fact they were not under any suspicion 
of unlawful behaviour.727  Snowden having passed secret documents to a Glen 
Greenwald, a Guardian employee, Greenwald in the first of a series of following 
reports revealed that since April 2013 and under PRISM, confirmed that the NSA 
was collecting and retaining indiscriminately the telephone records of millions of 
US customers.728  Although initially sanctioned to collect the communications 
records of foreign nationals, Greenwald confirms that it moved very quickly to 
concentrate on domestic communications.729  As Greenwald continues with the 
series, he reported that the GCHQ had gained access to the intelligence, including 
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sensitive personal information, which it then shared with the NSA.730  
Additionally it was also reported that the US Government had paid GCHQ over 
£100 million to secure access to the UK’s intelligence gathering programmes.731  
 
This is where the legal and cultural differences between the EU and US become 
quite prevalent, in that the Snowden revelations had the potential to damage 
diplomatic relationships, not only between the EU and US but the EU and the UK.  
This could have also affected international intelligence exchange between all 
parties as discussed further below.  In light of this danger, UK and US politicians 
were somewhat forced to provide honest information, and defend the actions of 
the NSA and GCHQ.  The then UK Foreign Secretary William Hague MP 
confirmed that both the UK and US had operated within the rule of law and used 
the intelligence obtained to protect citizens’ freedoms.732  Despite UK and US 
officials’ assurances, the actions taken by the NSA and GCHQ reverberated even 
further when reports indicated that EU politicians were also spied on, in particular 
Angela Merkel the German Chancellor.733   
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In terms of the public trust, despite assurances the UK public’s reaction has 
evidenced a suspicious attitude.734  In light of Snowden, an Austrian citizen and 
privacy advocate, Maximillian Schrems took action against the Data Protection 
Commissioner.735  His argument turned on the fact that Facebook Ireland has 
transferred his personal data to the US, and that the US did not ensure sufficient 
protection of his personal data.736  Referring to NSA’s practices as reported by 
Greenwald and leaked by Snowden, he claimed the NSA and other US agencies 
could have retained his personal data.737  The US’s Foreign Intelligence Services 
Act 1978 permits the NSA access to personal data held on US servers.  Therefore, 
because Facebook Ireland is a subsidiary of Facebook US, Schrems’ details had in 
fact been transferred.  The CJEU noted that the US Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court did not offer a judicial remedy to EU citizens’ and declared 
the 2000/520/EC Decision invalid, bringing an end to the Safe Harbour 
Agreement. 
 
Article 25 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive (discussed in Chapter Five) was 
critical to the CJEU, particularly concerning the Commissions responsibility to 
ensure adequate personal protection of transferred data.738  The CJEU confirmed 
that the level of protection provided need not be identical to the EU’s, but must 
                                                
734 A. Travis (2015) Snowden leak: governments’ hostile reaction fuelled public distrust of spies, The Guardian, 15 
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evidence adequacy at the very least, ensuring they have a high level of 
fundamental rights protection in place, equivalent to which is afforded by Article 
25.739  The leaking of this information and GCHQ’s actions regarding the 
allegation of conducting mass surveillance, led to the German Justice Minister, 
Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger’s request from UK ministers’, for 
reassurance that actions taken were legal and if they affected German citizens’, 
stating further: 
In our modern world, the new media provide the framework for a free 
exchange of opinions and information. Transparent governance is one of 
the most important prerequisites that a democratic state and the rule of 
law requires.740   
The legal director of Liberty also accused GCHQ of violating citizens’ Article 8 
rights to privacy, commenting on the then proposed IPA: 
Those demanding the [Investigatory Powers Act, also termed as the] 
Snoopers' Charter seem to have been indulging in out-of-control snooping 
even without it - exploiting legal loopholes and help from Uncle Sam 
[USA]. No one suggests a completely unpoliced Internet but those in 
power cannot swap targeted investigations for endless monitoring of the 
entire globe.741 
 
In light of such reports and adversarial commentary, the EU’s Justice and Home 
Affairs Council (JHAC) showed concern for the level of protection of EU 
citizens’ constitutional right to privacy, which resulted in Viviane Reding the EU 
Justice Commissioner stating: 
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The European Commission is concerned about the possible consequences 
on EU citizens’ privacy. The Commission has raised this systematically in 
its dialogue with the U.S. authorities, especially in the context of the 
negotiations of the EU-U.S. data protection agreement in the field of 
police and judicial co-operation…742 
 
It is interestingly to note the dichotomy between the civilian and the State when 
discussing powers of surveillance and personal data privacy.  Representing 
somewhat of a paradox, citizens’ seem less concerned with sharing information 
freely in a horizontal fashion, by means of social media for example where people 
seem quite happy for others to know everything about them, but become quite 
aggrieved when information is viewed vertically, by the State.743  To this regard 
the previous chapters have shown the importance of personal privacy, being 
paramount in the minds of citizens’ with a generalised fear of a Big Brother State, 
given weight by the law enforcements agencies use of OSINT and SOCMINT 
data.  Many fear the UK is moving towards a surveillance society, given that what 
follows a terrorist act or perceived threat usually takes the form of new legislation 
introducing more restrictive measures.  The fluid relationship between terror 
threats and new legislative prowess has been emphasised throughout this thesis, in 
addition to proposed new legislation dealing with extremism.  
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CONCLUSION  
Part One of the IPA could be equated to simply paying ‘lip service’, because for 
some, overall, the introduction of bulk powers under the IPA fails to extend 
human rights protections, specifically related to the right to privacy, protection of 
personal data and freedom of expression.  Whilst these bulk powers may pass the 
digital rights criterion and could be described as necessary in finding would-be-
terrorists, it may ultimately come to fail the CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence 
when testing the proportionality of the measures.   
In terms of checks and balances, the IPA does introduce a double lock system 
whereby a judicial commissioner must agree with the Secretary of State, in line 
with judicial review influences, that the powers permitted under the warrant are 
necessary and proportionate.  The ISC and the Home Affairs Committee, both 
independent Governmental scrutiny mechanisms, with the former able to see 
classified information relating to intelligence operations, provide another form of 
checks and balances.  Additional safeguards are currently provided by the office of 
the Interception Commissioner, currently the Rt. Hon. Sir Stanley Burnton, who 
oversees the security agencies arrangements for access to the data.744  The new 
double lock system under the IPA however, creates a number of new posts 
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uk.info accessed 29 April 2016 
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including judicial commissioners and an Independent Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner.745 
It has been stipulated in the IPA that judicial commissioners must apply judicial 
review principles.  Whilst this is not particularly concerning, given the 
commissioners will undoubtedly view the evidence used by the Home Secretary 
in approving the authority, it is a new element and until it is seen working in 
practice it would be difficult to make any firm statements.  It will also be 
interesting to see if the bulk powers under the IPA will survive in their current 
form given legal challenges will undoubtedly come from human rights 
organisations such as Liberty.  Even if the UK has left the EU prior to any future 
CJEU ruling on the subject, it must still keep within current criterions to ensure 
international intelligence exchange with the EU continues.   
 
The EU has led data protection and data privacy initiatives, legally and 
constitutionally.  However, looking forward it may be the case that the ECtHR 
takes the lead, given the EU’s focus on data retention.  Should the UK’s bulk 
powers under the IPA be challenged in the ECtHR, who historically do not 
approve of blanket policies, or the keeping of data of innocent civilians, it may 
not survive.  This would be detrimental however, and it is argued the CJEU and 
ECtHR should accept that terrorism in the digital age means the Internet must be 
monitored, allowing for bulk analysis of electronic communications data.  
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The Chapter found however that the balance between collective security and 
individual data privacy rights in the UK are fairly stable because of the role of 
judicial review; judicial independence, and the over-arching scrutiny provided by 
commissioners and parliamentary committees.  It is further argued that a blanket 
approach to retaining electronic communications data is necessary in finding the 
terrorist in the ever growing haystacks’, because sometimes privacy rights and 
data protection must be curtailed to ensure the state can protect citizens’ rights to 
life. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY TERROR THREAT: PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE UK LEAVING THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The chapter will explore the relationship between the EU and the UK following 
the UK’s exit.  International intelligence exchange is an essential element to 
national security illustrating an international terror threat requires an international 
response.  Particularly since al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the US on 11th 
September 2001, the EU and the US have sought to co-operate through sharing 
internal security data.  Of course the UK being a part of the EU has been party to 
this agreement. 
 
The EU’s legislative landscape has been shown in the previous chapter to be 
cluttered with many measures aimed at data surveillance and counterterrorism 
action.  In addition to collecting, storing and exchanging a greater volume of 
intelligence data within the EU, by means of using both targeted and bulk powers, 
there has been an increased emphasis on transnational data exchange.746  It will be 
highlighted that these international trends have also been contrary to the EU’s rule 
of law.  Focusing on current intelligence exchange arrangements between the EU 
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and UK, particularly with regards Passenger Name Records (PNR) data exchange; 
this chapter will assess what the new relationship will look like post the UK’s exit 
from the EU, using the US as a case study. 
 
This should show that differing cultures surrounding privacy rights between the 
EU and the USA have created their own set of problems.747  The protection of 
privacy, particularly data privacy is protected under EU law, but less clear in the 
US.748  Based on eight key principles, the EU focuses on the dignity on the 
individual citizen, whereas the US focuses on the liberty.749  Not forgetting that 
the protection of privacy forms the safeguarding role of the rule of law within the 
EU, thereby requiring compliance with EU constitutional and legislative 
standards, the position is exasperated by the US lacking any formally expressed 
data protection law.750    
THE UK AND EU: THE EXIT 
As at December 2016, it has been reported that the UK’s current Government 
appear to be playing with their cards close to their chest when it came to releasing 
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the details of the exit plan.751  The position remains extremely unclear and it will 
therefore not be possible to make any firm statements.  What is clear however is 
that the UK will certainly be leaving the EU, and Prime Minister Theresa May 
might be working towards remaining within the single market, and Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson has affirmed his position that the UK would remain part 
of a ‘dedicated European power’.752   
 
Although the Supreme Court is currently deliberating on one of the most 
important UK constitutional decisions since Lord Justice Law’s decision in 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, following a vote in UK Parliament on 7th 
December 2016 it would suggest that Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 
would be triggered in March 2017.753   
 
EU Counterterrorism: Security and intelligence 
In terms of counterterrorism laws, for Kaunert counterterrorism has been a driver 
in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) construction.754  Prior 
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to the attack on the US in 2001, the EU did not have a definition of terrorism.  
Since that point however, the EU has become increasingly active on the world 
stage focused on creating and maintaining internal and external intelligence 
exchange structures.755  The EU has also sort to harmonise Member States 
national legislation, as well as coordinating policies and offering support for 
operational work.756  Through this medium, Member States have been encouraged 
to adopt the same conceptual precautionary and organisational measures and 
structures.757  According to Boer and Wiegand, this relationship has resulted in a 
move from convergence to a deeply integrated legal counterterrorism 
arrangement.758  This has allowed the EU, in terms of supranational governance, 
to approach counterterrorism initiatives through a convergence between national 
counterterrorism systems, rather than a top down method.759  Harmonisation 
ensuring constitutional, institutional and cultural similarities allows for greater 
ease of communications and information exchange.760   
 
Whilst this idea and approach has perhaps been useful for law enforcement 
agencies’ in practical terms, particularly when accessing shared intelligence, 
research conducted by Wiegand suggests that significant differences remain 
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between the national counterterrorism approaches of the Member States, despite 
the best intentions of the EU.761  The EU has focused on four difference areas of 
convergence have been highlights, political-strategic, organisational, procedural 
and legal.  Within the legal spectrum the EU has pushed to integrate objectives by 
developing internationalised regulatory mechanisms and dividing the focal points 
into four subdivisions namely preparation and response, prevention, protection, 
and prosecution.762  Following the 175 measures adopted by the EU in the 
immediate aftermath of the attack on the USA in 2001, Wiegand’s study shows 
Member States were slow in implementing them resulting in a ‘slow, slack and 
uneven’ scenario.763 
 
The UK’s Exit Position 
Regardless this level of integration means that because the UK’s counterterrorism 
structure has been formed, largely by the membership with the EU, the effects of 
leaving on international intelligence exchange should be minimal.  Given the UK 
will still be a member of the EU on 25th May 2018, the latest EU PNR Directive 
will be required to be implemented.  However, when the UK leaves the EU, it 
may become necessary to renegotiate this agreement given the UK will essentially 
be classed as a third country.  For Jenni, there is no current model or framework 
the UK could look towards to give an indication of what a post UK exit would 
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look like.764  The point being no Member State has ever left the EU before.  The 
Swiss model for example is not a solution but may provide some slight 
suggestions.765  It is important to note that post the UK’s exit, the UK will still be 
exchanging intelligence with EU Member States, and here is a good example of 
the points raised below concerning Schrems. 
 
The Swiss Lessons 
Jenni argues there may be four lessons from the Swiss model applicable to the 
UK.  The first is that it may take many years to negotiate agreements, which may 
be determined on an ad hoc basis.766  The Swiss model has further shown that the 
UK will not be able to draw up an agreement dealing with one area of concern, 
rather that the EU deal in package type agreements including trade-offs.767  The 
second lesson is that leaving the EU will not end the EU’s influence on the UK’s 
law making powers.  Particularly in terms of maintaining international security 
and mutual recognition, the EU would effectively curtail the UK’s decision 
making powers, albeit perhaps not directly.  This process would also be important 
in terms of the UK remaining within the single market, which feeds into the third 
lesson whereby proposed legislation is assessed to ensure EU law compatibility.  
The final lesson proves that tailor-made agreements have become more difficult 
                                                
764 S. Jenni (2016) Is the Swiss model a Brexit solution? The UK in a Changing Europe, 23 March 2016, available at 
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/is-the-swiss-model-a-brexit-solution/ accessed 24 November 2016 
765 Ibid 
766 Ibid 
767 Ibid 
 241 
to achieve.768  Undoubtedly the current President of the EU Commission is Jean-
Claude Juncker, who is openly pro-federalist, could potentially cause problems 
for the UK negotiations.769  The EU can be uncooperative as evidenced by the 
Swiss model, whereby they simply refuse to agree upon the terms of a 
negotiation.  In response to the Swiss affirming their position, their access to the 
electricity market was suspended and they were excluded from the EU’s Horizon 
2020 research funding.770  In light of the fact the current threat requires 
international cooperation, this awkward postulated position by the EU could 
become rather problematic in terms of the UK’s current cross-border 
counterterrorism capabilities.  It could also be argued that the EU will 
purposefully make it rather difficult for the UK to negotiate a positive deal given 
the fact Juncker would not want more EU Member States to leave. 
 
International Security: The European Arrest Warrant 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was introduced in 2004 to make extradition 
of those suspected of serious crime and terrorist swifter and simpler.771   Although 
not specifically linked with surveillance of electronic communications data and 
intelligence exchange within the EU, with the UK leaving the EU in 2019 it may 
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no longer continue.  This measure does form part of the legal convergence 
mechanism aimed at the harmonisation of Member States laws within the EU.  
The EAW effectively removed central authorities from the extradition process, 
which is now dealt with by law enforcement agencies’ and judicial authorities.  It 
also meant that EU Member States could not refuse to surrender to another 
Member State their own citizens’ who were suspected of committing a serious 
crime on nationality grounds.772  It has been suggested the UK may lose some of 
these international counterterrorism capabilities upon leaving the EU.  The EAW 
and the relationship with Europol and Eurojust are some prime examples.  The 
EAW mechanism takes on average 48 days whereas prior to the EAW extradition 
used to take an average of one year.773  This was used by the UK in apprehending 
Hussain Osman who went on to be prosecuted in the UK for his part in the 
planned, but failed, attempted terrorist attack on London 21st July 2005.774  
Equally, there are some however that would like to see the UK come out of the 
EAW arrangement.775  Pollard cites a recent case involving Stuart Ramsay, an 
award winning Sky News correspondent who reported on an alleged firearm-
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running network in Romania.776  In response the Romanian Government have 
asserted the reporting was faked and charged Ramsay for spreading false 
information.777  As part of the first step to issuing an EAW, they have requested 
the UK assist in the criminal investigation.778 
 
Despite Kearney’s assertion that the UK’s exit would not affect the relationship 
with the EU because the UK has a unique and successful counterterrorism 
framework, this has been built upon the relationship within the EU.779  For Peers 
the EAW remain an important aspect for the UK, and as a quick form of 
extradition is something the UK should keep.  Without this it is possible that the 
UK may fall back on to an ECHR focused system, albeit similar to the EAW.  
According to Peers’ oral evidence to the recent Home Affairs Committee, ‘it 
would be something like the European arrest warrant, perhaps with exceptions, 
like Norway and Iceland have, but there might not be enough time to negotiate 
those exceptions, so we run the risk of falling back, rather than being able to 
negotiate something. The advantages of the European investigation order, which 
is not in force yet, might not be obvious for a few years, so we might end up 
falling out of that as well, rather than trying to stay part of it’.780 
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The relationship with Europol is equally important especially in light if 
technological growth and the use of digital electronic communications by 
terrorists’. 
 
International Cooperation: Europol 
In essence Europol is a centralised computer hub that contains the shared 
intelligence of 28 EU Member States and 20 third countries including the US, 
Canada, Russia and Turkey.781  Coming from the old third pillar of the TEU, it 
was envisaged Europol would be utilised as a system of information exchange.  
For Loader however, once confidence grew in the agency it was inevitable is 
would be promoted as a kind of US style FBI for Europe.782  Since its foundation 
Europol has developed at quite a fast pace, evidenced by the 2003 Europol 
Annual Report which confirmed in 2003 there was a substantial increase in 
operational activities for the agency, and in 2002 the information exchange 
between Europol and the member states increased by 40%.783  Europol has grown 
in external competences also, and now have external agreements with other 
agencies including Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
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(UNODC), and the World Customs Organisation (WCO).784  Europol is also a 
support centre for law enforcement operations and provides expertise.  Although 
at first glance there does not seem to be any difference between being an internal 
and external partner with Europol in terms of support or access to intelligence, for 
Guild the extent to which third countries are always at the demanding side of 
Europol is concerning.785  Accordingly, ‘they are always at the requesting side 
and they are never fully participating’.786  Another concern is that, ‘a lot of the 
measures relating to policing and criminal justice are subject to the data protection 
directive, which the UK has opted out of.  As a member state that has opted out of 
the directive, the UK’s position would be somewhat different’.787 
 
In procedural terms Europol has a designated Europol National Unit (ENU) that 
serves as the liaison between the authorities in that country and Europol, although 
only seven third counties have opted to have them.788   It would appear from news 
reports that the UK Government intends to remain within Europol despite the 
UK’s exit from the EU.789  Brandon Lewis the UK’s Policing Minister appears to 
have recognised the reality that transnational crime will remain when the UK 
                                                
784 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/other-agreements accessed 24 November 2016 
785 Home Affairs Committee, house of Commons, EU Policing and Security Issues, 6 December 2016, HC806, Oral 
evidence by E. Guild, available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-
committee/eu-policing-and-security-issues/oral/44210.html 
786 Ibid 
787 Ibid 
788 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements accessed 24 November 2016 
789 K. McCann (2016) UK opts back into Europol despite Brexit vote, The Telegraph, 14 November 2016, available 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/14/uk-opts-back-into-europol-despite-brexit-vote/ accessed 24 
November 2016 
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leave the EU.790  UK policing and security agencies do benefit from the level of 
expertise at Europol, which provides unique intelligence on cyber-crime in 
addition to terrorism.  Operation Golf is one such example where the 
Metropolitan Police and the Romanian National Police set up a Joint Investigation 
Team, which led to the rescue of 28 children and the arrests of over 125 
individuals for offences including trafficking human beings, money laundering, 
and child neglect.791  More recently in May 2016 a similar operation took place 
involving France, Paraguay and Spain.792  Specifically in terms of terrorism, 
Kearney argues Europol is largely irrelevant.793  However, policing and security 
officials who deal with the UK’s terrorist threat daily are of a different opinion, 
confirming Europol to an essential element in combatting the threat.794   
 
Europol also produce an annual TE-SAT report, with the 2016 edition assessing 
the terrorist threat posed from Islamist, ethno-Nationalist and separatist, left-wing 
and right wing groups, including single-issue threats.795  The report shows that:  
In 2015 the European Union (EU) experienced a massive number of 
casualties caused by terrorist attacks. By far the most affected Member 
State was France, which had to cope with losing 148 citizens’ and seeing 
                                                
790 Ibid 
791 J. Taylor (2010) Police smash Romanian ‘child trafficking ring’, The Independent, 12 October 2010, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-smash-romanian-child-trafficking-ring-2104694.html 
accessed 24 November 2016 
792 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-supports-successful-operation-against-human-
trafficking-network accessed 24 November 2016 
793 Supra as per J. Kearney (2016) 
794 J. Rankin (2016) Europol chief says Brexit would harm UK crime-fighting, The Guardian, 22 June 2016, available 
at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/22/europol-chief-says-brexit-would-harm-uk-crime-fighting 
accessed 24 November 2016 
795 Supra as per Europol (2016) 
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more than 350 injured in attacks perpetrated in January and November. 
Murders and injuries in 2015 resulted from both unsophisticated lone 
actor terrorist attacks and well-coordinated, complex attacks by groups of 
militants. The carefully planned attacks demonstrated the elevated threat 
to the EU from a fanatic minority, operationally based in the Middle East, 
combined with a network of people born and raised in the EU, often 
radicalised within a short space of time, who have proven to be willing 
and able to act as facilitators and active accomplices in terrorism.796 
The lasted figures to this regard are: 
 
 
                                                
796 Ibid 
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Figure 15, Terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU in 2015, taken from Europol (2016) EU Terrorism Situation 
and Trend report TE-SAT 2016, Hague: Europol 
 
 
The difficulty the UK has in terms of negotiating a relationship to maintain access 
to Europol is three fold.  Firstly for Guild it is a question of value, as in the value 
of the UK’s contribution to intelligence.  From the counterterrorism perspective, 
Guild confirms that from what he has seen in the ‘documents of the perspective, 
concerns and worries, the contribution there is perhaps not so evidently enormous 
as it is in the cybercrime field’.797  According to Peers however, it may come 
down to a matter of money, and the UK’s level of personal data protection, as 
raised by Guild above.798   Representing a further obstacle is that although the 
Council and the Commission may well confirm the UK’s data protection is 
adequate in providing safeguards, the European Parliament may cause difficulties, 
particularly should they send it to the CJEU, or ‘individuals might challenge it, as 
they have done in the United States, for instance, through information 
commissioners and national courts’.799  Peers elaborates and states that: 
Europol is quite closely connected to other EU legislation on data sharing 
because Europol has access to the EU’s databases and uses that as part of 
its analyses, so it might be difficult to think about a deal on Europol 
access in isolation, especially if we talking about a bespoke deal with 
different rights than other non-EU countries.800 
                                                
797 Home Affairs Committee, house of Commons, EU Policing and Security Issues, 6 December 2016, HC806, Oral 
evidence by E. Guild, available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-
committee/eu-policing-and-security-issues/oral/44210.html 
798 Ibid, Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence by S. Peers 
799 Ibid 
800 Ibid 
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In terms of personal data, there will undoubtedly be an assessment of how 
effective and strong the UK’s personal data laws are, particularly in light of the 
IPA that has just passed, which for Peers will face legal challenges to it in the UK 
and in the ECtHR.  There may be a problem in light of the CJEU’s judgment in 
Tom Watson’s case that will be decided on the 21st December 2016.  Based on an 
appeal on the earlier challenge to DRIPA, this represent a parallel Swedish case 
where the Court may decide to ‘set out a series of problems with the prior 
legislation’ which can then be read across to see if those problems also exist 
within the IPA’.801  Peers continues this point and states: 
[The UK] obviously offer more than other states do and that has a knock-
on effect in terms of access to other databases as well, because of the 
connection with that and Europol.  The downside in the UK 
Government’s argument is the potential complaint that might be made 
about the [IPA].  We will know, first of all on the 21st, and then probably 
in January or February with the Canada case, exactly where we stand in 
terms of what it would take.  Maybe some kind of carve-out might be 
possible—if there is a problem with the rest of the [IPA], we will treat the 
information that we receive from or give to the European Union in a 
different way to satisfy the adequacy standards. 
 
Armond confirms Peers’ assertion and goes further explaining that the UK’s 
access to EAW’s must continue because: 
Since [EAW’s] have been linked to [the Schengen Information System] 
SIS II, over 2,000 offenders have been arrested in the UK, and 150 
offenders wanted by the UK have been arrested in the EU. That is a 25% 
increase in a year. They are not individuals who are wanted for minor 
offences; those are serious offences. I would argue that we are not doing 
work for Europe; we are actually defending the citizens’ of the UK by 
arresting criminals who present a threat to society and are present in our 
shores. Those are the things that I would put at the top of the list. 
                                                
801 Ibid 
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The Schengen Information System 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) follows a similar story to that of Europol 
in terms of the UK’s relationship and negotiation, and the exit may affect the 
UK’s access.  The SIS is a large-scale information system and database that 
supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation, thereby 
protecting internal security.  Although the UK is not a member of the Schengen 
Area, it does have access to the SIS within the context of law enforcement 
cooperation.802   
                                                
802 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-
system/index_en.htm accessed 25 November 2016 
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Figure 16, Map of Schengen Countries, taken from 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK
EwiOmZats-fQAhWLnBoKHfSZCF4QjhwIBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fdgs%2Fhome-
affairs%2Fwhat-we-do%2Fpolicies%2Fborders-and-
visas%2Fschengen%2Findex_en.htm&psig=AFQjCNGqJrZlSbhJ02wVSBHPA9vAbw4BDQ&ust=1481382862
154127 accessed 9 December 2016 
 
SIS however still replied on a certain level of data protection, similar to the EU 
and Europol.  There may have been some recent rules changes following their 
meeting on the 7th December 2016, however details of this meeting have not been 
released.803  It is likely there will be an ‘increase in the amount of information 
collected, access to it and purposes for which it can be used, particularly in 
                                                
803 See https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/CSIS accessed 9 December 2016 
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counter-terrorism’.804  SIS is an important tool, used for ‘facilitating European 
arrest warrants, which includes stolen vehicles, missing people, people wanted for 
discussion with the police and people under surveillance, maybe for counter-
terrorism activities’.805  Given the current relationship is somewhat removed from 
EU membership it is possible the UK’s access will continue as a part of Europe.  
On 13th April 2015, UK law enforcement joined the SIS II increasing the sharing 
of intelligence.806  Armond, Deputy Director General of the UK’s National Crime 
Agency stated: 
SIS II has been a game-changer since it came online in April 2015, and 
access to it must remain…it is so important not only in terms of our 
border security, but in relation to work that police officers conduct every 
day on the street because 66 million records are available to them in the 
street via their radios and the police national computer. It is a very 
important function.807   
 
The sharing of intelligence data not only takes place through SIS, but also other 
mechanisms, such as those dealing with airline passenger travel, the rules around 
which changed substantially following the 2001 attack on the USA. 
 
                                                
804 Supra as per Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence by S. Peers 
805 Ibid 
806 See http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/european-arrest-warrant-statistics accessed 9 
December 2016 
807 Supra as per Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence by D. Armond 
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PASSENGER NAME RECORDS DATA AND ADVANCED PASSENGER 
INFORMATION: CASE STUDY IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND 
THIRD COUNTIRES 
Conducting a case study on intelligence data exchange is essential at this point 
given the UK is on course to leave the EU in 2019.  It has been shown in the 
previous Chapter, that the EU takes data privacy protection seriously.  Strict 
legislative controls are in place and the importance of remaining within the EU’s 
ambit to this regard, in order to maintain intelligence data exchange will be 
illustrate below.  Advanced Passenger Information (API) covers the basic details 
concerning the passenger that include name, date of birth, nationality and passport 
number.808  PNR however, includes data usually submitted by the passenger at the 
time of making the travel arrangements, including details such as, credit card 
details, personal contact information, dietary information and sensitive data on 
ethnic origin, health, political views and sexual orientation.809  Due to the fact API 
carries less personable data, the EU Directive ensuring data exchange within the 
EU for example was quickly adopted in 2004.810  PNR agreements on the other 
hand have been controversial to say the least, impacting upon citizens’ right to 
data protection, enshrined at the EU constitutional and EU law levels as discussed 
in the last chapter.   
                                                
808 M. Tzanou (2015) The war Against Terror and Transatlantic information Sharing: Spillovers of Privacy or 
Spillovers of Security? 31(80) Utrecht Journal of international and European law, 87-103, 96 
809 E. Brouwer (2009) The EU Passenger name record System and Human Rights: Transferring passenger data or 
passenger freedom, CEPS Working Document no.320/September 2009, p.3 
810 EU Council Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, 2004/82/EC, 29 April 2004, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:261:0024:0027:EN:PDF  
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND THE UK: PNR AND 
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 
An internal PNR agreement between the 28 Member States has been slow.  The 
first attempt failed in 2011 due to the fact it did not have sufficient safeguards in 
place to protect individual data privacy.811  The second attempt at a PNR 
Directive was passed in April 2016, giving Member States until the 25th May 
2018 to implement it into national law.812  Similar to the external PNR agreement 
with the US, this Directive has put various safeguards into place, such as a 
‘controller’ who will oversee the processing and exchange of data, ensuring 
requests made are proportionate.813  Member States must also provide a data 
protection officer, who will offer advice to the controller and other employees 
from the policing and security agencies, thereby monitoring compliance with the 
Directive.814  Article 54 of the Directive also ensures that those citizens’ affected 
by the provisions will have a judicial remedy.  The rationale behind this 
heightened protection is the CJEU’s decision in the Schrems and Digital Rights 
cases.815  Member States have been encouraged to implementation the new PNR 
                                                
811 European Commission (2011) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime, COM(2011) 32 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/news/intro/docs/com_2011_32_en.pdf accessed 23 August 2016 
812 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 27th April 2016, on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/681/oj accessed 23 August 2016 
813 Ibid at Article 3(8), 19 and 20 
814 Ibid at Article 32 and 34 
815 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, delivered on 8th April 2014 and reported at 
[2015] QB 127.  Referred to as Digital Rights Ireland 
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directive urgently and not wait two years as the directive allows, and thereby 
harmonize the exploitation of the PNR data.816 
 
The PNR data sharing agreement between the UK and the EU is another issue 
whereby the UK’s continued access to it is essential.  For Armond:  
[Access to PNR] is absolutely essential in terms of the profiling that we 
do to protect the UK. Of course, prior to recent agreements, it was long 
the case that because of free movement agreements in Europe, many 
European nations were not prepared to share passenger name record data 
with us. It is much more interesting, much more detailed and much more 
relevant than advance passenger information, and of course it gives us 
names, bank account details, phone numbers, details of previous travel 
and who people have travelled with. All of that material is really useful in 
terms of developing profiles and preventing the most dangerous people 
from coming to our country.817 
 
As with the UK’s continues access to Europol, any type of bulk data collection 
and retention must satisfy the Digital Rights Criterion developed in Chapter 
Three.  Representing a further impact on EU law making, the EU’s Directive must 
safeguard personal data and ensure it is protected, to in turn safeguard the 
Directive being invalidated by the CJEU.  If UK is to maintain access to PNR 
within the EU, then the UK’s legislation must still provide adequate protection.  
Ensuring that the Digital Right Criterion and the lessons learned from Schrems are 
employed fully should mean that the UK could maintain a relationship equal to 
the current standard.  However, this is unknown territory for the UK and therefore 
                                                
816 Council of the European Union, State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the 
European Council of 12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the 
Conclusions of the European Council of 18 December 2015, Brussels, 4 March 2016, available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6785-2016-INIT/en/pdf 
817 Supra as per Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence by D. Armond 
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one should look to how other third countries have agreed upon intelligence and 
data exchange. 
THE PNR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE US AND EU: THE SNOWDEN 
EFFECT 
For Kaunert and Zwolski the first international PNR agreement between the EU 
the US merely represented the EU’s attempt to play a significant role in the war 
on terror, which did not involve military action that had proved divisive since the 
Afghan conflict following 9/11.818  A noteworthy increase in EU-US 
counterterrorism cooperation was seen following the terrorist attack on the US on 
9th September 2001.819  Kaunert and Zwolski break this cooperation down into 
two areas, the Justice Dialogue and the Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport 
Security.820  Although the Justice Dialogue started in 1998 to ensure information 
was transferred to the US, it has become increasingly important since the 
development of ‘new EU competences in criminal judicial and police 
cooperation’.821  Particularly since 2002, the Dialogue has been essential for 
negotiating agreements on mutual legal assistance and extradition, including 
liaison issues with the newly continued enhancement of Eurojust and Europol.822  
During this time the US introduced several measures aimed at strengthening 
                                                
818 C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) The EU as a Global Security Actor: A Comprehensive Analysis Beyond CFSP and 
JHA, Palgrave Macmillan, p.96 
819 Ibid 
820 Ibid at p.97 
821 Ibid  
822 Ibid  
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border security, including the Container Security Initiative, the collection of PNR 
and the use of biometric passports.   
 
These measures are unsurprising given the international nature of the current 
terrorist threat; the point has been made in previous chapters that international 
security and national security carry the same weight in terms of importance.823  By 
this border security extension however, the US Homeland Security policies, 
specifically surrounding intelligence, policing and law enforcement, the financing 
of terrorism and justice, had vast implications for the EU that resulted in 
reinforcing cooperation.824   
	
Under the US Aviation and Transport Security Act 2001, all airline companies 
operating passenger flights to the US, must provide US authorities with electronic 
access to PNR.825  This requirement caused a problem for EU airline companies, 
putting them under an obligation to disclose as per US law, and an obligation not 
to disclose as per EU law, placing them at risk of compromising EU data 
protection laws, which inevitably could result in EU financial fines of up to 
$6,000 (USD) per passenger.826  This rock and hard-place scenario led to the EU 
Commission deciding to take on the challenge of negotiating with the US and 
                                                
823 Supra as per The RT Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick (1996) Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4 
824 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) p97 
825 Supra as per C. C. Murphy (2015) p.158 
826 P. Pawlak (2009) Made in the USA? The Influence of the US on the EU’s Data Protection Regime CEPS – 
Liberty and Security in Europe, Centre for European Policy Studies website 
http://aei.pitt.edu/15102/1/madeusa-influence-us-eus-data-protection-regime.pdf accessed 14 November 2016 
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they managed to delay the implementation of the measures on the grounds that the 
EU were required to comply with the 1995 EU Directive on the protection of 
personal data.827  The 1995 Data Protection Directive orates that no personal data 
should be transferred to any third country unless the EU Commission has 
determined that its data protection system provides an, ‘adequate level of 
protection of basic freedoms and rights of individuals’.828  For Lowe, this 
represented the central obstacle for the EU in agreeing to a PNR data exchange 
agreement with the US.829  The legal culture between the EU and the US is 
remarkably different, as the EU focuses on the dignity of citizens’ in protecting 
fundamental human rights and the rule of law, in addition to the legislative data 
privacy protection, whereas the US focuses on liberty, and thereby has no explicit 
protection for data privacy under the Bill of Rights.830  Rather legal scholars 
simply infer one from the specific rights in the First, fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments.831  Because the US privacy framework did not meet EU standards 
the EU Commission developed a rather original solution, called the ‘Safe 
Harbour’ scheme.832  This scheme was aimed at commercial practices and 
although the adequacy was challenged in 2002 and 2004, nothing changed.  For 
Van Wasshnova, this scheme lacked basic adequacy being insufficiently clear and 
                                                
827 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) p97 
828 D. Lowe (2016) The European Union’s Passenger Name Record Data Directive 2016/681: Is It Fit For Purpose? 
International Criminal Law Review, 16:5, 856-884, 860 
829 Ibid 
830 Supra as per S. Sottiaux (2008) pp.265-322.  
831 Supra as per J. Q. Whitman (2004) 1115-1221 
832 EU Commission Decision 2000/520/EC 
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precise, hence why the EU Commission finally determined it was not possible for 
them to agree upon PNR with a US state department alone.833  On the basis of the 
Commissions adequacy decision they agreed on the transfer of PNR intelligence, 
but required the US guarantee an adequate level of data protection for the 
transferred data.834  This agreement received EU Council approval in 2004.835   
 
Criticisms of this agreement came primarily from the European Parliament (EP), 
having been marginalised throughout the negotiation instigated proceedings 
through the CJEU, arguing the level of protection guaranteed by the US was 
below EU standards, and the agreement was based on the wrong law dealing with 
transport being Article 95 EU (now Article 114 TFEU).  For Ilbiz et al, the latter 
point is much more prevalent given that that early PNR data agreements such as 
this, focused far too heavily on expanding and prioritising counterterrorism 
cooperation to the detriment of data protection rules.836  The CJEU in 2006 
focused on the former point and annulled the PNR agreement based on the fact 
they pertained to criminal justice co-operation and thereby the public security 
                                                
833 M. R. Van Wasshnova (2006-2008) Data Protection Conflicts Between the United States and the European 
Union in the War on Terror: Lessons Learned from the Existing System of Financial Information Exchange, 29 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 827, 832 
834 EU Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community 
and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, (2004/496/EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32004D0496  
835 Ibid 
836 E. Ilbiz, C. Kaunert and D. Anagnostakis (2015) The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third 
countries: data protection and power asymmetry, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-18, 2 
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framework, and not on the regulations of the internal market.837  The CJEU made 
this clear in confirming that the now Article 114 TFEU was incompatible with 
Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, which excluded the processing of 
personal data for ‘public security, defence, state security and the activities of the 
state in areas of criminal law’.838  As a result the PNR agreement was annulled on 
the basis that the Commission could not lawfully use the Data Protection 
Directive, and the Council was not competent to conclude the agreement on that 
foundation.839 
 
Unfortunately, the adequacy of data protection under the Directive received very 
little discussion, which meant that any future PNR agreements must be based 
within the framework of the third pillar, in turn excluding the EP from the 
decision making process, arguable despite the future Treaty of Lisbon abolishing 
the old system and providing the EP with more decision making powers.840  This 
meant that the second PNR agreement had to be based on the CJEU’s findings, 
which Gilmore and Rijpma describe as a ‘poisoned chalice’ in terms of improving 
human rights and data protection compliance agreements.841  For Murphy, this 
result could be termed perverse in that the ‘constitutional role of the rule of law 
                                                
837 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2006] ECR I-4721 
838 Data Protection Directive 1995, 95/46/EC, Article 3(2) and 25 
839 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2006] ECR I-4721, [61], [70] 
840 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) p.98 
841 G. Gilmore and J. Rijpma (2007) Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and 
Commission, Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 30 May 2006, [2006] ECR I-4721, 44 Common Market Law Review 
1081, 1098 
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played a part in undermining the principle’s safeguarding role’.842  The EU 
Council therefore would lead the negotiations with the assistance of the 
Commission.  In the meantime an interim PNR agreement was put in place to 
ensure continued intelligence sharing.843  The second agreement was approved in 
2007, creating two main issues where the adoption was based upon the Court’s 
findings and properly under Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCCM), and where it was agreed the US would receive less fields of data than 
under the first agreement that could be ‘pulled’ from the airline carriers database, 
19 rather than 34.844   
 
With regards the latter point, Papakonstantinou argues the reduction was not a 
reduction at all however.845  Instead the original 34 fields of data were merged to 
merely give the appearance of a reduction.846  As part of the negotiation and in 
exchange for reducing the fields of data, the EU agreed for the US authorities to 
share the data with an increased number of internal agencies, and to store the data 
for 15 years.847  It was further agreed that the Department of Homeland Security 
be permitted to access ‘sensitive data’ where ‘the life of a data subject or of others 
                                                
842 Supra as per C. C. Murphy (2015) p.162 
843 Ibid p.161 
844 EU Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, or an Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(hereafter, Second Agreement) 
845 V. Papakonstantinou and de Hert (2009) The PNR Agreement and Transatlantic Anti-Terrorism Co-operation: 
No Firm Human Rights Framework of Either Side of the Atlantic, 46 Common Market Law Review 885, 914 
846 Ibid 
847 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) at p.99 
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could be imperilled of seriously impaired’.848  For Murphy, this broad test renders 
sensitive personal data ‘open to widespread use by US law enforcement 
authorities’.849  With regards the former issue, concluding the agreement under 
the authority of PJCCM resulted in significant consequences for the regulatory 
framework within the operation.  The roles of both the EP and national 
Parliaments, and CJEU in terms of oversight were therefore reduced.850  Not 
surprisingly the EP criticised this second agreement, mainly based on the lack of 
democratic oversight within the PNR agreement, coupled with the fact that the US 
agreement took little to no account of the PNR agreement with other nation states, 
such as Canada and Australia, which for Kaunert provide an as surety of ‘higher 
standards of protection of personal data’.851  The Canadian agreement for example 
allows the PNR data to be held for six years, with the Australian model allowing 
for five years and six months.852   
 
                                                
848 Department of Homeland Security, US letter to the EU, III Types of Information Collected, OJL204/21, 4 
August 2007, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/pnr-2007agreement-
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849 Supra as per C. C. Murphy (2015) p.163 
850 G. Gilmore and J. Rijpma (2007) Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and 
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851 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) 
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of an Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-
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record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service. And Council Decision 2006/230/EC of 18 
July 2005 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada 
on the processing of API/PNR data 
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Rather unmistakably this second PNR agreement was favourable towards the US, 
rather than towards the EU.  This adds weight to Lehrke and Schomaker’s 
hypothesis that because the EU is more embedded in its networks with the US, the 
US found itself able to exert influence on the EU Council and Commission.853  
According to Lowe, this hypothesis, ‘builds on Pawlak’s earlier study who states 
as the EU’s security consciousness has not developed as rapidly as the US, the US 
has the opportunity to exert a big influence on the transatlantic agenda with the 
US dictating and shaping the EU’s security agenda’.854  This second agreement 
was in turn replaced with a third PNR agreement in 2012, following the adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty 2007, which provided the EP with increased decision-
making powers.855  Introducing this third agreement the EU Council confirmed 
the legal framework for PNR data exchange would not only assist with border 
crimes, but it would greatly increase the capabilities inherent in the prevention 
and detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences.856  The third 
agreement resembles greatly the second in terms of broadness, retention periods 
and access to the data.857  
 
                                                
853 J.P. Lehrke and R. Schmaker (2014) ‘Mechanisms of Convergence in Domestic Counterterrorism Regulations: 
American Influence, Domestic Networks and International Networks’, 37(8) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 689-
712, 693 
854 Supra as per Lowe (2016) 
855 C. Kaunert, S. Leonard and A. McKenzie (2012) The social construction of an EU interest in counter-terrorism: 
US influence and internal struggles in the cases of PNR and SWIFT’, 21(4) European Security, 474-496, 485. 
856 Council of the European Union, Council adopts new EU-US agreement on passenger Name Records (PNR), 
(2012) 9186/12, PRESSE 173, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/129806.pdf accessed 14 November 
2016 
857 See Article 8 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1416915581157&uri=CELEX:22012A0811(01) 
 264 
 
The Broadness of the External PNR Agreements: Access, crime and human 
rights 
The CJEU added that legislation allowing public authorities’ access to the stored 
electronic communications data on a ‘generalised basis’ must be ‘regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to privacy’.858  In addition to 
the 15 years retention period and the so called reduced fields of data covered, the 
list of agencies permitted to access PNR data have been lengthy, including law 
enforcement agencies’ not generally associated with counterterrorism.  The first 
agreement included the Inland Revenue Service and Animal Plant Health 
Inspection Service for example.859  The interim and second agreements included 
an infinite number of agencies with the addition of the Office of the Department 
of homeland Security and all entities that directly support it’.860  The types of 
crimes listed under these agreements were also vast and broadly phrased to 
include other types of crimes’ in addition to serious crimes and terrorism.861  
Article 4 of the third PNR agreement provides the same extremely broad 
provisions, including threats to commit crime, and ‘other crimes’ punishable by a 
sentence of three years or more.862  During the PNR agreement negotiations, the 
EP, Article 29 Working Group, European Data Protection Supervisor, and 
                                                
858 Supra as per D. Lowe (2016) 860 
859 D. R. Rasmussen (2008) Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism? The Dispute Between the United 
States and the European Union over Passenger Name Record Data Transfers 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
551 
860 Ibid at 585 
861 Ibid 
862 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1416915581157&uri=CELEX:22012A0811(01)  
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national parliamentary organisations such as the UK House of Lords EU 
Committee have all conveyed severe trepidations relating to individual privacy 
protections.863  These centred on the fact that transferring such data to the US may 
violate the EU’s high-principled standards of data protection.864  PNR data has 
been referred to as broader than what could be considered ‘adequate, relevant and 
not excessive’.865  It has been further argued that access to the data should be 
limited to reasons of terrorism and serious crime only, and that sensitive data 
should be abandoned entirely thereby ensuring compatibility with the Directive.866 
 
Policing Cooperation: EU and US intelligence 
EU and US policing cooperation has mainly been based on agreements reached by 
the EU and US.  Following the terrorist attack on the US on 9th September 2001, 
the EU demonstrated eagerness to show solidarity with the US and asked the then 
Director of Europol to draft an intelligence exchange agreement.867  Focusing on 
strategic and technical information concerning serious forms of international 
crime, the first agreement was adopted by the EU Council in December 2001.868  
This agreement provided for the identification of personnel named as points of 
                                                
863 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was set up under the Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data.  See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/index_en.htm.  For information on the UK House of Lords EU committee see 
http://www.parliament.uk/hleu  
864 Ibid 
865 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US for the 
Transfer of Passengers’ Data, 13 June 2003, p.7 
866 Ibid at pp.7-8 
867 Supra as per C. Kaunert and K. Zwolski (2013) p.102 
868 Council (2001) Conclusions Adopted By The Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Doc. SN 3926/6/01 20 
September 2001 
 266 
contact, information exchange, mutual consultation, exchange of expertise and 
liaison officers, specifically for crimes committed or likely to be committed in the 
course of terrorist activity.869  The second agreement took longer to negotiate as 
the EU’s direction in terms of personal data protection had developed and 
changed in approach to that of the US.  For Rees the EU had passed a significant 
amount of data protection legislation due to the fact member states had tended to 
keep large amount of data of their citizens’, and in contract the US’s approach to 
this was more ad hoc and somewhat relaxed, whereby relatively small amounts of 
data was held and kept.870  Regardless the agreement was passed in December 
2002 and although criticised by civil liberties campaigners the agreement contains 
many data protection safeguards including the principle of ‘purpose limitation’, 
whereby intelligence can only be used for the specific purpose under which it was 
obtained.871  These agreements remain in place to date despite the Snowden 
revelations that could have potentially damaged this relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The UK is in a unique position when it comes to the relationship with the EU as a 
Member State.  This position will undoubted remain so given the legislative 
influence the EU has had on the UK since the enactment of the European 
Communities Act 1972.  As a new third country to the EU, the UK may have to 
                                                
869 Ibid at Article 3 
870 W. Rees (2006) Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative, (Routledge) p.92 
871 V. Mitsilegas (2003) The New EU-USA Cooperation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange 
of Police Data, European Foreign Affairs Review, 8, 515-536, 519 
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negotiate many provisions surrounds security, intelligence and data exchange, and 
future counterterrorism measures.  On striking the balance between national 
security and human rights, it could be argued that the USA leans more to the 
interests of national security over individual human rights, whereas the EU 
Member States lean more towards the interests of human rights. 
 
In order to maintain a relationship with the EU, and the many agencies the UK 
Government must retain its affiliation with human rights and preserve the data 
protection laws.  It is for now; unclear whether or not the UK will continue to 
have access to Europol, the EAW or SIS II and PNR data.  This chapter has 
shown that according to those who work within policing, the UK’s continued 
membership and access to these are essential to keeping the UK safe.  Four 
problems to the UK’s successful negotiation to this end have been highlighted, 
1. Money: The EU fund Europol and other measures, this will 
therefore cost the UK and may not be separated from other 
institutions; 
2. Value of Contribution: The UK must evidence the level of 
contribution it could make to Europol; 
3. Data Protection: Following the enactment of the IPA this may 
become a problem.  For the time being at least the bulk powers 
provisions are untested, but the decision on the 21st December 
2016 may provide an indication;   
4. Uncooperative: Following the Swiss model, the EU can be very 
uncooperative.  With Juncker in charge this may be more 
difficult. 
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis begins with an examination of the UK’s legal definition of terrorism 
under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  This is important to the thesis because 
UK law enforcement agencies’ and the courts use the definition when ascertaining 
that the activity they are dealing with is terrorism.  It found that several elements 
of the definition, namely the lack of defined phrasing used and the resulting 
broadness, impact upon the rule of law and individual human rights.  Through 
consideration two problems exist.  The first concerns the proliferation of 
undefined causes that has resulted in some difficulty in deciding which to apply to 
a particular case, thereby effecting at least to some degree judicial application.  
The analysis found that the second issue is intrinsically linked to the first, but with 
an increased focus on the political currency attached to the term ‘terrorism’.  Both 
problems are not rectifiable due to both the extremely varied 21st Century terrorist 
threat and the political nature of international agreements.  The analysis did 
however, find that a general criminal offence of terrorism may assist in taking the 
subject out of the political realm and firmly set into the legal.  To this end, 
inserting exclusion clauses into this definition, covering actions taken by way of 
protest and industrial action and dissent, or during an international armed conflict 
in accordance with customary international law, would further assist.   
 
Chapter Two concluded that the dynamics of private life have changed, following 
the advancements made in 21st Century communications technology, with people 
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living their lives increasingly online.  To that end private conversations simply no 
longer take place in the citizens’ home or through using a landline telephone, but 
rather online through the Internet, social media and through the ever-growing list 
of chat applications available on the smartphone, allowing encryption.  What 
follows the legitimate use of technological advancements is criminal, or in this 
case terrorist exploitation.  With terrorists using the Internet to communicate their 
propaganda and with each other, the resulting law enforcements investigatory 
capabilities gap must be filled.  It highlights the growth in technology, which is 
estimated to double every two years, and using the Islamic State as a case study, 
they have used this to fashion an extraordinary threat level whereby law 
enforcement have difficulty in recognising friend from foe.  It simply cannot 
continue to be the case, that law enforcement is denied investigatory powers 
within the realms of the Internet, when clearly there is a criminal exploitation and 
terrorist problem.   
 
In fulfilling their task of protecting national security and protecting the citizens’ 
right to life Chapter Three explores the vast powers of surveillance provided to 
law enforcement.  In conjunction with the EU, the UK has enacted new laws and 
regulations over time to close the capabilities gaps as and when they appear, due 
to technological advancements are made.  Allowing law enforcement to monitor 
Internet traffic has simply become an essential in the fight against terrorism, and 
in the States duty to protect its citizen’s lives.  To this end, the UK Government 
has recently enacted the IPA that introduces the ability to bulk collect and retain 
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electronic data communications, and to seek the operators’ assistance in 
decryption.  The examination highlighted the fact that although the IPA attempts 
to take a human rights approach, the main contentious elements in the Act are 
those in relation to the authorities’ capabilities to intercept electronic 
communications data on mass, and to retain such data, and to legally hack into the 
populations equipment, again on mass, often using backdoors into encrypted 
online services. 
 
The analysis went on to evidence that terrorist groups and self-starters have 
embraced modern communication technology, using it from marketing up to 
coordinating an attack. It also concluded that some legislative measures have 
failed to combat terrorism communication, such as the section 1 and 2 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006, and sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  Chapter 
three continued to critically analyse the legalised pre-emptive measures, including 
temporary travel restrictions and the criminalisation of neutral behaviour.  
Utilising the doctrinal methodology, terms used such as mass data surveillance 
and pre-crime measures have been discredited.  It was shown it would be 
physically impossible for law enforcement to conduct surveillance on the whole 
of the UK populations’ electronic communications data.  It has further been 
shown that the term ‘pre-crime’ is simply a fabrication and misleadingly used, 
given that pre-emptive measures are in fact criminal offences.  
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It was argued that a unique threat has been created, whereby the vertical effects of 
terrorist groups’ communication influence others, then the horizontal effect that 
allows people to operate under an anonymity cloak.  Concerning is the growth in 
the apparent advanced independent operational abilities of terrorists, with the 
potential access to explosives and firearms purchased on the darknet.  It was made 
clear that legislation is required aimed at policing Internet traffic.  A cooperative 
approach with ISP’s is essential to this aim, ensuring the dark sides of the web are 
monitored and then removed should they be deemed to be providing illegal 
materials.  
 
This in turn has resulted in new measures, providing bulk interception of 
communications data and bulk equipment interference, which have been deemed 
to be extraordinarily powerful tools to be wielded, having a much bigger impact 
upon individual privacy than traditional communications interception and 
surveillance might have had.  Intercepting electronic communications data and 
content is not the same as intercepting a landline call as evidenced in this chapter.  
Additionally it is unhelpful and disappointing to note the IPA does not expressly 
cover OSINT and SOCMINT collection, although the Government had plenty of 
time to implement such measures.  Chapter Three also showed that 
communications data, by the very nature of its digital form, is ideal for analysis 
and profiling individuals.  Data mining will increasingly become autonomous as 
automatic computer algorithms carry out the first bulk interception step.  Aimed 
at the population as a whole who are not suspected of being involved in any 
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criminal or terrorist activity, subject to authority these bulk powers have the 
potential to effectively destroy the privacy rights of millions of people, in order to 
find the elusive terrorist in the haystack.  Although the IPA may pass through the 
digital rights criterion as highlighted in Chapter Four, and could be described as 
necessary in finding would-be-terrorists, it may ultimately come to fail the ECtHR 
jurisprudence when testing the proportionality of the retention of data and the 
bulk power measures.  
  
Chapter Four further emphasised that fact that the EU has been the most 
influential on the UK’s law making processes.  The CJEU in particular has proved 
the most influential judicial body in terms of individual data protection, through 
its key judgements in Digital Rights Ireland.872  The CJEU has achieved this by 
applying the EU’s constitutional and legal prowess in protecting data protection, 
such as Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and byway of two 
directives, namely the Data Protection Directive in 1995 and the e-Privacy 
Directive in 2002.873  It was concluded that in order to keep the capabilities gap 
closed, the UK Government must ensure the law endures by safeguarding the 
cohesiveness with the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).  These human rights focused courts do focus on different 
                                                
872 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others and the conjoined case of 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others 
873 European Union Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data.  Also: Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.  
See also S and Marper v UK [2008] 48 ECHR 1581, [66]-[67], the Court noted the concept of private life is a broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. 
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elements, built around the Conventional rights, with the CJEU focused on data 
protection and the ECtHR on Article 8 right to privacy.   
The level of data protection becomes even more important in Chapter Five, as in 
order to maintain, or indeed build new agreements with regards to data 
intelligence exchange; these must be protected to a level agreed by the EU.  It is 
for now however, unclear whether or not the UK will continue to have access to 
Europol, the EAW or SIS II and PNR data.  Chapter Four explores these issues 
and illustrates that according to those who work within policing, the UK’s 
continued membership and access to these are essential to keeping the UK safe.  
EU levelled data privacy protection has been highlighted to be one of the three 
pre-existing conditions that must be met in order to assist in the UK’s negotiation.  
Other issues potentially surround money and the value of contribution, and the 
UK’s agreement to other measures.  It was concluded that following the Swiss 
model emphasises the potential problems an uncooperative EU can be.   
 
Using the US and EU’s PNR agreement as a case study for the UK, demonstrates 
the importance the EU place on data privacy protection. Overall, should the UK 
law be considered as providing adequate protection, looking forward and perhaps 
focusing on some of the potential stumbling blocks to successful negotiation, the 
situation may not be as worse as first thought.   
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In terms of answering the question posed by the thesis, it has found that there are, 
and will perhaps always be, conflicting issues between collective security and 
upholding individual human rights protections, specifically regarding the 
gathering and retention of electronic communications data, the sanctioned use of 
the bulk powers under the IPA and the sharing of intelligence, both domestic and 
international.  Following the analysis, the thesis found that this balance in the UK 
is fairly steady because of the role and importance of judicial review; judicial 
independence, and the over-arching scrutiny provided by commissioners and 
parliamentary committees.  It must also be accepted that at times, individual 
privacy rights must be secondary to the absolute human right to life. 
 
The value of these powers has been evidenced through the thesis, and particularly 
emphasised by the professionals working within the policing and security 
agencies.  This point has also been given credibility by the many Governmental 
Committee hearings into law enforcements action.  Continually reports suggest 
that there is no shortage of individuals mounting or attempting to mount terrorist 
attacks.  This is further evidenced the 2015-2016 Europol TE-SAT report, which 
highlights during 2015, there were 103 terrorist incidents/plots in the UK resulting 
in 134 terrorist related arrests, with an additional 41 in the Republic of Ireland.874  
Throughout the EU, there were 211 terrorist attacks in 2015 and 1077 arrests 
made.875  The figures for the UK in particular do seem to be lower, given that in 
                                                
874 Europol (2016) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report TE-SAT 2016, Hague: Europol, p15 
875 Ibid 
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2014 there were 35 terrorist attacks and 77 arrests made.   In 2012 there were 84 
terrorist attacks but only 24 arrests.  This perhaps highlights the fact that UK law 
enforcement is becoming more effective all round, and could also illustrate the 
importance increased powers play in countering the terrorist threat.  
 
The consequences when terrorist acts are not prevented can be severe resulting in 
serious injury and death.  On the 16th April 2013 in the USA bombs exploded at 
the finish line of the Boston marathon killing three people and injuring over 170.  
Many of those injured included loss of limbs resulting in permanent disability.  In 
2013 a British soldier, Lee Rigby, was hacked to death outside Woolwich 
Barracks, in London.  The thesis has shown that the perpetrators were on security 
intelligence databases, but were not identified as major threats.  Regardless of 
this, these incidents can still occur because terrorist methods have changed and 
continue to do so.  The success in preventing complex plots is largely due to 
increased international co-operation between states however, the thesis reveals a 
major concern for intelligence and policing agencies, being the threat lone actors 
pose to the overall terrorist threat as they can go about undetected due to their 
low-level planning.  This was seen recently on the 14th July 2016 in Nice, France 
where a lone actor influenced by the Islamist narrative drove a heavy goods 
vehicle into the crowds watching the firework display on Nice’s promenade. 
  
It is low-level attacks that largely justifies why state agencies require powers to 
conduct bulk surveillance in to aspects of citizens’ lives where the need 
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necessitates it.  The above examples show however, that even when citizens’ are 
placed under a targeted surveillance authority, the lack of resources and financial 
pressures on law enforcement agencies’ means that individual suspects must be 
prioritised and often intelligence is missed, and targets lost.  It therefore follows 
that it would simply be impossible to monitor the entirety of Internet traffic and 
all UK citizens’, all of the time, despite the media’s portrayal of law 
enforcements’ arbitrary use of surveillance and detention powers.  In the EU, UK 
and the US the powers are not arbitrary.  Powers to conduct surveillance of 
electronic communications must be applied proportionately and within the rule of 
law.  These assertions, and increased powers of surveillance have resulted in an 
emphasis on privacy that has in turn resulted in the growth of commercial 
encryption; particularly in light of the fact lives are being increasingly lived 
online.876  Privacy advocates have therefore campaigned for reduced state powers 
or enhanced safeguards, to protect the individual from what they judge to be a 
surveillance state.877  In turn Governments seem to fear the possibility of the 
emergence of electronic communication channels they cannot monitor, and the 
possibility of losing intelligence powers.  Both sides of the divide see a future in 
which they lose control, where ‘privacy advocates look at a world in whichever 
more data is produced, aggregated and mined and the authorities fear 
                                                
876 See https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2016/10/31/884765/0/en/Encryption-Software-Market-
Expected-To-Reach-2-16-Billion-By-2020.html accessed 22 November 2016 
877 See https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/917 accessed 22 November 2016 
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developments such as universal default encryption, peer-to-peer networks and the 
dark net’.878   
 
The Government has the duty to protect and ensure citizens’ absolute Article 2 
ECHR right to life.  In doing so they intimately interfere with the citizens’ qualified 
Article 8 right to privacy under ECHR, and Article 7 and 8 under the CFR.  It is 
impossible for a citizen to use and access qualified rights if their Article 2 right is 
not protected.  Overall, the thesis evidenced that the balance in the UK between 
collective security and individual data privacy rights is properly stable because of 
the role of judicial review, judicial independence, and the scrutiny by 
commissioners and parliamentary committees. 
                                                
878 Supra as per D. Anderson Q.C. (2015) p.34 
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